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ABSTRACT
The aim of this thesis is to identify the financial characteristics of takeover targets in UK
for the period 1982-1990. An examination of the financial characteristics of the target
firms may bring about an immediate recognition of the motives of takeover activity. The
present study attempts to identify the financial characteristics of takeover target firms
both at an economy wide level  and at an industrial leveL
The thesis has been motivated primarily by the fact that there is no comprehensive study
examining mergers and acquisitions in the UK in the 1980s and particularly within an
industrial classification framework.
The present thesis provides a comprehensive study of merger and acquisition activity for the
UK over the period 1982-1990. The sample selected includes an initial population of 314
target firms, 603 bidder firms and a sample of 236 non- target firms matched by industry
with the target firms. The basic methodology is logit analysis.
The novelty of the economy wide study of mergers and acquisitions is as follows: the use of
multivariate logit for a study of the UK, the separation of the data into distinct estimation
(1982-1985) and validation (1986-1990) periods and the binomial choice problem is
differentiated into bidders versus targets and non targets versus targets.
The industry by industry study examines the following sectors: chemicals, construction,
food, electrical and electronics engineering and mechanical engineering. The present thesis
suggests that the financial characteristics of target firms vary between different industries.
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INTRODUCTION
Stanley B. Block (1969)
believes that merger candidates may be identified, to some extent,
through intensive industry analysis.
What the existing finance literature has failed to identify is whether the behaviour of
mergers and acquisitions depends on a characteristic of the industry or a characteristic of
the economy. The present thesis attempts to identify the financial characteristics of takeover
target firms both at an economy wide level and at an industrial level. An examination of the
financial characteristics of the target firms may bring about an immediate recognition of the
motives of takeover activity. In order to get a better understanding of the reasons and
motives' of the takeover activity there is a need to identify the financial characteristics of
the takeover target firms, in other words to derive the financial profile of potential takeover
candidates. Moreover, Robert J. Monroe (1973) argues that the successful identification
and classification of merged firms by financial characteristics alone could be of interest for
regulators of antitrust policy where they should be interested in the financial profile of
merged firms in their attempt to identify the overall economic impact of antitrust policy as it
affects mergers.
The existing finance literature has examined mergers and acquisitions under two basic areas,
the efficient markets framework and the examination of the financial characteristics of the
acquired firms. Within the efficient markets framework the market model and the capital
asset pricing model were the major tools of the researchers. The major objective of the
different studies under this framework was to examine the movement of abnormal returns to
the acquiring and acquired firms' shareholders 2 . The second area of research is the
1 The most common motives described and suggested in the existing literature are: economies of scale, growth,
diversification, market power, avoidance of bankruptcy, an ambition of some firms to limit competition or achieve
monopoly profits, a desire of some finns to achieve sufficient size to have efficient access to capital markets, a
desire of the shareholders to replace an existing management, a desire of managers to manage an over- growing set
of subordinates.
2 Thomas Hogarty (1970), James Ellert (1976), M. Firth (1979), Peter Dodd (1980), Paul H. Malatesta (1983),
Michael C. Jensen and Richard S. Ruback (1983), Paul Asquith (1983), Robert F. Bruner and David W. Mullins
(1983), T. Boone Pickens Jr (1985) , Richard H. Pettway and Takeshi Yamada (1986) , Gregg A. Jarrell and Annette
B. Poulsen (1989).
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examination of the financial characteristics of acquired firms based on accounting data
(through financial ratio analysis). MDA 3 (Multiple Discriminant Analysis) was used as a
major tool for the analysis of the financial characteristics of the firms under examination.
MDA4 has been used to estimate a discriminant function relating some financial
performance measures for a sample of non-acquired and acquired firms or acquiring and
acquired firms in an effort to classify firms as acquisition candidates.
The contribution of the thesis is as follows:
i) it provides a comprehensive study of M&A5 activity for the UK over the period 1982-
1990.
the sample selected which is drawn from the EXSTAT database and includes:
a) a population of target firms.
b) a population of bidder firms.
c) a sample of non- acquired firms6 matched by industry with the target firms.
the novelty of the economy wide study of M&A is:
a) the use of multivariate logie for a study of the UK.
b) the separation of the data into distinct estimation (1982-1985) and validation
periods (1986-1990)8.
c) the use of stepwise regression to specify the final modeL
d) the binomial choice problem is differentiated into bidders versus targets and non
3 Simkowitz and Monroe (1971), Tzoannos and Samuels (1972), D. Stevens (1973), Belkaoui (1978), Wansley and
Lane (1983), P. Rege (1984), P. Barnes (1989).
Robert A. Eisenbeis (1977) explains that MDA has several methodological problems which are analysed in chapter 3
of the present thesis.
5 M&A= merger and acquisition.
6 Non- acquired firms are not involved in mergers or acquisitions for the period under examination.
7 Logit and probit are methodologies where very limited research appears to exist in the finance literature. Dietrich
and Sorensen (1984), Joel Hasbrouck (1985), K. Palepu (1986), Ronnie J. Clayton and M. Andrew Fields (1991).
Probit analysis is developed but the models derived with probit analysis have the same significant variables as the
logit ones, therefore the results are not presented in the thesis.
8 In a theoretical paper G. Kemp (1995) justifies this approach.
G. Kemp (1995), Structural Stability in Duration Models, Department of Economics, University of Essex.
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targets9 versus targets. Singh (1971) has divided his sample into three groups as
well but he focuses his study on a univariate and discriminant analysis.
iv) the industry by industry study l° of M&A activity for the full sample period (1982-
1990). The thesis develops industry specific models for the following industrial
classifications:chemical, construction, food, electrical and electronics engineering
and mechanical engineering. The industry specific models provide information
about the financial profiles of takeover targets by industry.
The outline of the present thesis can be described as follows.
Chapter 1 investigates the different theories of mergers and acquisitions with related
empirical evidence. Initially, there is an analysis for the theories that are actually tested in
the present thesis namely: profitability theory, inefficient management theory, leverage
theory and liquidity theory. All these theories are financial in nature. Then, there is a
discussion of the most important economic and other financial theories: avoidance of
bankruptcy as a motive for merger, monopoly theory (market power), economies of scale,
growth, diversification, tax loss carry forward and synergy. Moreover, another section is
discussing the theories that are directly related to the stock market (increase in market value
per share, payout theory and the P/E ratio and the undervaluation of the assets). Finally, in
this chapter there is an overview of the merger activity in an attempt to identify the motives
of mergers and acquisitions through time and identify what theories are related to each of
these merger waves. Moreover the different merger waves will give an indication as to
which industries participated in each wave. The contribution of chapter 1 is to identify the
existing theories concerning mergers and acquisitions so as to provide the theoretical basis
for the formulation of the hypotheses that are developed in chapter 2. Moreover, chapter 1
provides the rationale for the choice of the industries under examination through the
overview of merger waves.
9 A non target firm is a firm which is neither a bidder nor a target firm for the period under examination.
Dietrich and Sorensen (1984) suggest that the sample choice and variable definitions account for the different
effects of industry variation on measures of firm characteristics, which can vary substantially across industries.
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Chapter 2 reviews the existing literature behind the topic of predicting takeover targets and
analyses the various limitations of the previous studies. Moreover, chapter 2 analyses the
different postulates or hypotheses that have been put forward to be examined by the
present thesis. The hypotheses under examination are the following: profitability, inefficient
management, financial leverage, corporate liquidity and research and development. The
hypotheses are examined individually under two parts : the discrimination between " target "
firms against "bidder " firms and the discrimination of the financial characteristics of
target "firms against "non-acquire& " firms. The overall contribution of chapter 2 is to
identify the limitations of previous studies and to describe the different hypotheses that are
tested in the present thesis.
Chapter 3 describes the methodologies adopted in the present thesis. Initially, there is a
discussion of the limitations of discriminant analysis. Then, there is an analysis of the
techniques employed in the present thesis, logit analysis and probit analysis. In addition, the
chapter describes the 38 financial accounting ratios that are employed in the present thesis.
These ratios belong into the following groups of ratios: profitability, efficiency, liquidity,
leverage and capital expenditure. An appendix which is important for the present thesis and
it is directly related to chapter 3 is Appendix II which describes factor analysis and stepwise
regression analysis. These two techniques have been employed in the present thesis in an
attempt to reduce the number of the variables under investigation without losing the complete
set of information12 . Stepwise regression analysis proved to be a satisfactory technique in
selecting the significant variables for the empirical analysis. Factor analysis was not
fundamentally useful as it was replaced by stepwise regression analysis. However, many of the
variables selected were quite important in the factor analysis. In addition, factor analysis did
provide some information of the relative importance of the different dimensions under
investigation. The major contribution of chapter 3 is to provide the rationale for the choice
of logit analysis as an appropriate statistical method for the present thesis.
11 Non bidder / non target firms.
12 The 38 ratios used are highly collinear which means that they could not all be used in the logit and probit to
discriminate either between bidders and targets or between non targets and targets.
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Chapter 4 describes the data that has been employed in the present thesis. The sample
consists of firms from the chemical, construction, food, electrical and electronics
engineering and mechanical engineering sectors. The data is associated with potential
bidder firms and potential target firms as well as firms that were not involved in the
takeover activity during the period 1982-1990 ( non targets/ non bidders) within the U. K .
Graphical mean analysis is provided both at the economy wide level as well as by industry.
This provides a justification of the industry analysis considered in the chapter 6, though the
limitations of descriptive analysis are recognised. The contribution of chapter 4 is to identify
at a preliminary stage the financial characteristics of the groups under examination at the
economy wide level as well as by industry through graphical mean analysis.
Chapter 5 presents and discusses the multivariate models on the economy wide samplen
when the groups under investigation are firstly bidders against targets and secondly non
targets against targets. The contribution of the chapter is to isolate the financial
characteristics of target firms at the economy wide sample.
Chapter 6 presents and discusses the multivariate models by industry when the groups
under investigation are firstly bidders against targets and secondly non targets against
targets. The contribution of the chapter is to isolate the financial characteristics of target
firms by industry.
Chapter 7 concludes the thesis and also provides suggestions for further research.
13 The economy wide sample for the present thesis includes firms from the following industries: chemical,
construction, food, electrical and electronics engineering and mechanical engineering.
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CHAPTER 1
REVIEW OF THEORIES OF MERGERS
"The various motives for takeovers suggest a variety of financial
characteristics possessed by the ideal target firm. Hypothesised motivations for
takeovers include increased market power, reduced costs through economies of
scale, acquisition of undervalued assets, acquisition of liquid assets, the
resolution of an imbalance between the target firm's investment opportunities
and its financial resources, diversification resulting in lower risk of failure,
significant modification of capital structure, and a variety of managerial
motives. These motivations are not independent of one another which makes
the testing of alternative theories problematic. Thus, it is not surprising that
the empirical evidence simultaneously supports many differing theories of
takeovers."
Jon W. Bartley and Calvin M. Boardman, (1990).
1.1 Introduction
The objectives of this chapter are to analyse and investigate the different theories of mergers
and acquisitions with related empirical evidence and to investigate the merger waves so as
to give an insight as to what were the key factors that motivated these waves. It seems from
the statement provided by Jon W. Bartley and Calvin M. Boardman (1990) that a lot of
theories have been put forward to explain the phenomenon of mergers and acquisitions but
the finance literature faces a problem. The problem is to identify and justify a theoretical
framework for mergers and acquisitions. The reason is that the three basic decisions
(investment, financing and dividend decision) of finance are linked with mergers and
acquisitions.
The present chapter describes the theories of mergers and acquisitions under three different
sections. The first section describes the financial theories of mergers and acquisitions
namely: profitability theory, the inefficient management theory, the leverage theory and the
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liquidity theory. All of these theories provide the basis for the empirical modelling for the
present thesis. The second section describes the basic economic theories together with other
financial theories of mergers and acquisitions namely: avoidance of bankruptcy as a motive
for merger, monopoly theory (market power), economies of scale theory, growth,
diversification, tax loss carry forward, synergy. The third section provides a brief analysis of
the theories of mergers associated with the stock market.
Finally, the chapter gives an overview of the different merger waves that appeared in the
present finance literature. The analysis of the different merger waves will give an indication
about the fiuidamental motives that caused these mergers and the industries that participated
in these waves.
1.2 The Financial theories of Mergers and Acquisitions
1.2.1 Profitability Theory
Thomas Hogarty (1970) and Ajit Singh (1992) suggest that mergers have a neutral impact
on profitability. Ajit Singh (Jan. 1992) argues that there is empirical evidence that despite
the big merger waves of the early 1970s and of the 1980s, both for US and UK research
shows that mergers either have a negative or neutral effect on profitability. Steven (1973)
and Kuehn (1975) found that U.K acquired firms had low profitability. Moreover, M. Firth
(1979) carried out a research on the profitability of takeovers and mergers in U.K He
supports that maximising management utility in the form of growth and size is perhaps a
more important influence in many firms than the alternative theory of profit maximisation.
1.2.2 Inefficient Management Theory - The Market for Corporate Control
The theory of the "market for corporate control" considers take-overs as a controlling
mechanism for managers who operate their firms in ways that do not maximise profits and it
is a mechanism that promotes economic efficiency by reallocating the targets assets to better
managed firms where assets will be utilised more efficiently. The market for corporate
control seems to be a very important issue for mergers and acquisitions. Henry G. Manne
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(1965), Michael C. Jensen and Richard S. Ruback (1983), Paul Asquith (1983), G. D.
Hancock and M. Mougoue (1991) and Ajit Singh (Jan. 1992) support that the "market for
corporate control" through takeovers is a mechanism for disciplining managers who
operate their firms in ways that do not maximise profits. Henry G. Manne (1965) supports
that if a firm has inefficient management the market price of the shares is lower when
compared to the market price of the shares of other firms in the same industry or relative to
the whole market. The lower the share price, relative to what it could be with more efficient
management, the more attractive the takeover becomes to the efficient management team of
the potential bidder. In addition, Henry G. Manne (1965) advocates that the market for
corporate control implies a number of important advantages such as lessening the wasteful
bankruptcy proceedings, more efficient management of corporations and generally a more
efficient allocation of resources. Within the context of the market for corporate control and
mergers Henry G. Manne (1965) believes that mergers may be a valuable asset which is
independent of any interest in either economies of scale or monopoly profits and that many
mergers are probably the result of this market. Ajit Singh (January 1992) discusses the
market for corporate control and supports that large corporations in a modem economy
suffer from an acute 'agency' problem. This arises because of incomplete contracts,
asymmetric information between shareholders and managers, and the organisational
requirements for the efficient functioning of the modem corporation, the managers
inevitably have a great deal of discretion. This discretion can, and often is, used by
managers to pursue their own ends (e.g. perks, empire building) to the detriment of their
shareholders. The market for corporate control provides the only means by which inefficient
managers or those who do not promote shareholders interest can be disciplined. Therefore,
the free operation of the takeover mechanism can benefit society through two distinct
channels: firstly the threat of take-overs can discipline inefficient management and reduce
'agency costs' and secondly even if the firms were working efficiently, take-overs may lead
to a reorganisation of their productive resources and thereby enhance shareholder value. In
addition, Griffin James M. et. al. (1992) support that firms which are under financial
restructuring, emphasise that takeovers basically address agency concerns. P. H. Malatesta
(1983) supports that under the improved- management hypothesis a period of inefficient
management is a prerequisite for merger. When investors realise that inefficient policies are
being pursued, they will also realise that the firm is an acquisition candidate.
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1.2.2.1 Management acting for their own interest against shareholder interest l .
Managers are acting for their own interest against their shareholder interest when they will
decide if their firm will takeover another firm. Margotta D. G. (1989) advocates that some
researchers warned that the separation of ownership from control might enable controlling
managers to increase their own wealth at the expense of shareholders.
Empirical evidence concerning the notion that managers act for their own benefit and to the
detriment of their shareholders' is conflicting. Some researchers believe that mergers are
planned and executed by managers who thereby maximise their own utility [ T. Boone
Pickens Jr. (1985), Fridrich Trautwein (1990), H. Nejat Seyhum (1990) ] instead of their
shareholders' value and that some managers do not consider takeovers as a mean of
enhancing shareholder value but sometimes they view them as a threat to their personal
benefits (e.g. salaries and perquisites). Beside this, Victor Pastena and William Ruland
(1986) found that distressed firms with high ownership concentration (or owner control)
show an increase tendency to merge rather than to declare bankruptcy and believe that the
self-interest of managers, rather than just the interests of shareholders and creditors, seems
to help motivate the merger/ bankruptcy choice. The results are consistent with the
hypothesis that the self-interest of managers seems to be at least partly responsible for the
merger/ bankruptcy choice. On the other hand, there are some studies that support that
managers act rationally [ Yakov Amihud et. al. (1986), Ronald M. Giammarino and Robert
L. Heinkel (1986) ] when they will decide about a potential merger and that they do not act
against their shareholders' interest and sometimes managers approve some merger
proposals because they want to reduce the firm's risk.
Richard Roll (1986) develops the so called "Hubris Hypothesis" where under this
hypothesis decision makers in bidder firms pay too much for their targets on average in the
samples under examination. Richard Roll supports that potential bids are abandoned
whenever the bidder firm's valuation of the target turns up with a figure below the current
market price and that bids are rendered when the valuation exceeds the price. If there are no
gains in takeovers, hubris is necessary to explain why managers do not abandon these bids
also since reflection would suggest that such bids are likely to represent positive errors in
valuation. Richard Roll (1986) then says that hubris hypothesis might seem to imply that
managers act consciously against shareholders interest by issuing bids founded on mistaken
1 The present thesis will treat this issue in isolation and under the =thrall& of the nuutet for corporate control.
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estimates of target firm value. Regarding this issue, H. Nejat Seyhum (1990) examines the
conflict-of-interest hypothesis which predicts that bidder managers will knowingly overpay
for target firms and engage in activities that benefit them personally even if they reduce
share prices and subsequently shareholders' wealth. The findings of H. Nejat Seyhum's
(1990) research were that share price evidence regarding the wealth effects of takeover
activity for bidder firms is mixed and does not provide a clear answer to whether the bidder
managers undertake takeover activity for their own benefit. Moreover, Yakov Amihud et.
al. (1986) suggest that mergers are motivated by the manager's desire to reduce the firm's
risk
1.2.3 Leverage Theory
According to Jack 0. Vance (1969), Ronald E. Shrieves and Mary M. Pashley (1984)
acquisition candidates are characterised by excess debt capacity which means that a merger
produces debt capacity for the post-merger firm which exceeds the firms combined
premerger debt capacities. Stevens2 (1973) found that leverage was important in explaining
takeovers and that acquired firms are characterised by low leverage. Ronald E. Shrieves and
Mary M. Pashley (1984) in examining the increased debt capacity incentive state that
merger may result in a decrease in the likelihood of default at premerger debt levels, thus
creating debt capacity for the post-merger firm which exceeds the firms combined
premerger debt capacities. These findings are consistent with the existence of merger-
related incentives to increase financial leverage for a significant subset of merging firms.
There is a potential for increased debt capacity and/ or wealth shifting by the management
of acquiring firms. The terms of purchase of the acquired firm were consistent with an
immediate increase in leverage in the merging entities.
1.2.4 Liquidity Theory
Firms which have excess cash and do not have profitable investment opportunities to invest
are easy targets for takeover. On the other hand, firms in need of finds that want to finance
their working capital requirements are likely to be takeover targets because the bidder is
2 The financial leverage measure in Steven's study (1973) study was the most significant indicator in both the
univariate and multivariate models.
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expected to bring additional funds to improve the liquidity position of the target firm. Jack
0. Vance (1969), Simkowitz and Monroe (1971), Stevens (1973) and Rege 3
 (1984)
support that target firms have a very good liquidity position when compared to then non-
acquired firms. H. Kent Baker et. al. (1981) had as one of their objectives to examine the
opinions of corporate executives involved in mergers and acquisitions regarding specific
issues about business combinations. Some of the executives believed that business
combinations provide an effective means of investing surplus cash.
1.3 The Economic Theories of Mergers and Acquisitions
- Other Financial Theories
1.3.1 Avoidance of Bankruptcy as a motive for Merger
Companies that face liquidity problems and may declare bankruptcy sometimes prefer to
merge. This is the so called, theory of bankruptcy avoidance as rationale for mergers. Robert
A. Haugen and Terence C. Langetieg (1975) believe that a merger may raise the
profitability of a depressed firm in poor financial condition and significantly reduce the risk
of bankruptcy. In addition, Ronald E. Shrieves and Donald L. Stevens (1979) examine
financial data for samples of acquired and non- acquired firms and established that the data was
consistent with the theory of bankruptcy avoidance as a rationale for mergers. They found that
many cases of severe financial crisis among large firms are resolved through the merger process.
Therefore, this process contributes to the efficiency with which resources are reallocated to more
productive ends and this process serves a valuable function in the economy. Furthermore,
Ronald E. Shrieves and Donald L. Stevens (1979) set forth a number of possible reasons for
preferring merger over bankruptcy. These include avoidance of bankruptcy legal and
administrative costs4 and the fact that on a going concern (in a merger) the value of the firm
is greater than liquidation value if the bankruptcy progresses. Moreover, Victor Pastena and
William Ruland (1986) found that distressed firms that merge have lower financial leverage
and are larger than firms that enter bankruptcy.
3 Rege (1984) believes that very liquid firms will be attractive takeover candidates at low valuation ratios.
4 Henry G. Manne (1965) suggests that the market for corporate control among other things implies the advantage of
lessening the wasteful bankruptcy proceedings.
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1.3.2 Monopoly Theory - Market Power
Monopoly theory basically promotes market power. The desire to create substantial market
power is a significant motivation for a merger. A firm is a potential takeover candidate if
that firm has a dominant market position in an attractive growth sector of the economy.
Market power gives firms the ability to determine the prices of their products, usually above
the competitive equilibrium level. Industrial organisation typically considers market power
within the context of the horizontal', vertical6 or conglomerate' mergers. Evidence in
favour of market power within the context of M&A 8 activity has been presented by Ajit
Singh (Jan. 1992) and Severin Borenstein (1990). Severin Borenstein (1990) examined
airline mergers and found that these mergers have created substantial market power for the
acquiring firm. Additionally, Ajit Singh (Jan. 1992) argues that mergers can increase market
power even if there were few or no mergers, purely as a result of the normal growth process
of firms. Moreover, Ajit Singh supports that if there is a high incidence of mergers, this
does not necessarily indicate any increase in industrial concentration or monopoly power.
This is because changes in concentration are a function of a number of variables other than
just mergers or variations in the normal growth rates of firms. According to Ajit Singh this
point is particularly significant for merger policy in the most recent period since there is
empirical evidence that despite the big merger waves of the early 1970s and of the 1980s,
there has been little increase in industrial concentration either in the US or in the UK during
the last two decades. Ajit Singh explains that many industrial organisation economists have
argued in favour of much tighter policy on mergers because since mergers can lead to
increased market power, and since they do not on average seem to produce a greater
efficiency in the utilisation of resources, they should be subject to strict regulation.
Evidence against market power within the context of M&A activity has been presented by
Michael C. Jensen and Richard S. Ruback (1983) where they support that the gains created
by corporate takeovers do not appear to come from the creation of market power.
Moreover, B. Espen Eckbo (1983) when examining horizontal mergers has found no
significant evidence that proposed horizontal mergers are expected to produce a significant
5 Two firms which operate in the same line of business merge.
6 Two firms which operate in different levels of production merge together.
7 Two firms which operate in unrelated business activities merge together.
8 M&A= Merger and Acquisition.
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expansion of the merging firm's share of the market along with an increase in industry rate
of output.
1.3.3 Economies of Scale Theory
Economies of scale is one of the most prevailing motives for mergers and occur in a specific
firm when the average cost declines with increases in volume. An alternative explanation of
economies of scale could be that due to an increase in the size of the firm, total costs
decrease and long-run average costs fall. Within the context of M&A activity economies of
scale can be achieved with a merger of two firms because economies of scale is associated
with the increase in size of the firm. Economies of scale can perhaps best be realised with a
horizontal merger as it eliminates duplicate facilities. Hunter W. C. and Wall L. D. (1989)
support that banks that acquire other banks are sometimes motivated by the fact that they
want to achieve economies of scale in the production of financial services.
1.3.4 Growth
Growth is another legitimate motive for mergers and acquisitions. A firm may acquire
assets of another firm at low cost and may avoid the risk which is associated with the
development of a new product through acquisition of a firm, that has already developed a
specific product. It is usually quicker to acquire new products and facilities through mergers
than through internal development. External growth may take the form of the acquisition of
research capabilities of another firm. M. Firth (1971) advocated the view that takeovers and
mergers can be viewed as a major reason for the growth of the firms in the environment of
the modem business life. Before describing the motive of growth the following question
can be raised.
"What is the better way to achieve growth, through internal expansion or external expansion
(e.g. merger activity) ?
"A firm may not be able to grow at a fast or balanced enough rate by internal
expansion and may find that its only way of achieving a desired growth rate is
by acquiring other firms". James C. Van Horne (1983 pp 603-628)
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The acquiring firm may be unable to achieve growth or develop such prerequisites for
growth on its own. Therefore, the acquiring firm is likely to acquire another firm. Besides
this, the acquiring firm may be motivated to acquire another firm because the target firm
holds basic patents and only for that reason the target firm is valuable. In certain cases,
growth in sales, assets, and total earnings appears to have substituted maximisation of
shareholder wealth as the primary goal of the firm. Under such circumstances, mergers
obviously are attractive, because in most cases growth can be achieved more easily through
external acquisitions than it can be, through internal development. Douglas Kuehn (1975)
believes that it is anticipated that the firm's growth rate of net assets will negatively
influence the probability that it is acquired. That is, the past growth record of a firm is
expected to affect the probability that the firm is acquired through its influence on the
valuation ratio9 . Thus the historical record of earnings and growth rate of a firm should
provide different sorts of indicators of the past performance of the firm and hence a basis
for the market to assess its value. Furthermore Douglas Kuehn (1975) says that Marrisl°
(1964) has noted the possibility that firms attempting to maximise their growth rate may
become takeover candidates because of the choice of an "excessive" growth target caused
loss of control and consequently failure to meet the profits constraint imposed through the
valuation ratio. Marris has argued that survival is dependent upon adopting a growth
maximising policy and that firms which do otherwise will be those which fail to survive.
Evidence in favour of the growth motive within the context of M&A activity has been
presented by H. Kent Baker et. al. (1981) where they had examined the opinions of
corporate executives involved in mergers and acquisitions regarding specific issues about
business combinations. One of the two important merger motives that they had identified
was to affect a more rapid growth. Mergers and acquisitions provide a faster means of
growth and it was preferred to the growth that is generated through internal expansion.
Sometimes growth by acquisition can be achieved with less money than achieving internal
growth through internal expansion.
" Internal expansion takes longer and is often more expensive; and the penalty
for mistakes would be higher since firms could only liquidate their mistakes
by selling off individual assets piecemeal rather than as a part of a going
concern ". Edith Penrose (1980 pp. 179-180)
9 Man-is (1964) , The Economic Theory of Managerial Capitalism defines the valuation ratio as stock- market value of
a firm's equity capital over the book value of its net equity assets.
" Marris (1964), The Economic Theory of Managerial Capitalism.
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Howard I. Bernstein (1988) analyses mergers and acquisitions in the food processing
industry and when he asked the president of Curtice- Burns Foods Inc., a firm that
specialises in buying businesses, the president of the firm Mr. McDonald answered that the
three most important reasons one firm buys another are: firstly acquiring a going concern
may produce an immediate increase in income from sales to an established customer group
and may also allow for elimination of expenses. Secondly buying is cheaper than making If
you want to own a supermarket operation 1,000 miles from your firm headquarters, it may
be cheaper, faster, and easier to buy an existing chain than to burn up mileage, money, and
time in site selection, construction, and introductory promotion. Finally, an undiscovered
bargain. That is many times there is a business that is been doing well for years, but no one
has ever approached the owner with a purchase offer. Therefore, putting it all together, an
acquisition or merger produces faster growth, both in gaining new geographical sales
territory and in reaching the stage where an expanding firm becomes important to major
suppliers and simultaneously obtains additional customer segments and new distribution
channels.
1.3.5 Diversification
Diversification is the primary motive for conglomerate mergers. By acquiring a firm in a
different line of business, a firm may be able to minimise uncertainty in its profits. The main
problem with diversification is that diversification is easier and cheaper to be achieved for
the shareholders rather than the corporation. The shareholder can achieve diversification by
buying more shares of different firms.
But how can the firm achieve diversification?
"In the case of conglomerate mergers, however where economies were not so
evident, diversification seems to be more important motive. Firms would use
acquisitions to divert assets from their own industry, which they perceived to
be without much potential for growth and attempt to branch into others ".
Baruch Lev 11
Yakov Amihud et. al. (1986) in an examination of conglomerate mergers suggested that
such mergers are motivated by the manager's desire to reduce the firm's risk. On the other
hand, Richard H. Pettway and Takeshi Yamada (1986) in an examination of mergers in
"Joel M. Stern and Donald H. Chew, Jr. (1987), The Revolution in Corporate Finance, Basil Blackwell.(p.361).
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Japan found little support for the view that mergers reduce either systematic or
unsystematic risks of the acquiring firms.
1.3.6 Tax Loss Carry Forward
Baruch Lev 12 and Van Home James C. (1983) support that many times a firm may have
cumulative tax losses and may not have prospect of earning enough in the future in order to
utilise fully its tax loss carry forward. Therefore, if this firm merges with a profitable firm, it
may be possible for the surviving firm to utilise filly the tax loss carry forward. This can be
considered as an economic gain for the surviving firm, which gain is made at the expense of
the government that cannot be realised by either firm separately. Tax loss carry forward can
provide a tax shield for the acquiring firm.
1.3.7 Synergy
Synergy may form part of the "Efficiency "theory. Efficiency theory views mergers as the
mean to accomplish synergy. The value of the combined firm V (bidder target) exceeds the value
of the individual firms (Vbidder + Vtarget) brought together by the merger. Therefore with
synergy V(bidder+ target) Vbidder + Vtarget • Merger synergy implies that the post-merger benefits
will exceed the sum of the separate operations of the merging firms. These benefits may
occur immediately or develop over time. This explanation is often used by the acquiring firm
managers to justify acquisition payments (or premium payments) which exceed the
premerger market values of the target firms.
Synergy is evident [ Robert A. Haugen and Terence C. Langetieg (1975), Hunter W. C. and
Wall L. D. (1989) ] in some mergers because it makes possible the entry of some firms into
new product lines which change the level of the firm's profitability and improve efficiency as
well. Elazar Berkovitch and M. P. Narayanan (1990) develop an asymmetric-information
model and they found that the fraction of synergy captured by the target decreases with the
level of total synergy. Moreover, the higher the cash component, the lower the fraction of
synergy captured by the target. Furthermore, Chatterjee Sayan's (1992) study proposes that
12 Joel M. Stern and Donald IL Chew, Jr. (1987), The Revolution in Corporate Finance, Basil Blackwell.(pp. 359-
360).
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value from takeovers can be created by synergy or restructuring, suggesting that only if the
synergy element is prevailing, then the target firm must accept the offer. Evidence against
synergy within the context of M&A activity has been experienced by B. Espen Eckbo
(1983) when examining horizontal mergers found no significant evidence that the 'synergy'
effect is expected to produce a significant expansion of the merging firm's share of the
market along with an increase in industry rate of output. Besides this, William J. Best and
Ron E. Seger (1989) analyse the synergy benefits in distribution systems and support the
view that although mergers and acquisitions are executed to generate synergistic benefits
from the amalgamation of distribution systems, the results are often unsatisfactory.
Synergy may be classified as financial or operational or managerial.
According to Fridrich Trautwein (1990) financial synergies result in lower costs of capitaL
Fridrich Trautwein suggested that the different ways to achieve this is by lowering the
systematic risk of a firm's investment portfolio by investing in unrelated businesses,
increasing the firm's size, which may give it access to cheaper capital or establishing an
internal capital market which may operate on superior information and therefore allocate
capital more efficiently.
Synergy may be operational (e.g. production economies). A vertical combination of firms
can create operating economies. Specifically operating economies can arise when the
activities of one firm in a way supplements the activities of the other firm. Therefore, with
operating economies duplicate facilities can be eliminated at a great extent. In other words,
firms' operations can be consolidated. In an airline merger, the principal objective is to
realise economies of operation through elimination of duplicate facilities and flights.
Nicholas A. H. Stacey (1970) supports that technical research and development can be
viewed as major causes of many mergers, since technical research and development are
associated with rising costs. When a number of firms are researching towards identical
product objectives, resources of manpower and finance can be saved by avoiding
duplication of activities. This is one of the most significant reasons why research and
development expenditure, as well as administration costs can be successfully minimised with
horizontal mergers. Therefore, a proposed merger will carry out a specific research and
development programme more efficiently and with low costs.
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Fridrich Trautwein (1990) supports that operational synergies may lower the cost of the
involved business units or may enable the firm to offer unique products and services. These
potential advantages have to be weighted against the cost of combining or transferring
assets. Moreover, Sullivan M.J. et. al. (1990) advocated that takeover gains arise apparently
from the realisation of operating synergies or management related efficiencies. They
suggest that the acquiring firm would pay a premium to obtain an interest in the firm
sufficient to obtain operating control but would not pay premiums to obtain ownership
beyond this level of control. Another study developed by Stephen A. Rhoades (1993) found
that horizontal bank mergers during 1981-1986 did not generally result in efficiency gains.
Managerial synergies 13 are realised when the management team of the acquiring firm is
superior when compared with the management team of the acquired firm_ It is true that
many firms employ inefficient management. When a firm is badly managed then its assets
may not be fully utilised. Therefore, when a firm has inefficient management then it should
seek to replace its management. Takeovers can be the control mechanism where a firm faces
the problem of inefficient management 14 . For example, the managers of firm "B"(this firm
employs efficient managers) will persuade the shareholders of firm "T" (this firm employs
inefficient managers) that if they managed the assets of firm "T" then the results of
shareholders will be greater than at present.
13 Michael J. S et. al. (1990) advocated that takeover gains arise apparently from the realisation of management
related efficiencies.
14 The inefficient management theory has been discussed extensively before.
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1.4 Theories of mergers and the stock market
One of the important merger motives directly linked to the stock market is to increase the
market value per share 15 of the firm. H. Kent Baker et. al. (1981) found that an important
merger motive was to increase the market value of the firm. In addition, it is generally held
that a firm with low PIE ratio will be more prone to a bid. Thus a low PIE ratio implies a
low future growth rate, and hence takeover bids could arise from bidders who believe they
could improve performance There is strong evidence (Jack 0. Vance (1969), Simkowitz
and Monroe (1971), Tzoannos and Samuels (1972), Harris et al (1982) and Wansley and
Lane (1983) ) that the most common short term financial strategy was the use of acquisition
as a tool to boost EPS by acquiring firms with lower PIE ratios 16 because for a high PIE
ratio in the acquired firm means that the acquiring firm would be paying a high price for the
current earnings. Finally, according to Tzoannos and Samuels (1972), Marris 17 found that
acquired firms are those that are undervalued by the market. Furthermore Tzoannos and
Samuels (1972) state that the undervaluation of assets was explored by Gort (1969) 18 who
found that the level of takeover activity varied according to the degree of share
undervaluation in the market.
Po	
(1+ Ke)t
Dt: dividend expected at the end of period t.
Ke: the required rate of return of investors in a stock of the risk involved.
The case for a higher valuation after a merger than before must be based upon raising the level of expected future
dividends per share in the numerator, lowering the required rate of return Ke, in the denominator, or some
combination of the two. The first primarily involves increasing earnings per share over what they would otherwise
be; the second involves reducing the risk to investors.
16 This P/E ratio is determined by dividing the market price of the share over the earnings per share of the firm.
Marris (1964), The Economic Theory of Managerial Capitalism.
18 Go • ,ri m (1969), An Economic Disturbance Theory of Mergers, Quarterly Journal of Economics.
15 We know that the share price can be expressed as:
Dt
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1.5 Historical overview of merger activity
The first merger wave (See Table 1.5-1) took place between 1895-1904 and during this
period the greatest merger activity occurred. This trend was constituted primarily by
horizontal mergers and resulted in high concentration in many industries. The industries
participating in that wave were metals and metal products, fabricated metal products, food
and food products, non-electrical machinery, transportation equipment, tobacco, chemicals,
petroleum products, machinery and bituminous coal. The major motives behind that wave
were economies of scale in production, distribution, administration and marketing. In
addition, another characteristic of that period is that of the creation of monopoly in the
market. Patrick A. Gaugham (1991) advocates that financial factors forced the end of the
first merger wave: i) the shipbuilding trust collapse in the early 1900s brought to the force
the dangers of fraudulent financing, the stock market crash of 1904, the Banking
Panic of 1907 which closed many of the nation's banks.
Author Alexandra M. Post
(1994)
Patrick A.
Gaugham (1991)
J. Fred Weston,
Kwang S. Chunk
and Susan E. Hoag
(1990)
Conclusion
Merger Wave I
• Duration • 1898-1902/4 • 1897-1904 • 1895-1904 • 1895-1904
• Merger • HorizontaL • Horizontal. • Horizontal • Horizontal
Structure/Character.
• Industries • Metals. • Metals. • Metals.
participating. • Metal products. • Food products. • Metal products.
• Food. • Petroleum • Fabricated
	 metal
• Non-electrical products. products.
machinery. • Chemicals. • Food.
• Transportation • Transportation • Food products.
equipment- equiPment • Non-electrical
• Tobacco. • Fabricated mathinery.
• Chemicals. metal products. • Transportation
• Machinery. equiPment-
• Bituminous coal. • Tobacco.
• Chemicals.
• Petroleum
products.
• Machinery.
• Bituminous coaL
• Motives.
• Economies of Scale. • Ecmomies of Scale
• Economies of Scale • Economies of scale
• Specialisation.
•
in production and
distributim.
Creation of
monopoly in the
market.
in	 production,
administration	 and
marketing.
distribution.
•
in	 productim
distribution,
administration	 and
marketing.
Creation of
monopoly in the
market.
Table 1.5-1 Merger Wave I
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The second merger wave (See Table 1.5-2) took place between 1916-1929. The structure
of the mergers were vertical. The industries participating in that wave were public utilities,
banking, food processing, retailing, chemicals, mining manufacturing, primary metals,
petroleum products and transportation equipment. The major motives behind that wave
were product extension and efficiencies, marketing refinement and extension, creation of
national sales and marketing teams. In addition, another characteristic of that period is that
of merging for oligopoly and achieving technological economies. J. Fred Weston et. al.
(1990) support that the second wave of mergers ended with the onset of a severe economic
slowdown in 1929. Patrick A. Gaugham (1991), advocates that rather than monopolies, the
result was often an oligopolistic industry structure.
Author Alexandra M. Post
(1994)
Patrick A.
Gaugharn (1991)
J. Fred Weston,
Kwang S. Chunk
and Susan E. Hoag
(1990)
Conclusion
Merger Wave II
• Duratim • 1919/22-1929 • 1916-1929 • 1922-1929 • 1916 419)1(22)-
1929.
• Merger • Vertical. • Vertical • Vertical • Vertical
Structure/Character.
• Industries • Public utilities. • Manufacturing. • Public utilities. • Public utilities.
participating. • Banking Industry. • Mining. • Banking. • Banking.
• Food Processing. • Public utilities • Food Processing • Food Processing
• Mailing. • Banking. • Chemicals. • Retailing.
• Chemicals. • Primary metals. • is.fming Sectors. • Chemicals.
• Mining. • Petroleum products. • Mining.
• Food products. • Manufacturing.
• Chemicals. • Primary metAls.
• Transportation • Petroleum products.
equipment • Transportation
equiPment-
• Motives.
• Production
• Merging
	
for • Product extension.
•
product	 extension
efficiencies. oligopoly. • Market extension. and efficiencies.
• Marketing
refmement.
• Technological
economies.
• Marketing
refmement	 and
• Creation of natimal
sales and marketing
teams,
•
e:xtensiois
Creation of national
sales and marketing
teams.
• Merging
	
for
oligopoly.
• Tecimological
economies.
Table 1.5-2 Merger Wave H
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The third merger wave (See Table 1.5-3) took place between 1940-1947. This is the post-
war growth development with an economic environment where there was a strong
regulatory impetus. The industries participating in that wave were electricals which emerged
as a merger-intensive industry. The major motives behind that wave were efforts to avoid
government wartime price controls and other regulations as well as income and estate taxes
compared to relatively low capital gains taxes. Also, larger firms acquired smaller, privately
held firms for motives of tax relief and product extensions reasons. Patrick A. Gaugham
(1991) supports the view that this merger wave did not feature any major technological
changes or dramatic development in the nation's infrastructure.
Author Alexandra M. Post
(1994)
Patrick A.
Gaugharn (1991)
J. Fred Weston,
Kwang S. Chunk
and Susan E. Hoag
(1990)
Conclusion
Merger Wave DI
• Duraticn • 1940-1947 • 1940s • 1940-1947 • 1940-1947.
• Merger • Post-war growth. • The author does not • Rapid growth of the • Post-war growth.
Structure/Character. • Regulatory
impetus.
give any particular
information
economy and an
upsurge in merger
activity.
• Regulatory
impetus.
• Industries
paiticipatin&
• Electricals. • The author does not
give any particular
informatim
• The author does not
give any particular
information
• Electric-als
• Motives. • Eft'orts to avoid
government wartime
price controls and
• Larger
	
firms
acquired	 smaller,
privately held firms
• Govemmaa
regulation	 and tax
policies.
• Efforts to avoid
government wartime
price controls and
her regulations as
well as income and
estate taxes
compared to
relatively low
capital gains taxes.
for motives of tax
reief.
• Product extmsim. other regulations as
well as income and
estate taxes
compared to
relatively low
capital gains taxes.
• Larger	 firms
acquired	 smaller,
privately held firms
for motives of tax
relief.
• Government
regulation	 and tax
policies.
• Product extensim.
Table 1.5-3 Merger Wave HI
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The fourth merger wave (See Table 1.5-4) took place between 1960-1969. J. Fred Weston
et. al. (1990) support that merger activity reached its historically highest level during the
three year period of 1967 through 1969 (booming period for the economy). The number of
mergers declined sharply as the general economic activity slowed down after 1969.
Moreover, they support that during this wave a number of firms sought to diversify in the
attempt to acquire access to the new technologies that had developed after World War II.
Patrick A. Gaugham (1991) supports that in this merger wave smaller firms targeted larger
firms for acquisition. Besides this, Patrick A. Gaugham (1991) supports that this period was
characterised by the rapid growth of management science which developed methodologies
that facilitate organisational management and that could theoretically be applied to a wide
variety of organisations, something that accelerated the conglomerate movement. This has
accelerated the conglomerate movement because managers reasonably believed that they
could manage a corporate organisation that spanned several industry categories. The belief
that the conglomerate could become a manageable and successful corporate entity started to
become reality. Potential bidders soon learned that acquisitions, financed by stocks, could
be an excellent way to raise earnings per share without incurring tax liabilities. The
changing regulatory atmosphere at the end of the 1960s set the stage for a slowdown in this
merger wave. When the stock market fell in 1969, the P/E game could no longer be played.
Indeed, many analysts felt that the conglomerate mergers helped collapse this market in as
much as when securities attain values far in excess of the underlying economic basis for
their valuation, a collapse is sure to follow. This would be one lesson of the stock market
crash of October 1987. The structure of the mergers were conglomerate. The industries
participating in that wave were defense and aerospace, petroleum, coal products, paper
products, industrial chemicals, industrial machinery, communication equipment. The major
motives behind that wave were product extension, diversification into other industries, P/E
incentive, accounting manipulations, defensive or positive diversification in terms of
research, manufacturing and marketing and tax considerations.
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Author Alexandra M. Post
(1994)
Patrick A.
Gaugharn (1991)
J. Fred Weston,
Kwang S. Chunk
and Susan E. Hoag
(1990)
Conclusion
Merger Wave IV
• Duration • 1960-1968. • 1965-1969. • 1960s. • 1960-1969.
• Merger • Conglomerate. • Conglomerate. • Conglomerate. • anglomerate.
Structure/Character.
• Industries
palpating.
• Defense	 and
aerospace.
• The author does not
give my particular
• Aerospace industry. • Defense	 and
aerospace.
• Petroleum. information • Petroleum
• Coal Products. • Coal Products.
• Paper Products. • Paper Products.
• Industrial • IncluArial
Chemicals. Chemicals.
• Industrial • Industrial
Machinery. Machinery.
• Communicatim • Communication
Equipment Equipment
• Motives. •• PIE Incentive.
• Product eoctensica.
•
• Defensive or • Prochict extension.
• Diversificatim into
other industries.
Accounting
manipulations. positivediversificaticn	 in
• Diversification into
other industries.
terms	 of research,
manufacturing	 and
marketing.
•
•
PIE Incattive.
Accounting
manipulations.
• Tax considerations.
• Defensive or
positive
diversification	 in
terms	 of research,
manufacturing	 and
marketing.
• Tax consideratims
Table 1.5-4 Merger Wave IV
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The fifth merger wave (See Table 1.5-5) took place between 1970-1989. The structure of
the mergers were horizontal. J. Fred Weston et. al. (1990) support that following the
recession in 1974-1975, the US economy entered a long period of expansion, during which
M&As trended upward. Alexandra M. Post (1994) supports that this is the latest wave
which took place for strategic reasons in the USA starting in the second half of the 1970s
and the 1980s. An analogous wave occurred in the United Kingdom from 1985-1987.
The industries participating in this wave were oil and gas extraction, electronic equipment,
industrial machinery, transportation equipment, food, cement, airlines, chemicals,
commercial and investment banking, insurance, broadcasting, health and care and natural
resources. The major motives behind that wave were diversification, acquiring new
production technologies, economies of scale in data processing, lending and financing and
operational efficiency.
Author Alexandra M. Post
(1994)
Patrick A.
Gaugham (1991)
J. Fred Weston,
Kwang S. Chunk
and Susan E. Hoag
(1990)
Conclusion
Merger Wave V
•	 Duration • 1975-1989. • 1970s • 1976- • 1970-1989.
•	 Merger • Horizontal. • Hostile takeovers. • Vertical • Horizontal
Structure/Character.
•	 Industries
participating.
• Oil	 and
extraction.
gas • Investmatt Banking. • Commercial and
Investment Banking.
• Oil	 and	 gas
extraction.
• Electrmic • Insurance. • Electrmic
equipment- • Broadcasting. equipment
• Industrial • Health and care. • Industrial
machinery. • Natural resources. machinery.
• Transportation
equipmmt
• Transportation
equipment
• Food. • Food.
• Cement • Cemait.
• Banking. • Airlines.
• Airlines. • Chemicals.
• Chemicals. • Commercial and
Investment Banking.
• Insurance.
• Broadcasting.
• Health and care.
• Natural resources.
• Economies of scale • Diversification.
•	 Motives. •
•
Diversification.
Acquire new in data processing. •
Acquire new
production
tedmologies.
•
•
Lending and
financing.
Operatimal
efficiency.
•
production
tedmologies.
Economies of scale
in data processing.
• Lending and
fmancing.
• Operational
efficiency.
Table 1.5-5 Merger Wave V
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1.6 Conclusion
The market for corporate control is an important issue for mergers and acquisitions. There
is sufficient empirical evidence° to suggest that the "market for corporate control"
through takeovers is a control mechanism for disciplining managers who operate their firms
in ways that do not maximise profits and also when a firm faces the problem of inefficient
management. The market for corporate control implies a number of important advantages
such as decreasing the wasteful bankruptcy proceedings, more efficient management of
firms and generally a more efficient allocation of resources. Another important issue within
the M&A framework is the one that deals with the notion that managers act for their own
benefit and to the detriment of their shareholders'. Empirical evidence concerning this issue
is conflicting. Some researchers believe that mergers are planned and executed by managers
who thereby maximise their own utility20 . On the other hand, there are some studies that
support the idea that managers act rationally 21 when they decide about a potential merger
and that they do not act against their shareholders' interest. In addition to that, sometimes
managers approve some merger proposals because they want to reduce the firm's risk.
Thomas Hogarty (1970) and Ajit Singh (1992) suggest that mergers have a neutral impact
on profitability. On the other hand, Kuehn (1975) found that U.K acquired firms had low
profitability. Moreover, M. Firth (1979) supports that maximising management utility in the
form of growth and size has more impact in many firms than the alternative theory of profit
maximisation.
Another important theory developed and tested within the M&A framework is that of
leverage or increased debt capacity22 . Acquisition candidates are characterised by excess
capacity which means that a merger produces debt capacity for the post-merger firm which
exceeds the firms combined premerger debt capacities.
19 Henry G. Manne (1965), Michael C. Jensen and Richard S. Ruback (1983), Ajit Singh (Jan. 1992).
29 Fridrich Trautwein (1990), H. Nejat Seyhum (1990), T. Boone Pickens Jr. (1985).
21 Yakov Amihud et. al. (1986), Ronald M. Giammarino and Robert L. Heinkel (1986).
22 Jack 0. Vance (1969), Ronald E. Shrieves and Mary M. Pashley (1984).
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Liquidity theory has been developed and well documented for mergers and acquisitions and
this theory supports the notion that target firms have a very good liquidity position 23 when
compared to the non-acquired firms.
Market power is a motive where the acquiring firm want to acquire a firm so as to enhance
its market power. Evidence in favour of market power within the context of M&A activity
has been presented by Ajit Singh (Jan. 1992) and Severin Borenstein (1990). Evidence
against market power within the context of M&A activity has been presented by Michael C.
Jensen and Richard S. Ruback (1983) where they support that the gains created by
corporate takeovers do not appear to come from the creation of market power. Moreover,
B. Espen Eckbo (1983) when examining horizontal mergers has found no significant
evidence that proposed horizontal mergers are expected to produce a significant expansion
of the merging firm's market share.
Economies of scale is another prevailing motive for mergers. Economies of scale can
perhaps best be realised with a horizontal merger. Hunter W. C. and Wall L. D. (1989)
claim that banks that acquire other banks are sometimes motivated by the fact that they
want to achieve economies of scale in the production of financial services.
Growth is another legitimate motive for mergers and acquisitions. Evidence in favour of
growth motive within the context of M&A activity has been presented by H. Kent Baker et.
al. (1981). Moreover, Howard I. Bernstein (1988) analyses mergers and acquisitions in the
food processing industry and found that an acquisition or merger produces faster growth,
both in gaining new geographical sales areas and new distribution channels.
Diversification is the primary motive for conglomerate mergers. By acquiring a firm in a
different line of business, a firm may be able to achieve stability in its earnings. Yakov
Amihud et. al. (1986) in an examination of conglomerate mergers suggested that such
mergers are motivated by the manager's desire to reduce the firm's risk. On the other hand,
Richard H. Pettway and Takeshi Yamada (1986) in an examination of mergers in Japan
23 Jack 0. Vance (1969), Simkowitz and Monroe (1971), Stevens (1973), Rege (1984).
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found little support for the view that mergers reduce either systematic or unsystematic risks
of the acquiring firms.
Synergy is evident 24 in some mergers because it makes possible the entry of some firms into
new product lines which change the level of the firm's profitability and improve efficiency as
well. Evidence against synergy has been presented by William J.Best and Ron E. Seger
(1989) where they analyse the synergy benefits in distribution systems and found that
synergistic benefits from the combination of distribution systems are usually discouraging.
Financial synergies result in lower costs of capital. This can be achieved 25 either by
lowering the systematic risk of a firm's investment portfolio, by investing in unrelated
businesses or by increasing the firm's size, which may give it access to cheaper capital.
Synergy may produce operating economies where duplicate facilities can be eliminated at a
great extent and may lower the operating costs of the involved business departments.
Managerial synergies26 are realised when the bidder firm has better management team than
the target firm. When a firm is badly managed then its assets may not be fully utilised.
Therefore, when a firm has inefficient management then it should seek to replace its
management.
There is evidence that a merger increases the market value per share of the firm. H. Kent
Baker et. al. (1981) found that an important merger motive was to increase the market
value of the firm. There is strong evidence that the most common short term financial
strategy was the use of acquisition as a tool to boost EPS by acquiring firms with lower P/E
ratios27 because for a high P/E ratio in the acquired firm means that the acquiring firm
would be paying a high price for the current earnings.
24 Hunter W. C. and Wall L. D. (1989).
25 Fricirich Trautwein (1990).
26 Michael J. S et. al. (1990) advocated that takeover gains arise apparently from the realisation of management
related efficiencies.
27 Jack 0. Vance (1969), Simkowitz and Monroe (1971), Tzoannos and Samuels (1972), Harris et al (1982) and
Wansley and Lane (1983).
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This chapter has also described historically the different merger waves.
The first merger wave took place between 1895-1904 and the structure of the mergers were
horizontal. The major motives behind that wave were economies of scale in production,
distribution, administration and marketing. In addition, another characteristic of that period
is that of the creation of monopoly in the market.
The second merger wave took place between 1916-1929 and the structure of the mergers
were vertical. The major motives behind that wave were product extension and efficiencies,
marketing refinement and extension, creation of national sales and marketing teams. In
addition, another characteristic of that period is that of merging for oligopoly and achieving
technological economies.
The third merger wave took place between 1940-1947 and this is the post-war growth
development with an economic environment where there was a strong regulatory impetus.
The major motives behind that wave were efforts to avoid government wartime price
controls and other regulations, for tax relief purposes and product extensions reasons.
The fourth merger wave took place between 1960-1969. The structure of the mergers were
conglomerate. The major motives behind that wave were product extension, diversification
into other industries, P/E incentive, accounting manipulations, defensive or positive
diversification in terms of research, manufacturing and marketing and tax considerations.
The fifth merger wave took place between 1970-1989 and the structure of the mergers were
horizontal. The major motives behind that wave were diversification, acquiring new
production technologies, economies of scale in data processing, lending and financing and
operational efficiency.
The industries that participated in almost all the waves are: chemicals, food, electricals,
petroleum, machinery, financial services. The present thesis examines the following sectors:
chemical, construction, food, electrical and electronics engineering and mechanical
engineering.
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REVIEW OF THE PREDICTION OF TARGETS
HYPOTHESIS DEVELOPMENT
2.1 Introduction
The aims of the chapter are to explore the previous studies in predicting takeover targets
and identify the limitations of these studies. In addition, the chapter describes the different
hypotheses that are examined in the present thesis.
The chapter reviews the studies on the prediction of takeover targets. There is a discussion
of the limitations of the previous studies and also an attempt to identify the key variables of
these studies. Beside this, the present chapter analyses the hypotheses that have been
developed for examination by the present thesis. The hypotheses that are described are the
following: profitability, inefficient management, financial leverage, corporate liquidity and
research and development. These hypotheses are tested in the empirical chapters 5 and 6.
2.2 A Review of the Studies on the Prediction of Targets
Simkowitz and Monroe (1971) study is one of the earliest studies using MDA 1 in an
attempt to specify the financial profile of firms that are acquired by conglomerate firms for
the period April 1 to December 31, 1968. They used stepwise MDA so as to classify firms
as acquired or non-acquired. Four groups of firms were used in their study. The estimation
sample consisted of 25 non-acquired furms and 23 acquired firms which are used to
I MDA= Multiple Discriminant Analysis.
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construct the discriminant fimction. The validation sample2 was drawn consisting of a group
of 64 non-acquired firms and 23 acquired firms. A total of 24 variables were selected to
provide measurements on seven different aspects of a firm's financial condition. Seven ratios
entered MDA as significant (See Appendix I - Table 1). These variables denote a firm's:
growth, size, profitability, leverage, dividend policy, liquidity and a seventh group of
variables was also selected to provide information regarding the characteristics of the
market for the firm's stock Simkowitz and Monroe (1971) found that the most significant
ratios which give the greatest efficiency on standardise coefficients of the discriminant
function were four: i) P/E ratios: the acquired firms tended to seek out firms whose P/E
ratios are lower than their own. Lower dividend payout rates: the acquired firms tended
to be low dividend payers and ceteris paribus would be firms whose shareholders would be
more keen to abandon their position. Lower growth in equity: this variable indicates that
acquired firms were relatively unable to build the equity base needed and finally acquired
firms were smaller in size 3 . The estimation sample provided an overall accuracy rate of 77
percent. This model could correctly classified 82.6 percent of the acquired firms. The
predictive power of the model was also tested by using the validation sample of acquired
and non-acquired firms. The validation sample provided an overall accuracy rate of 63.2
percent and the model can correctly classified 64 percent of the acquired firms.
Singh (1971) is the first UK study of M87..A activity. Singh4 attempts to discriminate
between the acquired and the surviving firms, between the acquiring and the acquired firms
and between the acquiring and the non-acquiring firms. The period under examination is
1954-1960. Singh matched each acquired firm with the non- acquired firm nearest to it in
size, in the same industry at the last accounting date before the takeover. Singh used
tmivariate and discriminant analysis to complete his study. The detailed statistical analysis of
the data was related to takeovers in five industries: food, non-electrical engineering,
electrical engineering, clothing and footwear and drink. The sample consists of 847 firms
when all industries were combined, 132 firms from the food industry, 176 firms from the
drink industry, 96 firms from the clothing industry, 319 firms from the non- electrical
engineering industry, 124 firms from the electrical engineering industry. Data differing in
2 The validation sample is used as a basis for testing the discriminant function determined from the analysis sample.
3 Size was measured by the sales volume.
4 Singh (1971) has divided his sample into three groups as the present study does but he focus his study on a univariate
and discriminant analysis.
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age was used to compute the variables: the short-term (one to two years prior to merger)
records and long term (three to six years prior to merger) records. The study used ten ratios
(See Appendix I - Table 2) which nine (except X8, Net Assets) of them have been employed
for the multivariate analysis. For multivariate analysis three industries have been considered
: electrical engineering, non-electrical engineering and food industry. When short-term
records were used the misclassification rate was 35.6 percent. On the other hand, when long
term records were used the misclassification rate was 36.8 percent. When comparing
between the acquiring and the acquired firms acquiring firms appear to have higher rate of
growth, much larger size and more profitable. Beside this, acquiring firms have a higher
retention ratio, higher gearing ratio and less liquidity. Moreover, the acquiring firm is
significantly more profitable than the average acquired firm, but not than the average non-
acquiring firm. Singh found that acquired firms have low profitability, low growth, and low
valuation ratios when compared against non-taken over firms.
Tzoannos and Samuels (1972) investigate the distinguishing financial characteristics of
both the bidder firms and the target firms using a discriminant analysis approach. The time
period of the study is July 1967 to the end of March 1968. Thirty six mergers were selected
at random from those which took place over this period, and thirty two firms selected
randomly from the firms that were not the subject of takeover bids. The variables under
examination represent the dimensions of capital structure, profitability, liquidity, investment
and dividend policy. The model they used consisted from variables listed in Appendix I -
Table 3. Tzoannos and Samuels concluded that the characteristics possessed by those firms
that were acquired, which differentiated them from the firms not acquired were a higher
absolute level of capital, a higher rate of increase in the capital gearing, a slower increase in
profits, a lower PIE, a slower rate of increase in dividends and a greater variation over time
in the rate of dividends. The characteristics of the bidder firms were an above average
downward trend in capital gearing, a lower absolute level of capital, a higher than average
increase in profits to capital employed and a higher than average increase in the trend of
dividends.
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Stevens (1973) analyses the financial characteristics of acquired firms and develop a
multivariate model to determine which financial characteristics best distinguished firms
acquired in mergers from similar firms not acquired. The Stevens' sample consisted of 80
firms (40 acquired and 40 non acquired firms). Financial ratios 5 were calculated for each of
the firms (See Appendix I - Table 4). Stevens matched merged and non-merged firms by
size of the assets. Estimation sample contained mergers occurred in 1966 (80 firms 6 ) , and
validation sample 1967-1968 (40 firms'). In the validation sample, 70 percent accuracy was
achieved. In order to avoid the problem of multicollinearity, Stevens uses factor analysis.
The original set of ratios was factored into six distinct and orthogonal factors, with each
factor being a linear combination of the original 20 ratios (See Appendix I - Table 4 under
the column variables and heading factor analysis- variables). The different variables chosen
from factor analysis accounted for 82.49 percent of the total variance. The MDA model was
derived with four of the six ratios entering the equation (See Appendix I - Table 4). These
four ratios were
i)EBIT8 / Sales : This ratio ranked second in contribution to the MDA model, the univariate
test indicated no group differences. ii)Net Working Capital/Total Assets: This characteristic
was least important in group discrimination. iii)Sales/Total Assets: This overall measure of
activity and turnover indicated very little group difference but still contributed to the
multivariate profile that differentiated the groups. iv)Long Term Liability/Total Assets: This
financial leverage measure was the most significant indicator in both the univariate tests and
the MDA model which implies that capital structure considerations are important in merger
decisions and that acquired firms have systematically lower levels of leverage. According to
the author this is consistent with the Lintner (1971) and Lewellen (1971) w arguments. The
model demonstrated a classification accuracy of 70 percent in the estimation sample and
67.5 percent in the validation sample. The study of the discriminant coefficients showed that
acquired firms experienced: lower EBIT/ Sales, lower Sales/ Total Assets, lower Long -
Term Liability/ Total Assets than their matched non-acquired firms. Steven argues that,
5 The ratios were estimated after financial statement data from the two prior reporting periods was collected.
6 40 acquired firms and 40 non-acquired firms.
7 20 acquired firms and 20 non-acquired firms.
8 EBIT= Earnings before interest and tax.
9 Lintner John (May 1971), Expectations, Mergers and Equilibrium in Purely Competitive Securities Markets,
American Economic Review, Vol. 61, no. 2, pp. 101-111.
Lewellen, Wilbur G. (May 1971), A Pure Financial Rationale for the Conglomerate Merger, Journal of Finance,
vol. 26 , pp. 521-537.
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regardless of the stated motive for merger, financial characteristics either are specific
decision variables or directly reflect non-financial reasons for acquisition. In addition, the
firms' capital structure appears as an especially important variable, both by itself and in a
profile with variables measuring liquidity, profitability and activity.
Kuehn (1975) seeks to discriminate between merged and non-merged firms. The sample
size of this study consists from U.K. mergers that took place between 1957-1969 and the
methodologies adopted were linear probability models and probit analysis. Six financial
variables were chosen to represent the six financial dimensions which Kuehn believed were
important in the determination of the probability of a merger. The variables under
investigation are described in Appendix I - Table 5 together with the respective dimensions
that they represent. Kuehn found that acquired firms had low valuation ratios, low
profitability and low growth. Besides this, he found that acquired firms had low liquidity
and the dividend payout policy appeared to have no impact. Kuehn found that the valuation
ratio was the major variable in determining the likelihood of a takeover. He found that
acquiring firms are growth maximisers tended to have lower profitability than in the industry
average, higher growth in net assets than in the industry average, and higher valuation ratios
than in the industry average. The major limitation of Kuehn's study was that he had not
developed multivariate probit analysis.
Belkaoui (1978) attempted to distinguish between acquired Canadian firms from non-
acquired on the basis of accounting ratios using multiple discriminant analysis. Both
univariate analysis and multivariate analysis, of financial ratios, are conducted. The non-
acquired firms were matched with the acquired firms by industry and size. Four groups of
accounting ratios" were considered (See Appendix I - Table 6). Twenty-five firms were
randomly selected from a population of firms which were the subject of takeovers in the
years 1960 to 1968 and were matched with twenty five firms that were not acquired.
Therefore, for 50 firms [25 acquired and 25 non-acquired] the annual reports were
examined for 5 years prior to the takeover date. Sixteen potential predictor ratios were
collected for examination (See Appendix I - Table 6). The groups of the ratios are divided
11 The major assumption of Belkaoui's study is that most of the chosen ratios in this study indicate a low value to
predict takeovers. In other words, a firm may be acquired because it has lower than average profitability ,liquidity
and asset turnover. An opposite prediction rule is used for the long term debt + preferred stock /total assets. This
complies with the theory that the acquired firms have already used their borrowing potentials and that they will
allow the acquiring firm to access to new loan funds.
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into liquid and non-liquid financial ratios. The use of the dichotomous test showed the
superiority of the nonliquid ratios in predicting takeovers apart from the fact that the net
income/net worth and the cash flow/net worth ratios have a lower percentage effor 12 than
all fourteen remaining liquid and nonliquid ratios. The notable exception is the performance
of the working capital/ total assets ratio in the second year prior to takeover. The
superiority in the predictive power of the nonliquid ratios is more notable in the short-term,
particularly in years one, two and three, than in the long term. The classification accuracy
has been tested with a validation sample consisting of 22 firms (11 acquired and 11 non-
acquired firms). The table below describes the classification accuracy from year one to year
five prior to the merger for both the estimation and validation period.
Years prior to the merger Classification accuracy.
Estimation Period
,
Classification accuracy.
Validation Period
1 72% 70%
2 80% 76%
3 84% 85%
4 78% 76%
5 80% 75%
The best classification accuracy Belkaoui achieved was when he used the data of three years
prior to merger. (85%).
Harris et al. (1982) examines the financial characteristics of acquired firms by means of
probit analysis for the period (1974-1977) and to determine if such characteristics differ
considerably from the characteristics of non-acquired firms and to detect if such
characteristics might be useful in predicting which firms will be acquired. The sample used
consists of 106 acquired firms and approximately 1,200 non-acquired firms. For a detailed
analysis of the sample and final variables under examination (See Appendix I - Table 7).
Harris et al. used both two year and five year data in their study, but the results were
similar. They also normalised the variables by industry averages, but found that only one
12 The number of misclassifications obtained by the use of the optimal cut-off ratios in each of the five years is used
to compute the percentage error rate of classification. The percentage error rate that is found through this test
denotes a predictive ability in the sense that the lower the error, the greater the predictive power. Similarly, a cross
sectional analysis was used over all industries. Belkaoui adopted Alttnan's (1968) z method to distinguish mergers
from nonmergers. A firm was classified as a firm candidate for acquisition if its z-score exceeded the cutoff point.
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such variable, total liabilities/total assets was useful for the prediction. This suggests that
normalisation of variables for industrial effects was not important. No classification or
prediction accuracy was reported in their study. The major conclusions of the study are that:
In sample design, it is important to keep the ratio of acquired to non-acquired firms
approximately equal to the ratio found in the firm population. Moreover, the estimated
probit models are statistically significant but are not very powerful in explaining the
determinants of the acquisition activity and that a focus on characteristics of only the
acquired firms may miss important phenomena that involve specific matching of acquired
and acquiring firms.
Wansley and Lane (1983) investigate the financial characteristics of firms acquired in the
late 1970's by using linear discriminant analysis in an attempt to develop a model that best
distinguished the acquired group from the non-acquired group. Firms selected for use in this
study were merged in 1975-1977. There are 83 such firms. Of this total, 16 were merged in
1975, 28 in 1976 and 39 in 1977. The model was developed based upon the estimation
sample of the 1975-1976 where the examination consisted of 44 acquired firms and 44
firms that remain non-merged whose fiscal year end matched that of the merged firms. Non-
acquired firms were selected randomly from the Compustat Industrial file and matched by
fiscal year-end to ensure that data came from the same reporting period. The validation
sample consists of 39 firms merged in 1977 which were withheld to test for the predictive
power of the model. In this study initially 20 variables measuring 10 aspects of the firm's
profile were employed (See Appendix I - Table 8). The final model constructed through
stepwise discriminant procedures showed that 5 of the original 20 variables were useful in
prediction (See Appendix I - Table 8). The estimation sample provided an overall accuracy
rate of 75 percent for a sample of 44 firms merged during 1975 and 1976 and an equal
number of randomly selected non-merged firms matched for fiscal year-end. This model
could correctly classified 78.6 percent of the acquired firms. The predictive power of the
model was also tested by using the validation sample of merged and non-merged firms. The
validation sample provided an overall accuracy rate of 69.2 percent and the model can
correctly classified 76 percent of the acquired firms. These findings suggest that the
acquired firms may be successfully identified from non-acquired firms based solely upon
their financial characteristics. Five variables were significant: price/earnings, lnsales, market
value/book value, compound growth in sales, long term debt/total assets.
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Rege (1984) examines if financial ratios based on historical accounting information can
differentiate between firms which are likely to be acquired and those which are not. The
information obtained concerned 116 foreign and 167 domestic acquired firms. Sixty five
non-acquired firms were found to match the sixty five foreign acquired firms. These firms
were compared to the domestic acquired firms and out of the sample of 167 only 55
domestic acquired firms could be obtained which matched 55 foreign acquired firms and 55
non-acquired firms according to the three criteria 13 . Therefore the total sample size was 165
for the present study. Multiple discriminant analysis was employed with 44 firms chosen
from each group at random so as to derive the coefficients. Rege used the remaining i.e.
cases from each sample which were included in the third group for finding the possibility of
misclassification. Five accounting ratios were selected (See Appendix I - Table 9) based
upon the findings of previous studies. After the variables were computed from the data of
one year prior to takeover, tests of the group location difference were conducted. The
results failed to reject the null hypotheses of no difference in group means. As a result, the
classification was not successful, and thus, no classification result was reported in the study.
The results indicate that financial characteristics of the acquired firm considered in this
study neither distinguish between domestic and non-acquired, foreign and non-acquired,
non foreign and domestic acquired firms based on published accounting information. This
finding suggests that historical cost information might not have sufficient discriminatory
power in merger prediction, if the predictor variables are not carefully selected. It also
implies that non- historical cost information might be useful for the prediction. Their
ranking in the multivariate setting puts the payout variable first followed by activity,
liquidity, leverage and profitability in that order.
Dietrich and Sorensen (1984) employ logit estimation in predicting the probability that a
given firm will be a merger target. They viewed mergers as external investments and they
employ a net present value framework in selecting their discriminant variables. The main
assumption of the study is that the factors tending to increase the net present value of cash
flows of a potential target are expected to increase the attractiveness of a particular merger
candidate while factors increasing the cash outflows associated with a merger tend to
reduce its attractiveness. The variables were measured by the percentage deviation from
13 Rege (1984) used three criteria to select the non-acquired firms: industry, year of takeover and asset size.
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industry averages. To account for industry variations in measures affecting performance and
cash flows they gathered data on merged and nonmerged firms in four industries namely
food and beverages, chemicals, electronics and transportation. Data were obtained for 46
firms in the above industries merged in the years 1969 to 1973. (A matched sample of 60
firms distributed equally in the same four industries). Then they transformed the above
variables to relative deviations from industry averages. Five-year-old data was used for the
nonmerged group (stated as a five-year average departure from the mean value for all
nonmerged firms in the sample from the same industry over the same period), while one-
year-old data was used for the merged firms (the merger occurred in one of the years 1969
to 1973). The probability of a firm being merged was said to be a function of the financial
variables that are shown in Appendix I - Table 10. The logit model correctly classified
92.54% of the estimation sample. When the variables were reduced to five the accuracy in
classification of the estimation sample fell to 85.55%. The "predictive" power of the model
was 91% for the validation sample, which consisted of only six merged and 16 nonmerged
firms. The probability that a firm is a merger target increases as payout, turnover, size and
leverage decrease; the probability that a firm is a merger target increases as volume
increases. The results indicate that firms make attractive merger targets when management
is deficient in producing sales rather than deficient in maintaining profit margins.
Additionally, the significance of size and volume probably points to the relative ease of
acquiring smaller firms with high trading volume. The results indicate that a firm with
average or above average turnover has a very low probability of being a merger candidate,
ceteris paribus. But if a firm has a high-turnover with compensating characteristics of low
leverage, low payout, or high trading volume, the model assigns nearly a zero value to the
probability of merger. The conclusion of the study is that factors tending to increase the
NPV of a potential target are expected to increase the attractiveness of a particular merger
candidate while increasing the cash outflows associated with a merger tend to reduce its
attractiveness. Moreover low turnover must be accompanied by any or a combination of
low payout, low financial leverage, high trading volume, and smallness in aggregate market
value in order to produce a high probability of merger. The power of the model to predict
was 90 percent accuracy. Therefore, one can use logit results to estimate the probability
that a given firm will become a merger target.
Joel Hasbrouck (1985) attempts to assess differences in the financial characteristics of
target and non-target firms using logit analysis. A sample of firms that were takeover targets
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in the 1977-1982 period was gathered. Each acquired firm was matched by industry with
two control (non-acquired) firms. Financial data was collected for all firms and an analysis
was made of the systematic differences between target and control groups. The control
variables considered in the study were three". The variables under investigation are
described in Appendix I - Table 11 together with the respective dimensions that they
represent. The results indicated that target firms are characterised by low q ratios
(market/replacement values) and to a lesser extent high current financial liquidity (high level
of liquid assets). There is an apparent importance of the q ratio (both equity and assets).
The relative magnitude implies that low q firms are more likely to be targets, and that the
effects are of similar size for both industry-and size-matched control groups. Measures of
financial leverage were not found to be significant. Based on the t-statistics, the most
important determinant is LSIZE 15 , the logarithm of the market value of equity. The
presence of a q effect in both analyses suggests that for a firm-specific mechanism, while the
similarity in significance associated with QEQU 16 and QASSET 17 , this is an indication of
the irrelevance of capital structure as a determinant of takeover likelihood. The debt ratio
differences suggest that target firms are more highly levered than the control firms. The role
of q must be seen as a firm-specific signal of managerial incompetence. The financial
liquidity effect is somewhat more problematic, however, suggesting an industry-related
causal mechanism. Measures of financial leverage were found to be significant only insofar
as they were indicative of an induced q effect. The role of q (market/replacement value) is
perhaps the most interesting and complex and several explanations for its relationship to
takeover likelihood may be advanced. It may be said that q is indicative of managerial
performance, a role consistent with the value maximisation hypothesis. Such a relationship
would lead to a greater likelihood of takeover for a firm with q low relative to other firms, a
firm specific characteristic.
14 Joel Hasbrouck (1985) used three control variable: time, size(market value of equity) and industry. Among the
three, time is perhaps the most safe control variable. Firm size is likely to be a firm-specific (negative) determinant
of acquisition likelihood. It was introduced into the analysis in two ways. In the non-industry-matched analysis, size
was used as a control variable in constructing the control group. In the industry-matched analysis, size was included
as an additional explanatory variable. The population of available firms was too small to permit control matching by
size and industry simultaneously.
" LSIZE=log(market value of equity).
QEQU=q measure for common equity, defined as (market value of equity)/(replacement value of assets-market
value of liabilities).
QASSET= q measure for the entire firm, defined as (market value of equity+ market value of
liabilities)/(replacement value of assets).
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Victor Pastena and William Ruland (1986) examine the joint ability of the independent
variables to explain the merger/ bankruptcy choice using both probit analysis and multiple
discriminant analysis. A probit analysis was used to test the importance of three firm-
related variables- revenues, financial leverage, and the magnitude of tax carryforwards in
explaining the merger/ bankruptcy decision. They have also examined the association of
ownership concentration with the merger/ bankruptcy choice. A sample of troubled firms
was obtained for the 14-year period beginning in 1970 and ending in 1983. The sample of
firms was obtained from the 1983 Compustat Annual Industrial Research Tape. This tape
shows all firms deleted from Compustat with financial data up to one or two years prior to
the year of deletion. The sample of distressed firms was selected using the model developed
by Altman (1968). They restricted the sample to manufacturing firms since the Altman
model was not developed for banks, insurance firms, or other nonmanufacturing businesses.
The Research Tape contains 531 manufacturing firms that merged during the study period.
The Altman model was then run on each firm for the last year of data availability. The z-
scores suggest that 83 manufacturing firms were distressed. There were some problems
with the data of some of the firms and a sample of 68 distressed manufacturing firms that
merged remained for study. The Compustat research tape includes 95 bankrupt firms, of
which 56 are manufacturing firms. Fourteen firms were deleted for data availability reasons,
and 42 firms remained in the study. The final sample contains 110 distressed firms that
either merged or entered bankruptcy. The ownership concentration and tax caffyforward
data were obtained from Standard and Poor's Corporate Records using information for the
reporting period just prior to the announcement of bankruptcy or merger. All other financial
data were taken from Compustat using the most recent financial information available on
the bankruptcy or merger announcement date. The form of the classification model is :
M a +b1 * CON j +b2 * LEV + b3 * TAX., +b4 * SIZE j +ej
(See Appendix I- Table 12)
The intercept a and the terms b through b4 are coefficients obtained by fitting the model,
and ei is the unexplained error term. The examination shows that the distressed firms that
merge have lower financial leverage and are larger than firms that enter bankruptcy. Tax
carryforwards are not important in the model. Another finding from the study was that the
tests reveal that distressed firms with high ownership concentration (or owner control)
show an increase tendency to merge rather than to declare bankruptcy. The results suggest
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that the self-interest of managers, rather than just the interests of shareholders and creditors,
seems to help motivate the merger/ bankruptcy choice. The probit model correctly classifies
73.6 percent of the cases. The authors conducted multiple discriminant analysis to test the
predictive power of the variables considered in the merger/ bankruptcy choice. The results
are consistent with the hypothesis that the self-interest of managers seems to be at least
partly responsible for the merger/ bankruptcy choice.
Krishna G. Palepu (1986) undertakes a methodological and empirical analysis of takeover
prediction so as to analyse methodological problems associated with the development of
binary state prediction models when the distribution of the two states of interest is skewed.
In addition, Palepu examines if it is possible to predict targets with a high degree of
accuracy after correcting the methodological flaws of the earlier studies. Palepu has isolated
three disadvantages 18 which make the reported prediction accuracies of the previous studies
unreliable. A total of 277 targets were initially identified. Of these, 163 were included in the
estimation sample after screening for data requirements. The population of 2054 firms,
which were not taken over as of 1979 and satisfied the criteria for inclusion in the sample as
non-targets, was first arranged in alphabetical order. Every sixth firm was selected from this
list to generate a random group of 343 non-targets. Of these, 256 firms met the data
requirements and were included in the sample. To test the predictive ability of the estimated
model, a separate group of firms is used. This includes all the targets from the year 1980
and all the non-targets, other than those used in the estimation sample, listed on the
COMPUSTAT tape in 1980. After screening for the criteria for inclusion in the study listed
earlier, and the data requirements, this group consists of 30 targets and 1087 non-targets.
Notice that the targets form only about 2.6% of this group. This is a more realistic group to
test the true predictive ability of the model than the type of hold-out samples used by the
earlier studies. The methodology of the binomial logit model is employed with 9
independent variables. (See Appendix I - Table 13).
18 The first disadvantage is the use of non-random equal share samples in the model estimation, without appropriate
modification to the estimators, leads to inconsistent and biased estimates of the model parameters and the
acquisition probabilities. Therefore, this overstate model's ability to predict targets. The second disadvantage is the
use of equal-share samples in prediction tests leads to error rate estimates that fail to represent the model's
predictive ability in the population. Finally, the use of arbitrary cutoff probabilities in prediction tests without
specifying a decision context (the state-payoff matrix and the prior state probabilities).
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The variables to be included in the acquisition likelihood model are specified on the basis of
six hypotheses 19 , frequently stated on the determinants of a firm's acquisition probability.
The magnitudes of the acquisition probabilities are in general very small. When the model is
tested on a group of 1117 firms, 24 of the 30 (80%) actual targets and 486 of the 1087
(45%) actual non-targets are correctly classified. The strategy of investing in the 625 firms
identified by the model to be potential targets is found to result in statistically insignificant
excess returns. Hence, the estimated model's ability to predict targets is not superior to that
of the stock market. Since the market does not seem to identify targets very accurately long
before the takeover announcements, it is concluded that the model also does not predict
targets accurately.
Paul Barnes (1989) examines if takeovers can be predicted using historical financial data in
the form of accounting ratios. The statistical technique of multiple discriminant analysis
(MDA) has been used in order to estimate a linear model which best discriminates between
the two population groups (acquired and non-acquired) in terms of their distinguishing
financial characteristics. The discriminating model is then used to predict group
membership, i.e. failure and nonfailure. Data concerning 92 successful takeover bids of UK
quoted firms during the years 1986-87 were obtained (mergers announced prior to the
October 1987 crash). Each firm was matched with a non-acquired listed firm within the
same industrial sector whose market capitalisation immediately prior to the merger was the
nearest. Industrial classification was that used by datastream. Nine basic financial ratios for
each firm two years prior to the merger were obtained. The ratios under investigation are
described in Appendix I - Table 14 together with the respective dimensions that they
represent. The ratio between it and the relevant sector average, the industry relative ratio
was used for the analysis. Nine variables in the initial data set and the use of factor analysis
in only 9 variables raises some doubts about the validity of factor analysis. MDA also is a
technique which has a lot of limitations. The model in the estimation period can correctly
19
-Inefficient management hypothesis: Firms with inefficient managements are likely targets.
-Growth-resource mismatch hypothesis: Firms with a mismatch between their growth and the financial resources
at their disposal are likely targets.
-Industry disturbance hypothesis: Firms that are in an industry subjected to "economic disturbances" are likely
acquisition targets.
-Size hypothesis: The likelihood of acquisition decreases with the size of the firm.
-Market-to-book hypothesis: Firms whose market values are low compared to their book values are likely
acquisition targets.
-Price-Earnings hypothesis: Firms with low P/E ratios are likely acquisition targets.
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classified 68.48 per cent of the acquired firms. The model in the validation period (37
acquired firms and 37 matched non-acquired firms) can correctly classified 74.3 per cent of
the acquired firms. The use of industry relative ratio was advocated and was illustrated by
means of some UK data giving a reasonably high prediction success rate.
Jon W. Bartley and Calvin M. Boardman (1990) examines whether CC 2° and CD21
financial data (in conjunction with HC 22 data) have the potential to improve the predictive
ability of models that classify firms as takeover targets. The two most frequently used
research methodologies for comparing inflation adjusted data to HC data are the
examination of the security price reaction to inflation adjusted disclosures and the
relationship between inflation adjusted data security returns. These methodologies are
indirect tests of usefulness because they test whether or not investors behave as if the
disclosures have information content rather than demonstrating the actual use of the data. A
second avenue of research provides more direct tests usefulness. The performance of
inflation adjusted data is compared to that of HC data in mathematical models that are
useful to investors. The research methodology of the study is MDA (Multiple Discriminant
Analysis). The independent variables were grouped into the general categories of
performance, earning power, long-term solvency, short term solvency, and other
characteristics. The variables and the results of the models are summarised in Appendix I -
Table 15. The objective of this study was to determine if inflation adjusted accounting data
have incremental usefulness in the context of predicting takeover targets. Classificatory
models were developed that have direct implications for predictions of large investments
and takeovers, and the results indicate that models combining CC and CD data with HC
data are more accurate than simple HC models. The usefulness of CC and CD data for
identifying takeover targets is not surprising. It is widely recognised that many acquiring
firms contemplate the restructuring and /or sale of some portion of the target firm's
operations. Inflation adjusted values of specific assets as well as inflation adjusted measures
of performance and capital structure should be more useful than HC measures in evaluating
a firms restructured value. The authors believe that their analysis of the takeover prediction
20 CC= Current Cost.
21 CD= Constant Dollar.
22 HC= Historical Cost.
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models provides a pragmatic comparison of the usefulness of alternative accounting
disclosures and facilitates a better understanding of the economic phenomena of takeovers.
Ronnie J. Clayton and M. Andrew Fields (1991) assess the relative performance of logit,
probit, and discriminant analysis models developed from selected financial variables and
applied to the prediction of acquisition candidates. The time period selected for this study
was the four-year period, 1976 to 1979. The first two years are used for model
development (estimation period) while the second two years are used to inter-temporally
test each model's predictive capabilities (validation period). During 1976-77, 71
acquisitions were completed for which data were available in the Compustat Industrial Files.
For modelling purposes a random sample of 71 other firms was selected also. In order to
provide an appropriate prediction sample, a total population of 1967 firms with complete
data, including 171 acquisitions, was identified during the 1978-79 period. This data is used
to develop, test, and compare the logit, probit and discriminant analysis models. The ratios
(See Appendix I - Table 16) represent nine distinct groupings including common measures
of liquidity, leverage, coverage and profitability. Measures of firm size, growth, dividend
policy and variability are also included. The final category includes market factors that are
likely to be important in the determination of acquisition candidates. In addition, the
relationship between basic ratios and attractive acquisition candidates may be distorted by
industry influence. Of the 47 ratios, 15 are basic variables normalised by industry averages
to adjust for this possible distortion. The results of the study are summarised in Appendix I
- Table 16. The variables included in the models provide insight into the characteristics
shared in common by acquisition targets:
Size: The net working capital variable is a proxy for size. Although this variable often is
considered to be a measure of liquidity, it actually is highly correlated to the other size
variables. Size is a factor common to all studies of acquisition targets since are smaller in
general. Acquisition costs and the ease of acquisition are directly related to size; however
the average size of acquired firms has risen during the last ten years.
Leverage: Acquired firms use less leverage. This factor is reported to be significant by most
other studies. Unused debt capacity is attractive to the bidder.
Return on Assets: All three models provide a measure of return on assets (ROA or CFTA).
Buying firms prefer targets with a higher return on assets. This would indicate a stronger
financial position particularly with respect to future cash flows.
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Dividends: Acquired firms pay lower dividends. These firms are retaining relatively more
earnings, which may indicate a higher growth potential. Alternatively, it could indicate that
the buying firm has an interest in utilising this business as a potential source of cash flow.
This variable appears in the logit and probit models.
Price to cash Flow: Numerous studies, including Harris et al (1982), Simkowitz and
Monroe (1971). and Wansley and Lane (1983), have reported that acquired firms have
lower price-earnings ratios. This study finds no significant relationship, a result reported by
Dietrich and Sorensen (1984) and Palepu (1986). However, the logit and probit models
indicate a significant positive relationship when measuring market price to cash flow per
share instead of earnings per share. Buying firms prefer targets with a higher PCF. This
tends to indicate a desire to purchase a firm with a higher expected growth rate in cash
flow.
Net Profit Margin: The discriminant model includes the adjusted net profit margin. Acquired
firms have relatively lower industry adjusted NPM's. This would reflect an area of possible
improvement in earnings available to buying firms.
Coverage: The times interest earned ratio is the final variable in the discriminant model and
indicates that coverage is higher for acquired firms. Unlike the other variables it is not
significant.
P. Roll and J. F. Pickering (1991) examine the effects of takeovers and other variables on
corporate performance reported. The methodology used is logit analysis. Their sample of
972 establishments is taken from the Workplace Industrial Relations Survey, 1984, in which
the plant is the unit of investigation and the assessment of performance is made by
managers. The different variables employed by the study are described in Appendix I - Table
17 . Using logit analysis the authors found that the main determinants of relative financial
performance are avoidance of takeover and strength of market position. The main
determinants of growth of sales are profitability, change of ownership, smaller size and lack
of market dominance
Stephen A. Rhoades (1993) conducts tests to determine whether banks involved in
horizontal mergers achieve efficiency improvements relative to other firms. The analysis
covers 898 bank mergers from 1981 to 1986. The overall sample is composed of banks
engaged in horizontal mergers and all 'other' banks, for each of the years 1981- 1986. The
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sample of banks engaged in horizontal mergers is based on a listing of all bank mergers and
acquisitions during each of the years 1981-1986. The models and the variables of the study
are described in Appendix I - Table 18. The results of this study indicate consistently that
horizontal bank mergers during 1981-1986 did not generally result in efficiency gains.
2.3 A critical overview of the previous studies
The examination of existing literature on the topic of the prediction of takeover targets as
described in section 2.2 and Appendix I  has revealed some methodological problems
which need to be examined very carefully and if possible to make an effort to rectify them.
The first problem that has been identified after the examination of the previous studies on
the prediction of takeover targets is that industry classification was not considered23.
"There is another factor to the stability assumption. This is that the model is
also stable across all industries. This is most unlikely to be the case, especially
as industry average financial ratios, of course, vary across industries ".
Paul Barnes (1989) (p.77)
Paul Barnes (1989) mentioned the problem of the stability of the existing models and
and then he put forward some suggestions.
"There are a number of ways around this problem. One is to estimate 
industry specific models. Another is to adjust for industry specific differences
in the general model. Probably the best and easiest way, again, is to use
industry- relative ratios ".
Paul Barnes (1989) (p.77)
Stevens (1973) was criticised by Monroe (1973) in a comment paper for not taking the
industry effect into account. Dietrich and Sorensen (1984) support that the sample choice
and variable definitions account for the different effects of industry variation on measures of
firm characteristics, which can vary substantially across industries.
23 Simkowitz and Monroe (1971), Stevens (1973), Belkaoui (1978), Wansley and Lane (1983), Rege (1983).
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Simkovvitz and Monroe (1971), Wansley and Lane (1983) analysed financial characteristics
of acquired firms and have not considered industry classification. Platt and Platt 24 (1990)
suggested that the problem with the financial ratios may be solved if we use industry relative
ratios (i.e. firm's ratio/ industry's average ratio). But, Paul Barnes (1982) proved that
industry relative ratios are associated with skewness and non-normality. Furthermore, Jon
W. Bartley and Calvin M. Boardman (1990) suggested that matching on industry may be an
appropriate control mechanism when the research objective is to examine the statistical
significance of individual causal variables.
The present thesis advocates a solution around the problem, which is to develop industry
specific models for the chemical industry, construction industry, food industry,
electrical and electronics industry and mechanical engineering industry. Given the
inter-industry differences, an examination by industry, may adjust any specific factors
creating major changes in economic environment and in takeover activity in the years under
examination.
The second problem is that validation samples (hold- out samples) were chosen from the
same time period as the estimation samples 25 . Paul Barnes (1989) supports that the
predictive application of the model must have stability over time. Therefore, there is a need
to test the model derived in the estimation sample in a totally different period for the
validation sample with a totally new set of firms. This approach has been justified by
Gordon Kemp (1995) in his paper "Structural Stability in Duration Models". The
contribution of the present thesis is the fact that it employs validation samples that are
chosen from a different time period from that of the estimation samples. The estimation
period is the period 1982-1985 and the validation period is the period 1986-1990.
The third problem is the analysis of financial characteristics of acquired firms shortly
preceding to an acquisition26 . Most of the previous studies have identified firms that were
takeover targets during a single year and then obtained financial data from the financial
24 Platt, II D. and M. B. Platt (1990), Development of a Class of Stable Predictive Variables: The Case of Bankruptcy
Prediction, Journal of Business Finance and Accounting  (Spring 1990), pp. 31-51.
23 Simkowitz and Monroe (1971) , Stevens (1973), Belkaoui (1978), Rege (1983), Dietrich and Sorensen (1984).
26 Simkowitz and Monroe (1971), Tzoatmos and Samuels (1972), Wansley and Lane (1983), Rege (1983).
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statements immediately preceding the year of the takeover. Simkowitz and Monroe (1971)
analysed financial characteristics of acquired firms immediately prior to an acquisition.
Tzoamios and Samuels (1972) have used the estimating function with the parameters of one
period to forecast events in the next period with the same set of firms. Dietrich and
Sorensen's (1984) major limitation is that one year old data was used for the merged firms
but five year old data was used for the nonmerged firms. The present thesis employs 6 year
old data for target, bidder and non- acquired firms (non bidder and non targets firms) so as
to capture the financial performance of the firms well before the acquisition attempt.
The fourth problem is that many studies used MDA 27 analysis which employs many
problems such as multicollinearity, classification problems, time series problems, the
definition of groups, the distribution of the variables etc.)28 . Wansley and Lane (1983)
accept the fact that since linear discriminant algorithm employs averages, some information
relevant to particular mergers is lost in the discriminant function. Thus although no liquidity,
profitability or activity variable enters the model as significant the authors do admit that
these are important attributes in particular mergers. Simkowitz and Monroe (1971) used
MDA which was selected as the appropriate statistical tool for their study but the high
probability that several of the original variables possessed a high degree of multicollinearity
made necessary the exclusion of those variables which did not add to the power of the
model (e.g. the discriminant function includes no direct measure of profitability, debt policy
or liquidity while one or more measures of each of these were included in the original set of
variables). Therefore, the technique employed with highly correlated input data raises some
doubts as to which financial characteristics were significant. Jon W. Bartley and Calvin M.
Boardman (1990) have identified multicolinearity in their study which led the authors to
remove in subsequent steps of the stepwise procedure for some variables that initially
entered the models. The present thesis employs logit and probit approaches in an attempt to
avoid the methodological problems of MDA.
Another problem is the use of small sample sizes which makes the findings more genera129.
Dietrich and Sorensen (1984) study use small sample sizes, especially the validation sample,
27 Simkowitz and Monroe (1971), Singh (1971), Tzoamios and Samuels (1972), Stevens (1973), Rege (1983), Wansley
and Lane (1983), Paul Barnes (1989), Jon W.Bartley and Calvin M.Boardman (1990).
28 More discussion of these problems is provided in chapter 3.
28 Belkaoui (1978), Dietrich and Sorensen (1984), Stevens (1973), Wansley and Lane (1983).
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which consisted of only 6 merged and 16 nonmerged firms. Belkaoui's (1978) results are
based on a relatively small population of acquired firms ( 50 and 22 firms in the estimation
and validation samples, respectively). The sample size for the present study is described in
chapter 4 and it is large enough to justify the empirical findings. Finally some studies employ
limited number of variables in their empirical models [Rege (1984), P. Barnes (1989)].
The present thesis employs 38 variables explaining five different dimensions.
Moreover, the following key variables were used in the final models in the above studies:
Return on Capital Employed, Acid Test Ratio, Current Assets/ Total Assets, Long Term
Liabilities/ Total Assets, Sales/ Total Assets, Net Working Capital/ Total Assets, Total
Liabilities/ Total Assets, Natural Log of Total Assets, EBIT- Depreciation\ Total Assets,
Net Profit/ Total Assets, Capital Expenditure\ Total Assets, EBIT/ Sales, Natural Log of
Sales, EBIT\ Interest Payment, Quick Assets\ Current Liabilities, Current Assets\ Current
Liabilities, Log of Net Working Capital, Net Profit Margin, Payout ratio and P/E ratio.
Consequently, the intention is to use these variables as the basis of the present study. From
this list it was found that the most common financial characteristics of takeover targets are:
low P/E ratios30 , low dividend payout 31 , low growth32 , smaller in size33 , low profitability34,
low valuation ratios35 , low efficiency36 , low leverage37
 and high liquidity38.
Simkowitz and Monroe (1971), Tzoannos and Samuels (1971), Wansley and Lane (1983).
31 Simkowitz and Monroe (1971), Dietrich and Sorensen (1984), Ronnie J.Clayton and M.Andrew Fields (1991).
32 Simkowitz and Monroe (1971), Singh (1971), Kuehn (1975).
33 Simkowitz and Monroe (1971), Wansley and Lane (1983), Dietrich and Sorensen (1984), Palepu (1986), Ronnie
J.Clayton and M.Andrew Fields (1991).
34 Singh (1971), Tzoannos and Samuels (1971), Stevens (1973), Kuehn (1975).
35 Singh (1971), Kuehn (1975).
36 Stevens (1973), Dietrich and Sorensen (1984).
37 Stevens (1973), Wansley and Lane (1983), Victor Pastena and William Ruland (1986), Ronnie J.Clayton and
M.Andrew Fields (1991).
38 Joel Hasbrouck (1985).
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2.4 Hypotheses
In the light of the above studies there is an attempt to test the following thesis which in the
main depend on the variables isolated as being significant before.
Review of the Prediction of Targets - Hypothesis Development
2.4.1 Hypothesis 1  : "Profitability Hypothesis"
It is often supposed in finance literature that the acquired firms are less profitable than the
acquiring firms. Tzoannos and Samuels (1972) vouch that a merger is therefore seen as part
of a healthy process of rationalising the industrial structure. If this hypothesis is correct it
should be possible to discriminate those firms that are likely to be acquired from those firms
that will do the purchasing. Thomas Hogarty (1970) and Ajit Singh (Jan. 1992) support
that corporate mergers have a neutral impact on profitability. This hypothesis has been
tested by the following studies: Singh (1971), Tzoannos and Samuels (1972), Stevens
(1973), Kuehn (1975), Harris et. al. (1982), Wansley and Lane (1983), Rege (1984),
Dietrich and Sorensen (1984), Paul Barnes (1989) and Ronnie J. Clayton and M. Andrew
Fields (1991).
• Potential bidders and potential targets should show different financial
performance in terms of profitability.
The issue being explored is whether a firm will become the target of a takeover bid, because
of its relatively poor financial performance in terms of profitability. Under the null
hypothesis, bidders are able to escape takeover due to their superior financial performance
in terms of profitability as compared with that of the potential targets which show poor
financial performance in terms of profitability.
• Non-acquired fu-ms and potential targets should show different financial
performance in terms of profitability.
The issue being explored is whether a firm will become the target of a takeover bid, because
of its relatively poor financial performance in terms of profitability. Under the null
hypothesis, non-acquired firms are able to escape takeover due to their superior financial
performance in terms of profitability as compared with that of the potential targets which
show poor financial performance in terms of profitability.
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2.4.2 Hypothesis 2: "Inefficient Management Hypothesis"
Many firms employ inefficient or incompetent management. The existing finance literature
suggest that an indication of inefficient management is when the assets of a firm are not fully
utilised. Therefore, when a firm has inefficient management then it should seek to replace its
management. Takeovers can be an indirect control mechanism by which managers of a firm
who fail to maximise the efficiency of the assets of the firm and subsequently of the market
value of the firm are replaced. In the present thesis ratios under the efficiency group are
used as a proxy for management performance This hypothesis is related to Manne's (1965)
concept of a market for corporate control. Under this hypothesis corporate mergers shift
control of an acquired firm's assets from a relatively inefficient management to the superior
managers of the acquiring firm. Moreover, Seymour Tim (1986) says that poor
performance in relation to industry benchmarks is often viewed as a presence of ineffective
management, and predators may believe such firms offer opportunities to substantially
increase returns. This hypothesis has been tested by Krishna G. Palepu (1986) and some
other studies (e.g. Stevens (1973), Harris et. al. (1982), Wansley and Lane (1983)) have
used some activity ratios to measure the efficiency of the firm without testing directly the
above hypothesis.
• Potential bidders and potential targets should show different financial
performance in terms of efficiency.
The issue being explored is whether a firm will become the target of a takeover bid, because
of its relatively poor financial performance in terms of efficiency. Under the null hypothesis,
potential bidders are able to escape the actual takeover due to their superior financial
performance in terms of efficiency as compared with that of the potential targets which
show poor financial performance in terms of efficiency.
• Non-acquired and potential targets should show different financial performance in
terms of efficiency.
The issue being explored is whether a firm will become the target of a takeover bid, because
of its relatively poor financial performance in terms of efficiency. Under the null hypothesis,
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non-acquired firms are able to escape the actual takeover due to their superior financial
performance in terms of efficiency as compared with that of the potential target firms
which show poor financial performance in terms of efficiency.
2.4.3 Hypothesis 3: "Financial Leverage Hypothesis"
The purpose of this hypothesis is to examine the differences of potential takeover targets
and non-acquired firms in terms of financial leverage measures as well as the differences of
potential takeover targets and bidder firms in terms of financial leverage. The proxy for this
hypothesis are the ratios under the leverage group. Jack 0. Vance (1969) when analysed the
financial characteristics of target firms he found that excess debt capacity was one of them.
This hypothesis has been tested by the following studies: Singh (1971), Tzoannos and
Samuels (1972), Stevens (1973), Harris et. al. (1982), Wansley and Lane (1983), Rege
(1984), Dietrich and Sorensen (1984), Joel Hasbrouk (1985), Victor Pastena and William
Ruland (1986), Paul Barnes (1989) and Ronnie J. Clayton and M. Andrew Fields (1991).
• Potential target fu-ms use less financial leverage than bidder firms.
The issue of being explored is whether a firm will become the target of a takeover bid,
because of its relatively poor leverage position compared to bidder firms.
• Potential target firms use less financial leverage than non-acquired firms.
The issue being explored is whether a firm will become the target of a takeover bid, because
of its relatively poor leverage position compared to the non-acquired firms.
2.4.4 Hypothesis 4: "Corporate Liquidity Hypothesis".
As it was discussed in chapter 1, firms which have excess cash and do not have profitable
investment opportunities to invest in are deemed to be targets for takeover. The general
perception is that target firms have good liquidity position. On the other hand, there are
firms in need of funds that want to finance their working capital requirements. If this is the
case, then, these firms are likely to be takeover targets because the bidder is expected to
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bring additional fluids into the target firm so as to improve its liquidity. Jack 0. Vance
(1969) analyses the financial characteristics of target firms and among these financial signals
is a firm with excess liquidity. According to Rege (1984) and Joel Hasbrouck (1985) very
liquid firms will be attractive takeover candidates. This hypothesis has been tested by the
following studies: Singh (1971), Tzoannos and Samuels (1972), Stevens (1973), Kuehn
(1975), Belkaoui (1978), Harris et. al. (1982), Wansley and Lane (1983), Rege (1984),
Dietrich and Sorensen (1984), Joel Hasbrouk (1985), Paul Barnes (1989) and Ronnie J.
Clayton and M. Andrew Fields (1991).
• Potential bidders and potential targets should show different financial
performance in terms of liquidity.
The issue being explored is whether a firm will become the target of a takeover bid, because
of its very good liquidity position compared to the bidder firms.
• Non-acquired firms and potential targets should show different fmancial
performance in terms of liquidity.
The issue being explored is whether a firm will become the target of a takeover bid, because
of its very good liquidity position compared to the non-acquired firms.
2.4.5 Hypothesis 5: "Research and Development Hypothesis ".
SSAP39 13 defines three terms: pure (or basic) research 49 , applied research41 and
development42 . An acquisition candidate may be characterised from good research and
3° SSAP=
 Statement of Standard Accounting Practice. SSAP 13 was issued by the ASC (Accounting Standards
Committee) in December 1977 and it was revised in January 1989.
40 Pure (or basic) research: i) original investigation undertaken in order to gain new scientific or technical knowledge
and understanding and ii) not primarily directed towards any specific practical aim or application.
41 Applied Research: i) original investigation undertaken in order to gain new scientific or technical knowledge and ii)
directed towards a specific practical aim or objective.
42 Development: i) the use of scientific or technical knowledge in order to produce new or substantially improved
materials, devices, products, processes, systems or services prior to the commencement of commercial production.
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development capabilities. The proxy for this hypothesis will be the following set of financial
ratios: Capital Expenditure' to Total Assets and Capital Expenditure to Sales.
The hypothesis is formulated as follows:
• Potential bidders and potential targets should show different financial
performance in terms of the size of research and development.
The issue being explored is whether a firm will become the target of a takeover bid, because
it can generate research capabilities from its total assets or sales when compared to the
potential bidder firms.
• Non-acquired firms and potential targets should show different financial
performance in terms of the size of research and development.
The issue being explored is whether a firm will become the target of a takeover bid, because
it can generate research capabilities from its total assets or sales when compared to the non-
acquired firms.
43 R. H. Parker (1992) ( "Macmillan dictionary of accounting") defines capital expenditure as expenditure on fixed
assets. In the U.K, there must be disclosed, were practicable, in the notes to the accounts the aggregate or estimated
amount of contracts for capital expenditure insofar as not provided for, and the aggregate or estimated amount of
capital expenditure authorised by the directors but not contracted for. For the present thesis capital expenditure is
assumed to measure the research and development intessiveness.
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2.5 Conclusion
The present chapter identifies the major limitations of the previous studies which are:
industry classification was not considered, estimation samples and validation samples were
chosen from the same time period, analysis of financial characteristics of acquired firms
shortly preceding to an acquisition, the use of MDA analysis, limited number of variables
under consideration and the use of small sample sizes for both the estimation and validation
periods. In addition, the present chapter identifies the key variables that are employed in the
final models of the previous studies. Moreover, it describes the most common financial
characteristics of takeover targets as identified by the previous studies which are: low P/E
ratios44 , low dividend payout 45 , low growth" , smaller in size' , low profitability" , low
valuation ratios" , low efficiene , low leverage 51 and high liquidity52 . The findings of this
chapter are valuable so as to decide on the financial variables to be employed and provide a
benchmark for the comparison of the results of the present thesis to the results of the
previous studies. Moreover, the present chapter describes the different hypotheses under
investigation namely profitability, inefficient management, financial leverage, corporate
liquidity and research and development. The above hypotheses have been chosen because all
of them are purely financial in nature and therefore they satisfy the requirements of the data
that has been collected. In addition these hypotheses are representatives of the respective
theories of mergers that are described in chapter 1 under section 1.2. It is beyond the scope
of the present thesis to test all the theories outlined in chapter 1. It is clear that due to the
nature of the data some economic theories can not be tested (e.g. monopoly theory,
economies of scale theory, growth, diversification etc.).
44 Simkowitz and Monroe (1971), Tzoannos and Samuels (1971), Wansley and Lane (1983).
45 Simkowitz and Monroe (1971), Dietrich and Sorensen (1984), Ronnie J.Clayton and M.Andrew Fields (1991).
46 Simkowitz and Monroe (1971), Singh (1971), Kuehn (1975).
47 Simkowitz and Monroe (1971), Wansley and Lane (1983), Dietrich and Sorensen (1984), Palepu (1986), Ronnie
J.Clayton and M.Andrew Fields (1991).
Singh (1971), Tzoannos and Samuels (1971), Stevens (1973), Kuehn (1975).
Singh (1971), Kuehn (1975).
5° Stevens (1973), Dietrich and Sorensen (1984).
51 Stevens (1973), Wansley and Lane (1983), Victor Pastena and William Ruland (1986), Ronnie J.Clayton and
M.Andrew Fields (1991).
52 Joel Hasbrouck (1985).
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METHODOLOGY
3.1 Introduction
The classification methodologies that appear in the existing finance literature are LPM 1 , MDA2 ,
Logit analysis and Probit analysis which are employed many times with financial ratios to predict
group membership and especially in the prediction of bankruptcy and the prediction of takeover
targets.
The aims of the chapter are to review the different methodologies adopted in the present
thesis and to describe the covariates employed in the thesis.
Initially, the present chapter makes an overview of discriminant analysis, a technique that
has been used widely in the area of the prediction of takeover targets but it employs some
statistical problems. Then, there is a description of the methodologies that have been
employed in the present thesis namely logit analysis and probit analysis. Moreover, there is a
description of the covariates (financial accounting ratios 3 ) that are used in the present
thesis.
The major contribution of chapter 3 is that it provides the rationale for the choice of logit
analysis and probit analysis as appropriate methodological techniques for the present thesis.
1 LPM= Linear Probability Models.
2 MDA= Multiple Discriminant Analysis.
3 The variables used in the present thesis are all financial. The variables are financial ratios which have been
calculated based on the financial statements of the firms under analysis. Thirty-eight variables have been calculated
which explain five different dimensions namely profitability, efficiency, liquidity, leverage and research and
development. An extensive analysis of the data is provided in chapter 4.
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3.2 Multiple Discriminant Analysis (MDA)
3.2.1 Discriminant Analysis - An Overview
William 11_ Klecka (1980) describes discriminant analysis as a powerful technique for examining
differences between two or more groups of objects with respect to several variables
simultaneously and it has been applied in a wide range in the social science studies4 field. Donald
Stevens (1973) argues that MDA is well suited to many finance problems where the dependent
variable is nonmetric (acquired and non acquired, bankrupt or not bankrupt) and is further suited
to finance applications because as a multivariate technique, it treats a profile of variables rather
than one variable at a time. Furthermore, James W. Wansley (1984) identifies the different areas
where MDA has gained wide acceptance in applied business research. Within the area of finance,
MBA has been used to identify problems with banks 5 , analyse industrial bond ratings6 , predict
corporate bankruptcy and small business failures' ,determine the capital adequacy of commercial
banks8 . In the area of mergers and acquisitions, MBA has been used to analyse the financial
characteristics of acquired firms9 . Discriminant analysis enables the significance of a number of
variables to be considered at the same time. This is a methodology whereby an observation is
classified into one of several groups based on the profile of its characteristics. MDA reduces the
multi- dimensional variable space into a single dimension called the discriminant function
(Z). Z is a linear combination of the various discriminating variables used in the modeL
Using the two samples ie. the firms that were acquired and those that were not subject to a
takeover bid, discriminant analysis takes the form of estimating a linear probability function. This
function can be used to give an estimate of the probability of a firm taken over in response to
various financial variables. The method consists of using as the dependent variable a dummy that
takes the values of 1 if the firm belonged to the first sample (those taken over) and 0 if it
belonged to the second (those not subject to takeover bids or bidder firms). Then this variable is
4 Personnel placement testing, psychological testing of the children, the effects of medical treatments, economic differences
between geographic regions, predicting voting behaviour etc.
5 Sinkey, J. F. (1975), A Multivariate Statistical Analysis of the Characteristics of Problem Banks, Journal of
Finance, March, pp. 21-36.
6 Pinches, G. E. (1973), A Multivariate Analysis of Industrial Bond Ratings, Journal of Finance , March, pp. 1-8.
7 Altman E. I (1968), Financial Ratios ,Discriminant Analysis and the Prediction of Corporate Bankruptcy,
Journal of Finance, September, Vol. XXIII, No 4, pp. 589-609.
8 Dince, R. R. and Fortson, J. C. (1972), The Use of Discriminant Analysis to Predict The Capital Adequacy of
Commercial Banks, Journal of Bank Research, Spring, pp. 54-62.
9 Simkowitz and Monroe (1971), Tzoannos and Samuels (1972), D. Stevens (1973), Belkaoui (1978),
Wansley and Lane (1983), P. Rege (1984), P. Barnes (1989).
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regressed against the various explanatory variables which are the financial characteristics that
the theory suggests will influence one firm in its decisions to take over another firm. If the
independent variables are normally distributed, the discriminant analysis estimator is the true
maximum-likelihood estimator. However, if the independent variables are not normal, the
discriminant analysis estimator is not even consistent, whereas the logit maximum likelihood
estimator is consistent and therefore more robust.
3.2.1.1 Discriminant Analysis - Properties and Limitations.
Discriminant analysis has been widely used to two -category (dichotomous) classification
problems in empirical financial research. What has not been analysed in depth was the fact that
the difficulties associated with discriminant analysis have not been analysed by the various
researchers properly. 0. Maurise Joy and John 0. Tollefson (1975) support that the
conclusions and generalisations that can be drawn from such studies are frequently groundless
and questionable. Moreover, 0. Maurise Joy and John 0. Tollefson (1975) and William R
Klecka (1980) discuss the limits on the statistical propertiee of the discriminating variables.
According to Robert A. Eisenbeis (1977) most discriminant analysis papers that have appeared
in the business finance and economics literature have suffered from methodological or statistical
problems that have limited the practical usefulness of the results. The major limitations that will
be discussed in this section are the following: multicollinearity, classification problems, the
distribution of the variables, group dispersion (variance-covariance) matrices and the relative
importance of individual variables. Hence, the conclusions from studies employed discriminant
analysis are disputable.
10
	
no variable may be a linear combination of other discriminating variables. Secondly, each group is drawn
from a population which has a multivariate normal distribution. This permits the precise computation of tests of
significance and probabilities of group membership. When this assumption is violated, the computed probabilities
are not exact. Finally, the population covariance matrices are equal for each group. This allows a simplification of
the formulas used to calculate the discriminant function and certain tests of significance.
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Multicollinearity is a common problem when MDA is used with ratios in most empirical
studies in finance. Donald Stevens (1973) discusses the problem of multicollinearity n . Altman
(1968) reported high multicollinearity in the ratio set from which he derived his discriminant
model. He emphasised the need to choose the variables for the model very carefully, and his
selection was achieved through a large number of trial computer runs. In addition, Simkowitz
and Monroe (1971) experienced similar problems, and no ratios measuring leverage, liquidity or
profitability enter the final discriminant function. They explained that the multicollinearity they
observed in the data was the reason why leverage was omitted because they were not important
discriminators. Similar multicollinearity problems were experienced in the study developed by
Stevens (1973) which employed a large set of ratio data. In an attempt to reduce high
correlations among the variables entering the MDA phase, the data were first subjected to a
factor analysis12
0. Maurise Joy and John 0. Tollefson (1975) support that discriminant analysis faces
classification problems. The problem is the classification of entities into a priori categories,
where each entity may be characterised by a number of characteristics. Robert A. Eisenbeis
(1977) advocated that if one of the main purposes in conducting a discriminant analysis is to
construct a classification scheme, then a central problem involves assessing the performance of
the estimated rules. Reclassification of the original sample used in constructing the classification
rules as a means to estimate expected error rates leads to a biased and overly optimistic
prediction of how well rules perform in the population.
The distribution of the variables is another problem that faces the standard discriminant
analysis. Robert A. Eisenbeis (1977) believes that procedures assume that the variables used to
describe or characterise the members of the groups being investigated are multivariate normally
distributed. Violations of the normality assumptions may bias the tests of significance and
estimated error rates. It is very important to note that if the normality hypothesis is rejected, one
11 Donald Stevens (1973) supports the view that the shortcomings of the MDA approach are significant whenever more
than one variable interacts to produce differences. An assumption of most statistical techniques derived from the
general linear model is that the independent variables are mutually tmcorrelated. If there are moderate departures
from this do not significantly damage the results. But if the variables are highly collinear, the weights in the
resulting model are highly unstable and the model tends to be highly sample sensitive and subsequently the
interpretation becomes very difficult.
12 See Appendix II for a discussion of factor analysis.
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is then faced with the practically impossible task of deriving the appropriate alternative joint
probability density functions.
Robert A. Eisenbeis (1977) goes on and discusses another critical assumption of classical
linear discriminant analysis which says that the group dispersion (variance-covariance)
matrices are equal across all groups. Relaxation of this assumption affects only the significance
test for the differences in group means.
Furthermore, Robert A. Eisenbeis (1977) believes that one of the misunderstood aspects of
discriminant analysis relates to the problem of determining the relative importance of
individual variables. The discriminant function coefficients are not unique; only their ratios are.
Therefore it is not possible nor does it make any sense to test, as is the case with regression
analysis, whether a particular discriminant function coefficient is equal to zero or any other value.
That is, there is no test for the absolute value of a particular variable. It is this aspect of
discriminant analysis that may be more upsetting to economists than to others. It seems to be the
nature of the behavioural hypotheses generated in economics and finance that they require that
the influence of specific variables be isolated and quantified in a fundamental sense. Regression
analysis seems particularly well suited for such problems, since it does allow one to test, ceteris
paribus, whether specific coefficients are significantly different from a particular value.
3.2.1.2 THE LINEAR PROBABILITY MODEL
In the LPM 13
 , the coefficient indicates the marginal change in the probability associated with a
unit change in the explanatory variable.
A linear probability model" is the linear relationship of the coefficients in equation which
are used to explain a dummy dependent variable:
o	 3 1 )( if ± 2 X2i + )51 3 X3i ei	 (1)
13 Robert S. Harris, John F. Stewart ,and Willard T. Carleton (1982), Financial Characteristics of Acquired Firms
(Mergers and Acquisitions: Michael Keenan and Lawrence J. White-Lexington Books) pp. 223-241.
14 A. H Studennumd (1992), Using Econometrics: A Practical Guide, Harper Collins Publishers.
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where
= dummy variable
X s = independent variables,
I3s = regression coefficients,
and
= the error term.
The covariates variables for the present research are the financial ratios under investigation.
The term linear probability model comes from the fact that the right-hand side of the
equation is linear, while the expected value of the left hand side is a probability.
For the purpose of the present thesis suppose Yi as a dummy variable is equal to 0 if a firm
is a non-acquired firm and is 1 if the firm is an acquisition candidate, a potential takeover
target. (See chapters 5+6). Moreover, the present thesis also investigates another area
where Yi will serve as a dummy variable and it is equal to 0 if a firm is a potential bidder
firm and it is equal to 1 if the firm is an acquisition candidate, a potential takeover target.
(See chapters 5+6)
Models, such l5 as (1), which express the dichotomous Y1 as a linear function of the
explanatory variable(s) Xi(3), are called linear probability models (LPM) since E(Y i / X1), the
conditional expectation of Yi given Xi, can be interpreted as the conditional probability that
the event will occur given Xi The justification of the name LPM models like (1) can be
described as follows:
Assuming E(ed=0, as usual (to obtain unbiased estimators), we obtain:
Y, /X 1
 =	 + /3 1 X +fl2 X2i +/33X3i
	 (2)
Now if" Pi= probability that Yi= 1(that is, that the event occurs) and probability that
Yr- 0 (that is, that the event does not occur), the variable Y i has the distribution outlined in
(3). Equation (1) measures a probability because it can be shown that the expected value of
15 Damodar N. Gujarati (1988), Basic Econometrics, McGraw-Hill International Editions, Second Edition.
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Yi equals the probability that Yi will equal one. The proof of the above point can be
described as follows:
If Pi = the probability that Yi will equal to one, then the probability that Yi will equal zero is
(1- Pi), since Yi can take only two values.
Thus, the expected value of Yi =1P1±(1-P1)0=P1,	 (3)
the probability that Yi equals one.
Therefore, by the definition of mathematical expectation, we obtain
E(Yi ) = 0(1— Pi )+1(P,)=	 (4)
Comparing (2) and (4), we can equate:
E(Yi I X)= fl 0 + )0 1 X 11 + X 2i + )6 3 X3i =	 (5)
that is, the conditional expectation of the model (1) can be interpreted as the conditional
probability of I',.. Since the probability Pi must lie between 0 and 1, we have the restriction:
0 E(Yi / Xi)  1	 (6)
that is, the conditional expectation, or conditional probability, must lie between 0 and 1.
3.2.1.2.1 Problems with the Linear Probability Model
Caudill- Sb (1988) mentions that criticisms of the linear probability model are discussed by
Maddala (1983); the disturbances in the LPM are heteroscedastic, therefore least squares is
not efficient, the disturbances are not distributed normally, so there exist nonlinear
procedures more efficient than least squares, and predicted probabilities from the LPM can
lie outside the 0-1 interval. The criticism of the linear probability model (LPM) has led to
increased use oflogit analysis and probit analysis.
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"1.PM has frequently been used in econometric applications, especially in the
early years, because of its computational simplicity. Though I do not recommend
its use in the fmal stage of a study, it may be used for the purpose of obtaining
quick estimates in a preliminary stage." Amemiya 16 (1981)
Summarising, the use" of OLS to estimate the coefficients of an equation with a dummy
dependent variable encounters some problems which eventually are problems of LPM:
• The error term is not normally distributed. Because the dependent variable takes on
only two values, the error term approaches the normal distribution only for large samples
but not for small samples. The absence of normally distributed errors affects the
statistical inference of equation (5).
• The error term is inherently heteroskedastic. The variance of ei equals P;(1-P i) , where
P i is the probability that Yi equals 1. Since P i can vary from observation to observation,
so too can the variance s. Thus the variance of ei is not constant, and the classical
assumption of OLS that the error term has a constant variance is violated.
• The expected value of Yi is not bounded by 0 and 1. Since the expected value of Yi is a
probability, we would expect the expected value of Yi to be limited to a range of 0 to 1.
Meador J. W. et. al. (1986) assessed the advantages of several multivariate models and
found that the logit technique is an appropriate method for estimating the probability of
acquisition because the logit model measures the probability of merger using maximum
likelihood estimates derived from a comparison of the financial characteristics identified to
the conditional probability of merger. Therefore, there is a valid justification for using logit
as a methodology for predicting takeover targets.
16 Amemiya, Takeshi (1981), Qualitative Response Models: A Survey, Journal of Economic Literature, Vol. 19, pp.
1483-1536.
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3.2.1.3 THE BINOMIAL LOGIT MODEL
The use of the logit does not depend on the assumption that independent variables are
distributed multivariate normal and enables direct interpretation of the various explanatory
variable coefficient estimates. In the logit mode1 17 , the coefficient is the change in the log of the
odds associated with a unit change in the explanatory variable. Dietrich and Sorensen (1984)
support the view that when logit analysis is used to estimate the probability of a merger
instead of MDA, it makes the interpretation of the estimation results more direct and
imposes less restrictive assumptions on the statistical properties of the data. Moreover, they
support that specifically in the area of prediction of target firms logit estimation allows a
comparison of the relative importance of the explanatory variables in determining the likelihood
of merger.
The binomial logit model" is an estimation technique that uses the cumulative logistic function:
in 	
 — fi 0 ± P1Xli /3 2 X2i /3 3 X3i + 61
	 (1)
where Y1 is a dummy variable. For the purpose of the present thesis suppose Y i as a dummy
variable is equal to 0 if a firm is a non-acquired firm and is 1 if the firm is a potential
takeover target. (See chapters 5+6). In addition, the present research also carries out
another examination where Y1 will serve as a dummy variable and it is equal to 0 if a firm is
a potential bidder firm and it is equal to 1 if the firm is a potential takeover target. (See
chapters 5+6).
The expected value of Yi continues to be 131, the probability.
Therefore based on the LPM we can re-write (1) above as:
P, = E(Y = 1/ X, ) = + fi,X ii + fl 2 X2, + /3 3 X 3,	 (2)
where X i(s) are the financial characteristics (different financial ratios) of the firms and Y=1
means that a firm is a potential acquisition candidate.
Equation (1) can be thought of as the log of the odds. Odds 14 refers to the ratio of the number of
times a choice will be made divided by the number of times it will not.
17 Robert S. Harris, John F. Stewart ,and Willard T. Carleton (1982), Financial Characteristics of Acquired Firms
(Mergers and Acquisitions: Michael Keenan and Lawrence J. White-Lexington Books) pp. 223-241.
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Now, there is a discussion of how the logit model l4 avoids the unboundedness problem of the
linear probability model because both sides of Equation (1) are unbounded.
If Y1=1, then the left-side of Equation (1) becomes:
lr
—0) = C°	 (3)
1
n 	 	
)
,[1—
Similarly, if Y14_1 :
In 
Y 
n	
(0 = _co	 (4)
,[1-11
A
The Y produced by a logit now is limited by zero and one. To prove that we need to solve
Equation (1) for Yi .
It can be shown that Equation (1) is equivalent to :
1
— 1+ e-(ficix2x2,+fi3x31)
Combining (2) and (5) we can write:
1 
= E(Y = 1 / X,)—
	
	
(6)1+ e-u3.-Ffiixu+fl2x.+P3X3,)
where e is the familiar base of the natural logarithm. For ease of exposition, we can write
1 
— 1+e-zi
where Z, = )30 +/3 1 X u + )3 2 X 21 +/33X31.
Equation (7) represents what is known as the (cumulative) logistic distribution function.
A
If we examine equation (5) the largest I', that we can have given
A	 A	 A
p 0 +fi l x 11 +p 2 X2i + fl 3 X31 = 00 is
v^	 1	 1
— 1+ e  — 1 — 1
A
The smallest Y that we can have given
A	 A	 A	 A
/3 0 +,3 1 X u + # 2 X2i + )3 3 X3i = -CO is
A	 1	 1
=	 —1+ e° co —
(5)
(7)
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A
Thus, Yi is bounded by one and zero.
We can estimate a binomial logit using a maximum likelihood method.
1fF1 , the probability of a firm be a potential takeover target , is given by (7), then (1-P1), the
probability of not being a potential takeover target, then:
1 
1+ez 	
(10)
Therefore, we can write
P,	 1+ez'
7 - e '	 (11)
1+e—'
Now Pi / (1— Pi ) is simply the odds ratio in favour of a firm being a takeover target- the ratio
of the probability that a firm will become a takeover target to the probability that a firm will not
become a takeover target. Thus, if Pi= 0.8, it means that odds are 4 to 1 in favour of the firm
being a takeover target.
Now if we take the natural log of (11), we obtain a very interesting result, namely.
P L, —	 pj—Zi = Po +fi	 + fi 2 )(2 , + fi 3 X 3,	 (12)
that is, L, the log of the odds ratio, is not only linear in X, but (from the estimation viewpoint)
linear in the parameters also. L is called the logit, and hence the name logit model for models like
(12). The statistical significance of the above model (12) can be tested with the likelihood ratio
test18
3.2.1.4 THE BINOMIAL PROBIT MODEL
In the probit19 model the coefficient is the change in the standard deviations of the normally
distributed variable. Probit provides means for estimating the probability that a firm will be
acquired as well as the contribution of a particular financial characteristic to that probability.
Probit assumes that potential acquiring firms will judge the attractiveness of all potential
18 The likelihood ratio test examines whether the logit or probit equation are statistically significant. According to
Leonard Lardaro (1993)(p.418) the test statistic for the null hypothesis is LR= -2 [log of likelihood function
(Restricted) - log of likelihood function (Unrestricted)] which follows the chi- square distribution with k degrees
of freedom, where k is the number of coefficients whose values are restricted to 0 in the null hypothesis. If the
value of this test statistic exceeds the critical chi-square value with k degrees of freedom at the selected level of
significance, we reject H., that the set of partial slope coefficients does not influence the dependent variable. Like
the situation with a "large" equation F statistic, we then conclude that the logit or probit equation is statistically
significant.
19 Robert S. Harris, John F. Stewart ,and Willard T. Carleton (1982), Financial Characteristics of Acquired Firms
(Mergers and Acquisitions: Michael Keenan and Lawrence J. White-Lexington Books) pp. 223-241.
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targets. Probit estimates the coefficients by maximum likelihood techniques, given the pattern of
the events observed in the sample. These coefficients then can be used to estimate the probability
that a particular firm given its financial characteristics will be acquired. Coefficients have the
statistical properties of consistency and an asymptotically normal distribution. The statistical
significance of the probit model is tested in a similar way to that of logit18. An advantage of
Probit over multiple discriminant analysis is that it provides significance tests for the
individual independent variables as well as for the overall classification.
The binomial probit model" is an estimation technique for equations with dummy
dependent variables that avoids the unboundedness problem of the linear probability model
by using a variant of the cumulative normal distribution:
1 	 f	 zi 	 2/2
—	 j	 e	 ds	 (1)
where : Pi= the probability that the dummy variable I' s= 1.
A	 A
Z i= )6 0 + f3 X + 2 X 21 + )63 X3i +e i 	 (2)
s=. a standard normal variable
We can rewrite the probit so as to look familiar to the logit models.
Z, = F-1 (P,)= 13 0 + 13 1 X li +13 2 X2i + 13 3 X3i +6i	 (3)
where F1 is the inverse of the normal cumulative distribution function.
Probit models typically are estimated by applying maximum likelihood techniques to the model in
the form of Equation (3), but the results often are presented in the format of Equation (4).
Z, = F-1 ( 13 ) = I 3 0 +	fi 2 X2,+ ,X3,	 (4)
For the present thesis the statistical package of LIMDEP is employed to carry out LPM
models, logit models and probit models. Following the discussion in the present chapter
binomial logit has been selected to estimate the models presented in the thesis as it is
preferred to MDA and as conclusions drawn from probit are not materially different.
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3.3 Financial Ratio Analysis - The design of covariates.
Financial ratios are the covariates for the present thesis. The aim of section 3.3 is to make
an overview of financial ratio analysis and describe its properties. In addition, there is a
description of the covariates selected to be used by the present thesis.
3.3.1 Financial Ratio Analysis - An overview
Financial ratios are mainly divided into two main categories concerning their treatment from the
analytical point of view: i) the time series analysis which is concerned with the behaviour of a
given ratio over time and the cross sectional analysis which involves comparisons between the
investigated firm's ratios and also the examination of the characteristics of different firms within
an industry or across industries. The most widely discussed cross-sectional technique is a
comparison of ratios across firms. Numerous individual ratios have been proposed in the
literature. The principal value of ratio analysis is that it identifies matters which need further
investigation. Financial ratios may be regarded as a convenient way to summarise large quantities
of financial data and allow comparisons in the firms' performance. Traditionally, ratio analysis has
been the major tool used in interpretation and evaluation of financial statements. Financial
statements analysis then may be regarded as part of a larger information- processing system on
which informed decisions can be derived. Ratios based on historical accounting information 20 are
often considered as yardsticks for evaluating the financial condition and performance of the firm.
Horigan21 (1967) used them to determine the long-term credit standing of the firm. Beaver22
(1967) and Altman23 (1968) used them for predicting corporate failures. O'Connor24 (1973)
studied the usefulness of financial ratios to investors in common stock E1am25 (1975)
considered the effect of lease data on the predictive ability of financial ratios. All these studies
found that the information input obtained from the ratios is useful for making rational financial
20 Udayan P. Rege (Autumn 1984), Accounting Ratios to Locate Takeover Targets, Journal of Business Finance and
Accounting, pp. 301-311.
21 Horigan, J. 0. (1967), The Determination of Long Term Credit Standing with Financial Ratios, Supplement to the
Journal of Accounting Research  (1967, pp. 44.62).
n Beaver, W. IL (1967), Financial Ratios as Predictors of Failure, Supplement to the Journal of Accounting Research
(1967), pp 71-111.
23 Altman, E. L (1968), Financial Ratios, Discriminant Analysis and the Prediction of Failure, The Journal of Finance
(September 1968), pp 589-609.
24 0' Connor, M. C. (1973), On the Usefulness of Financial Ratios to Investors in Common Stock, The Accounting
Review (VOL. XLVBI, No. 2, April 1973), pp 339-352.
25 Elam, R. (1975), The Effect of Lease Data on the Predictive Ability of Financial Ratios, The Accounting Review
(VOL. XLX, No. 1, January 1975), pp. 25-43.
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decisions. Therefore, there is a valid justification to employ financial accounting ratios to
investigate the financial characteristics of target firms.
3.3.1.1 Properties of financial ratio analysis.
The rationale for research into the distribution of financial ratios can be explained by two main
principles. The first principle is the control for the effect of size and the second one is normal
distribution can be used to describe much of the analysis of the distribution of financial ratios.
The most vital reason for using ratio analysis is to control for the effect of size on the financial
ratios being examined This assumption highlights proportionality. Proportionality, implies that a
proportionate relationship exists or ought to exist between the two variables of the ratio. Strict
proportionality implies that size is only properly controlled when two financial variables (x and y
where x is a measure of size and where x and y are strictly proportional). Therefore yi = bx i and
the ratio yi / Xj = b (This is a good measure of the statistical relationship between the two
variables under consideration. Strict proportionality, is assumed in both cross sectional analysis,
in which the ratio is evaluated in relation to a representative ratio of either firms in the same
industry for the same time period, and in time series analysis in which the historical behaviour of
the ratio is examined for a specific firm. The strict proportionality assumption is violated under
the following circumstances: (i) if there is an intercept term, a and a  0. In this case the ratio
does not satisfactorily control for size as y/ x= b + a/ x and (ii) where there is an error term u, in
which case yi = a + bx; + u. In this case the control of size is heavily depended on the behaviour
of the error term u.
Significant empirical studies were carried out concerning the vital aspect of proportionality of
ratio analysis and especially are concerned with its violation. Whittington (1980) and Barnes
(1982) identified the nature and likelihood of misinformation arising from the fact that there is an
intercept term a and a  0 in the proportionality function. What they suggested as a solution was
that a regression analysis should be used. That is for the functional relationship to be properly
estimated it is necessary for the intercept to be estimated. Beside this, Barnes (1982) carried out
empirical studies concerning the cross sectional distribution of financial ratios which proved
skewness as evidence for non zero-intercept. A second approach to checking visually for
proportionality is to plot values of the ratio for alternative values of the denominator.
Proportionality implies that the value of this ratio across alternative values of the denominator
would be similar and therefore the line linking values of the ratio would be parallel to the
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horizontal axis. Now, if the analyst is facing the problem of choosing upon proper size measures
then a practical way that can be carried out by him is to plot the numerator against alternative
size measures and then he can select the measure that best satisfies the strict proportionality.
However, where the proportionality assumption is not descriptive (ie fails to collect, summarise
and present data), using statistical tools like linear or non-linear regression analysis is the best
option for helping us to analyse data. Now, we will examine how normal distribution can be used
to describe the analysis of the distribution of financial ratios. The normal distribution has a bell-
shaped curve symmetrical about the mean. The normal distribution has the advantage of that if
we know the mean and the standard deviation of a ratio (standard deviation is the square root of
the variance), that statistical significance of deviations from the mean can be determined if the
distribution of that ratio is normally distributed. Despite, the advantages of examining normally
distributed variables evidence suggests that ratios are not normally distributed mainly for two
reasons. Firstly, some financial ratios have technical limits that prevent normal distribution. In
this case, the actual distributions of financial ratios tend to be asymmetric and are generally
skewed to the right. The main reason for the right- skewness is that most ratios have a lower
limit of zero but an indefinite upper limit. Secondly, some financial ratios have economic limits
that may result in fewer observations in either the lower or upper end of the distribution than the
normal distribution.
Various empirical studies show an effort to attempt to impose normality. The extent of departure
from symmetry may sometimes be reduced by transformation of the original variables
(logarithmic transformation). Deakin (1976) concluded that the normality assumption was not
able to be held for eleven well known ratios, except for the debt to total asset ratio and he found
out that square root and logarithmic transformation sometimes produced normality but no
general guidelines could be extracted. Frecka and Hopwood (1983) used Deakin's original ratios
and found out that by deleting outliers (an outlier is an observation which appears to be
inconsistent with the remainder set of data) normality could be achieved for most ratios using a
population of manufacturing firms and specific industry groupings. This also greatly reduced
variances and increased their stability over time. The attempt to impose normality by deleting
observations that deviate most from normality is called trimming the sample. Moreover, an
attempt to impose normality can be achieved by resetting extreme observations to less extreme
values. This is called winsorizing the data. In other words, changing an outlier's value to that of
the closest non-outlier, and then attempting to fit the distribution on with a known one.
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Watson (1990) examined the multivariate distributional properties, multivariate outliers,
and modified power transformations to determine whether multivariate normality could be
approximated for cross-sectional samples of financial ratios. The results indicated that the
joint distribution of the financial ratios differed significantly from multivariate normality and
that the financial ratio data contained multivariate outliers. By deleting multivariate outliers
and applying modified power transformations to the ratios, approximate multivariate
normality was obtained. Watson (1990) concludes that using multivariate outlier detection
and transformation methods in accounting research would enhance statistical conclusion
validity.
3.3.2 The covariates selected
In attempting to analyse the hypotheses under examination it is my reasoning to find proper
measures of the theoretical concepts that are tested. To some extent accounting theory
provides good definition of variables. However, in many cases the accounting definition is at
variance with economic and financial theory. In selecting the ratios the present thesis group
variables by their relationship to the relevant hypotheses. In addition, the financial ratios
have been selected based on the availability of data.
3.3.2.1 Profitability Group
"Every business in the private sector of the economy must, in the long
run, be profitable if it is to survive. Profitability is necessary if investors
and lenders are to continue to support the business."
(Michael F. Morley)26
Profitability refers to the ability of a firm to generate revenues in excess of expenses. Profitability
ratios are designed for the evaluation of the firm's operational performance. Thomas Hogarty
(1970) in an attempt to examine the profitability of corporate mergers he suggests that
mergers have a neutral impact on profitability and that mergers are a risky form of
investment. In addition, Hisham Fadel (1977) examines the predictive power of financial
26 Michael F. Morley, Ratio Analysis, Published for The Institute of Chartered Accountants of Scotland,
by Gee & Co (Publishers) Limited.
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ratios in the British construction industry. The study investigates the impact of both size and
profitability on financial ratios and suggests models for prediction for different sizes and
levels of profitability. The findings of the study carried out by Hisham Fadel (1977) suggest
that both the level of profitability and the size of the firm, measured by sales turnover, have
a definite impact on some of the financial ratios with the level of profitability having the
greater effect. Table 3.3-1 describes the covariates under the profitability group.
Table 3.3-1: PROFTTABILTTY GROUP
Ratio Formula
Return on Capital Employed
(X1)
Profit before tax
x 100
Total Assets
Profit to Sales
(X2)
Profit after tax
x 100
Sales
Profit to Total Asset
(X3)
Profit after tax
X100
Total Assets
EBIT to Sales
(X4)
Profit before tax
X100
Sales
Return on Capital Employed is a ratio where in the present thesis examines the
relationship of profit before tax to the capital employed which is described as being the
total assets which is found by adding the value of fixed assets to that of current assets. The
return on capital employed may show that the firm is using its assets efficiently due to a
lower expenditure on fixed assets or it may be the case that the firm is using assets over a
long period of time. This ratio is a good measure on the profitability of the firm. The higher the
rate, the better for the shareholders, in other words the more dividend they will get. Singh
(1971) has employed this ratio in his analysis. Tzoannos and Samuels (1972) suggest that it
is possible that a film is taken over because it has a higher than average rate of profit to
capital employed (See Appendix I - Table 3), and so is an attractive purchase to the
shareholders of the buying firm. On the other hand, because their rate of profit is lower
than average, the shareholders of the selling firm may be keen on a takeover hoping that
new management will improve matters. Rege (1984) has seen this ratio as a proxy of
profitability (See Appendix I - Table 9) because this ratio is not influenced by the financing,
tax and size implications. (EBIT- depreciation expense/total assets.)
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Profit to Sales will measure what amount of profit after tax is generated from sales and
subsequently distributed to the shareholders.
Profit to Total Assets will measure what amount of profit after tax is generated from total
assets.
EBIT27 to Sales measures the profitability of the firm and indicates the relative efficiency of
the firm before interest and taxes paid. This ratio has been employed by Stevens (1973) and was
a proxy of the profitability dimension (See Appendix I - Table 4) and his final discriminant model
suggested that acquired firms experienced a lower EBIT/ Sales ratio. Dietrich and Sorensen
(1984) used this ratio as a proxy for profit margin (See Appendix I - Table 10).
3.3.2.2 Efficiency Group
Traditional financial accounting statements do not tell us how efficiently the resources of a firm
are managed. In other words, financial accounting statements do not say anything about
efficiency. Efficiency means how successful the management of a firm is in using the resources
of the firm. In other words, efficiency ratios measure the operational efficiency of the firm.
Within the merger context a rigorous definition of efficiency is lacking and it has to be
differentiated from the pareto efficiency as defined in micro- economics. For the purpose of
the present thesis, if a firm has operational inefficiency then this is a signal that may employ
inefficient managers, therefore this firm is a takeover target. Table 3.3-2 describes the
covariates under the efficiency group.
27 EBIT= Earnings before interest and tax.
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Table 3.3-2: EFFICIENCY GROUP
Ratio Formula
Sales to Shareholders' Funds
(X5)
Sales
Shareholders' Funds
Sales to Total Assets
(X6)
Sales
Total Assets
Annual Sales
(X7)
Natural Log of Sales
Sales to Fixed Assets
(X8)
Sales
Total Net Tangible Assets (See note 1)
Sales to Current Assets
(X9)
Sales
Total Current Assets
Annual Equity and Capital
Reserves
(X10)
Natural Log of Equity and Capital Reserves
Annual amount of Total
Assets
(X11)
Natural Log of Total Assets
Average Debtor Collection
Period
(X12)
Debtors
X365
Sales
Debtors Turnover
(X13)
_
Sales
Debtors
Note 1: Total net tangible assets, excludes leased assets and assets under construction.
Sales to Shareholders' Funds indicates what amount of sales is generated from
shareholders' funds.
Sales to Total Assets indicates how many times annual sales cover total assets. Stevens (1973)
found that this ratio though activity indicated very little group difference, it participated to the
multivariate profile of his model and represented the activity dimension (See Appendix I - Table
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4) and this ratio suggests that acquired firms have a lower Sales/ Total Assets ratio. Moreover,
Harris et al.(1982) employed this ratio as a proxy for the activity dimension (See Appendix I
- Table 7) as well as Rege (1984) (See Appendix I - Table 9). Dietrich and Sorensen (1984)
used this ratio as a proxy for asset turnover (See Appendix! - Table 10).
Annual Sales will determine the level of total sales and it seems to be a legitimate measure
of the activity of the firm. A similar variable has been employed by Simkowitz and Monroe
(1971) (See Appendix I - Table 1) which was the annual sales and represented the sales
volume dimension. This variable has entered the final model of Wansley and Lane (1983)
and it was a proxy for size (See Appendix I - Table 8). Moreover, this ratio was employed by
Ronnie J. Clayton and M. Andrew Fields (1991) as a proxy of the firm size but has not been
successful to enter the final model (See Appendix I - Table 16).
Sales to Fixed Assets represents the efficiency dimension as well. It is the sales to fixed
assets ratio. Fixed assets (such as plant and machinery) enable the business to function more
efficiently. Therefore, this ratio indicates how efficient is the use of fixed assets in generating
sales.
Sales to Current Assets will determine the level of sales which is yield from the current
assets of the firm.
Annual Equity and Capital Reserves determine the equity and capital reserves that is
maintained in the firm. In other words this is what belongs to the ordinary shareholders. A
similar variable has been employed by Simkowitz and Monroe (1971) (See Appendix I -
Table 1) which was the three year percentage change in equity and represented the growth
dimension. Simkowitz and Monroe (1971) found that among the most significant ratios
which give the greatest efficiency on standardise coefficients of the discriminant function
was the growth rates in equity which was a lower growth in equity for acquired firms. This
variable indicates that acquired firms were relatively unable to build the equity base needed.
Joel Hasbrouk (1985) employed this ratio as a measure of size (See Appendix I - Table 11).
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Annual amount of Total Assets will indicate the total amount of assets employed by the
firm. This ratio has been employed by Harris et al.(1982) which acts as a proxy for the size
dimension (See Appendix I - Table 7).
Average Debtor Collection Period shows how frequently debtors pay their debts. A
company can increase sales by either reducing the price of the product or offering more generous
credit terms. If this ratio increase then that may imply that we will have liquidity problems.
Therefore, if the debtors do not pay at the specific time limits set up by the firm then the firm
may find that it has run into cash flow problems. There is no optimum number in this ratio. It
depends on the type of the business. If the trend of this ratio is upwards, then it might suggest
that the firm's credit control was beginning to weaken. Most firms turn over their debtors
somewhere between one month to two months.
Debtors Turnover. If the annual turnover of a firm is divided by the average debtors figure
the resulting ratio shows the number of times debtors are turned over in a year. The ratio is an
indication of the efficiency of the firm's credit controL
3.3.2.3 Liquidity Group
Liquidity ratios measure the extent to which assets can be quickly turned into cash. In other
words, they try to assess how much cash the entity has available in the short term (one financial
accounting year - 12 months) so as to see if it can meet its immediate financial obligations and
thus avoid the possibility of insolvency. Joel Hasbrouck (1985) has examined the role of
financial liquidity in takeover behaviour and he believes that this is somewhat problematic
because firms may hold financial assets in excess of normal transactions requirements for a
number of reasons. The events that give rise to excess liquid assets, and in consequence the
relationship to takeover likelihood, may be either firm-or industry-specific. Table 3.3-3
describes the covariates under the liquidity group.
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Table 3.3-3: LIQUIDITY GROUP
Ratio Formula
Current Ratio or
Working Capital Ratio
(X14)
Total Current Assets
Total Current Liabilities
Acid Test or Liquid Asset or
Quick Asset Ratio
(X15)
Total Current Assets- Stock of Finished Goods
Total Current Liabilities
Asset Cover
(X16)
Total Assets
Total Liabilities- Total Current Liabilities
Cash Position No.1
(X17)
Cash & Equivalent + Interest Received
X100
Total Current Liabilities
Cash Position No.2
(X18)
Cash & Equivalent + Interest Received
X100
Sales
Cash Position No.3
(X19)
Cash & Equivalent + Interest Received
X100
Total Assets
Working Capital to Sales
(X20)
Total Current Assets- Total Current Liabilities
Sales
Working Capital to Total
Assets
(X21)
Total Current Assets- Total Current Liabilities
Total Assets
Cash to Total Assets
(X22)
Cash & Equivalent
Total Assets
Cash to Current Liabilities
(X23)
Cash & Equivalent
Total Current Liabilities
Quick Assets to Total Assets
(X24)
Total Current Assets- Stock of Finished Goods
Total Assets
Quick Assets to Sales
(X25)
Total Current Assets- Stock of Finished Goods
Sales
Current Assets to Total
Assets
(X28)
Total Current Assets
Total Assets
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Current Ratio assumes that current assets could be converted into cash to meet current
liabilities. In most cases we expect that current assets will be more than current liabilities.
The current assets ratio will then be at least 1:1. If this is not the case, the entity may not
have sufficient liquid resources available to meet its immediate financial commitments. If the
current assets consist of a very high proportion of stocks, then the acid test ratio (See X15)
may be a better indicator for the liquidity position of the firm.
A high current ratio28 may suggests that the firm has excessive levels of current assets. The firm
may hold excessive stocks or cash balances or of failing to collect its debts quickly, thus
maintaining high levels of debtors in the current assets. In addition, production management may
keep high levels of raw materials constantly so that production is never delayed. The explanation
of a high ratio could be that the firm keeps high stock levels so as to provide a better service to
customers. The numerical value of the current ratio helps the ratio user towards asking the right
questions, but additional information is needed to answer properly these questions.
This ratio has been employed by Belkaoui (1978) 29 and it was one of the proxies for the liquid
asset to current debt group (See Appendix I - Table 5). Moreover, Paul Barnes (1989) used the
ratio in the final MDA model (See Appendix I - Table 14). This ratio was employed by Ronnie
J. Clayton and M. Andrew Fields (1991) as a proxy of the liquidity dimension but has not
been successful to enter the final model (See Appendix I - Table 16).
The acid test ratio is probably a better measure of the entity's liquidity position than the
current assets ratio because it excludes stocks, as they are not always sold. Therefore, the
ratio is current assets less stock divided by the current liabilities.
28 Michael F. Morley, Ratio Analysis, Published for The Institute of Chartered Accountants of Scotland,
by Gee & Co (Publishers) Limited.
29 This ratio had the following percentage error in classification for years one to five before the takeover: 44%, 52%,
40%, 50% and 50%.
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The acid test ratio3° compares the assets which are already liquid (cash) together with those
which should very soon be liquid (debtors) with liabilities due for payment in the short term.
The popular rule of thump is that the ratio should not be less than unity. Therefore, if the
acid test ratio is less than 1:1 then we should investigate the make up of the current assets and
current liabilities. An acid test ratio less than 1:1 may not necessarily imply that the firm has a
serious liquidity problem now but the firm will have financial difficulties in the near future. This
rule is basically sensible in that one does expect immediately available liquid resources to
exceed immediate liabilities, but it is too rigid to be applied to all firms.
The acid test ratio has been employed by Belkaoui (1978)31 and it was one of the proxies for the
liquid asset to current debt group (See Appendix I - Table 6). In addition, this ratio has been
utilised by Tzoannos and Samuels (1972) and it was a proxy for the liquidity (See Appendix I -
Table 3). Moreover, Paul Barnes (1989) employed this ratio in his analysis and has entered the
final discriminant model (See Appendix I - Table 14).
Asset Cover will explain the relationship between total assets against long-term liabilities.
This will determine how many times the total assets cover the long-term liabilities.
For the Cash Position No.1 and Cash Position No.2  and Cash Position No.332 the
higher these ratios, the higher the cash resources available to the firm.
Working Capital to Sales ratio has been employed by Belkaoui (1978) 	 it was one of the
proxies for the liquid asset turnover group. (See Appendix I - Table 6).
Working Capital to Total Assets ratio was used by Singh (1971) (See Appendix I - Table
2) and his results rank liquidity third in a group of five variables when he tried to
discriminate acquired from non- acquired firms. Stevens (1973) found that the acquired
3° Michael F. Morley, Ratio Analysis, Published for The Institute of Chartered Accountants of Scotland,
by Gee & Co (Publishers) Limited.
31 This ratio had the following percentage error in classification for years one to five before the takeover: 34%, 50%,
36%, 34% and 44%.
32 This ratio was employed by Romiie J. Clayton and M. Andrew Fields (1991) as a proxy of the liquidity dimension
but has not been successful to enter the final model (See Appendix I - Table 16).
33 This ratio had the following percentage error in classification for years one to five before the takeover: 50%, 46%,
44%, 54% and 44%.
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firms were more liquid by utilising this ratio which ratio contributed to its multivariate
profile (See Appendix I - Table 4). Belkaoui (1978) has used this ratio 34 which has shown
superiority compared to the other ratios under investigation. Harris et al (1982) employed
this ratio which was a proxy for the corporate liquidity dimension (See Appendix I - Table
7). Rege (1984) has seen this ratio as a proxy of liquidity because the numerator stands for
working capital representing the availability of short term assets and the denominator
represents total assets which normalises the size effect of the numerator (See Appendix I -
Table 9).
Cash to Total Assets ratio will indicate the amount of cash that is generated from the total
assets. This ratio has been examined in the study carried out by Belkaoui (1978)35 and it
was one of the ratios under the liquid assets to total asset group (See Appendix I - Table 6).
Cash to Current Liabilities ratio will indicate the amount of cash that is generated from
the current liabilities. This ratio has been employed by Belkaoui (1978) 36 and it was one of the
proxies for the liquid asset to current debt group (See Appendix I - Table 6).
Quick Assets to Total Assets ratio will indicate the amount of the current assets except the
stock of finished goods that are generated from the total assets. This ratio has been
examined in the study carried out by Belkaoui (1978) and it was one of the ratios under
the liquid assets to total asset group (See Appendix I - Table 6).
Quick Assets to Sales ratio has been employed by Belkaoui (1978) 38 and it was one of the
proxies for the liquid asset turnover group. (See Appendix I - Table 6).
34 This ratio had the following percentage error in classification for years one to five before the takeover:
34%, 20%, 42%, 32% and 52%.
35 This ratio had the following percentage error in classification for years one to five before the takeover:
48%, 44%, 42%, 42% and 36%.
36 This ratio had the following percentage error in classification for years one to five before the takeover:
44%, 48%, 42%, 48% and 46%.
37 This ratio had the following percentage error in classification for years one to five before the takeover:
42%, 32%, 40%, 36% and 28%.
38 This ratio had the following percentage error in classification for years one to five before the takeover:
34%, 36%, 40%, 42% and 48%.
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Current Assets to Total Assets ratio shows the amount of current assets that it has been
generated from total assets and generally establishes the input of the current assets to the
overall total assets of the firm. This ratio has been employed by Singh (1971) and
represented the liquidity dimension in his study (See Appendix I - Table 2). In addition, this
ratio has been examined in the study carried out by Belkaoui (1978) 39 and it was one of the
ratios under the liquid assets to total asset group (See Appendix I - Table 6). Moreover,
this ratio was employed by Ronnie J. Clayton and M. Andrew Fields (1991) as a proxy of
the liquidity dimension but has not been successful to enter the final model (See Appendix I
- Table 16).
Current Assets to Sales ratio has been employed by Belkaoui (1978) 4° and it was one of the
proxies for the liquid asset turnover group. (See Appendix I - Table 6).
3.3.2.4 Leverage Group
Leverage ratios describe the firm's financial structure and evaluates the risk implied by the
capital structure of the firm. Leverage ratios examine the relationship between the funds
invested by shareholders and the funds invested by creditors. Joel Hasbrouck (1985) when
discussing the financial leverage and its relationship to the takeover activity he supports that
a practitioner would suggest that unused debt capacity may be considered attractive. In the
modem academic view, existing capital structures are considered consequences of tax rules
and agency costs. Moreover, Joel Hasbrouck (1985) discusses a point raised by Jensen and
Meckling (1976) , that manager's claim on the firm has some of the characteristics of debt,
particularly with respect to the consequences of bankruptcy, and managers inclined to
minimise the risk of bankruptcy have incentive to underlever the firm. If low leverage is
viewed as a signal of managerial incompetence, this will lead to a firm-specific relationship
between this variable and takeover likelihood. This line of reasoning, consistent with value
maximising behaviour, suggests that takeover targets, will have lower pre-existing levels of
debt, a relationship also likely to be firm specific. Table 3.3-4 describes the covariates under
the leverage group.
39 This ratio had the following percentage error in classification for years one to five before the takeover:
48%, 38%, 38%, 34% and 38%.
40 This ratio had the following percentage error in classification for years one to five before the takeover:
44%, 42%, 32%, 32% and 40%.
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Table 3.3-4: LEVERAGE GROUP
Ratio Formula
Long Term Liabilities
to Shareholders' Equity
(X26)
Total Liabilities- Total Current Liabilities
Shareholders' Funds
Total Liabilities
to Shareholders' Equity
(X27)
Total Liabilities
Shareholders' Funds
Preference and Loan Capital
to Equity and Reserves
(X30)
Preference Capital + (Total Liabilities- Total Current
Liabilities)
Shareholders' Funds
Loan Capital and Preference
Capital to Total Assets
(X31)
(Total Liabilities- Total Current
Liabilities) + Preference Capital
Total Assets
Interest Paid to Loan
Capital
(X32)
Total Interest
(Total Liabilities- Total Current Liabilities)
Total Profit to Interest
Paid
(X33)
Profit after Tax
Total Interest
Gearing Ratio
(X34)
Total Liabilities+ Preference Capital
Shareholders' Funds + Minority Interest + Total liabilities
Debt to Equity Ratio
(X35)
Total Liabilities + Preference Capital
Shareholders' Funds + Minority Interest
Interest Cover
(X36)
Profit before Interest & Tax
Total Interest
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Long Term Liabilities to Shareholders' Equity. Joel Hasbrouk (1985) employed this
ratio as a measure of long-term financial leverage (See Appendix I - Table 11).
Total Liabilities to Shareholders' Equity. A similar ratio is employed by Victor Pastena
and William Ruland (1986) as a proxy of leverage. (See Appendix I - Table 11).
Preference and Loan Capital to Equity and Reserves ratio is defined in Table 3.3-4
above.
Loan Capital and Preference Capital to Total Assets ratio is employed by Stevens
(1973) in the final discriminant model and represents the leverage dimension of the study (
See Appendix I - Table 4) and suggests that acquired firms have a lower Long- Term
Liability/ Total Assets ratio. Moreover, Harris et. al.(1982) employed this ratio which was a
proxy for the financial leverage dimension (See Appendix I - Table 7). Besides this, this
variable has entered the final LDA model of Wansley and Lane (1983) and it was a proxy
for leverage (See Appendix I - Table 8). Dietrich and Sorensen (1984) used this ratio as a
proxy for leverage (See Appendix I - Table 10).
Interest Paid to Loan Capital ratio shows the relationship between interest payments and
loan capital.
Total Profit to Interest Paid ratio shows the relationship between total profit and interest
payments.
Gearing Ratio is an indicator of the financial risk of the firm. In the present thesis, the
gearing ratio is formulated as follows: If the total debt (total liabilities) and preference share
capital is divided by total debt (total liabilities) plus shareholders' funds and minority interest, the
resulting ratio shows the gearing or the leverage ratio because high gearing describes a financial
structure which is heavy with debt.
The gearing ratio's' is a measure that describes the financial structure of the firm. The basic rule
for lenders to the business is that a high gearing ratio is more risky than a low one and is seen as
41 Michael F. Morley, Ratio Analysis, Published for The Institute of Chartered Accountants of Scotland,
by Gee & Co (Publishers) Limited.
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a warning sign. A low gearing ratio is an indication of stability and safety for long-term creditors,
since any fall in operating earnings or firm asset values would then have to be very substantial
before the creditors would be exposed to the risk of non-payment of their interest or capital on
the due dates, or of insufficient firm assets to repay their loans in the event of a winding up. A
moderate amount of gearing involves borrowing at a level which presents little risk to the
lenders, therefore long term creditors should look at the interest cover ratio as well.
Debt to Equity Ratio. The numerator of this ratio consists of short-term as well as long-term
liabilities and preference shares while the denominator consists of shareholders' funds and
minority interest. This measure of solvency is based on the notion that the larger the ratio of debt
to equity, the lower the protection of the lenders.
Interest cover 41 measures the firm's debt-servicing capacity and provides a warning if there is
some doubt as to whether the firm can pay future interest on what it has borrowed. The ratio is
constructed by dividing the annual profit before interest and tax which is available to pay interest
commitments by the interest due. The numerator is therefore the net profit before tax and before
interest payable. Pre-tax profit, rather than post-tax profit, is used in the numerator because tax is
only payable on profits after interest, which is another way of saying that interest takes
precedence over tax in the ranking of claims on operating earnings. The ratio measures the cover
or safety margin for interest claims. A low cover figure warns creditors that there is a greater risk
of non-payment of interest should there be any future fall in operating earnings.
3.3.2.5 Research and development Group
Table 3.3-5 describes the covariates under the capital expenditure/ R&D group.
Table 3.3-5: CAPTTAL EXPENDITURE RATIOS
Ratio Formula
Capital Expenditure to
Total Assets
(X37)
Capital Expenditure Contracted
Total Assets
Capital Expenditure to
Total Sales
(X38)
Capital Expenditure Contracted
Total Sales
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Capital Expenditure to Total Assets ratio will determine the amount of capital
expenditure that is generated from total assets. Dietrich and Sorensen (1984) used this ratio as
a proxy for investment (See Appendix I - Table 10).
Capital Expenditure to Total Sales ratio is defined in Table 3.3-5 above. This ratio will
determine the amount of capital expenditure that is generated from total sales.
3.4 Conclusion
The present chapter describes the methodologies adopted in the present thesis which are
LPM, Logit analysis and Probit analysis. Following the discussion in the present chapter
binomial logit has been selected to estimate the models presented in the thesis as it is
preferred to MDA and as conclusions drawn from probit are not materially different.
Finally, the ratios under investigation are analysed together with the rationale of their
inclusion in the study. The major contribution of chapter 3 was to provide the rationale for
the choice of logit analysis and probit analysis as appropriate methodological techniques for
the present thesis. Moreover, the fact that financial accounting ratios have been used widely
in the existing finance literature in the prediction of certain events, this justifies their
utilisation in the present thesis. The major limitation of using financial characteristics to test
alternative merger hypotheses is the fact that one cannot test any economic theories like
economies of scale, growth, monopoly theory (market power) etc. This limitation has been
discussed before and I do recognise that with financial accounting ratios the dimensions that
can be tested are only financial in nature and in the final model some other economic factors
are not captured.
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4.1 Introduction
The present chapter has three sections. In the first section, the data is described in terms of the
population from which the companies are drawn, the sampling methods, the nature of the data
and the time periods examined and their separation into sub samples for estimation and
validation. In the second section graphical analysis of the means of the ratios of the economy
wide sample' is developed and finally in the third section, graphical analysis of the means of the
ratios by industry is outlined.
The data is associated with potential bidder firms and potential target firms as well as firms that
were not involved in the takeover activity, non-target firms for the period 1982-1990.
The collection of a substantial financial database on M&A activity for this period is a major
contribution of the present thesis. A major part of this work has been the collection of financial
statement information on acquisitions differentiated by industrial classification.
1 The economy wide sample includes the firms from all the industries under investigation.
STAGE 1
Collection of the names of the firms for the period 1982-1990.
Acquisitions
Monthly
Bidders/ Targets
Financial Times
Mergers and
Acquisitions Journal
Bidders/ Targets 
Exstat database
Non acquired firms
i
Estimation Period
1982-1985
I
STAGE 2
Financial Statement Information is derived from EXSTAT database
i
Validation Period
1986-1990
I
Match Bidders with Targets
-By year of the announcement of the bid for bidders
-By year of receiving a bid for targets
-By industry (SIC code)
Match Non Targets with Targets
-By year of receiving a bid for targets
-By the same year the target is receiving a bid
-By industry (SIC code)
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4.2 Description of Data
CHAPTER 4	 Description of Data
The time period selected for the present thesis is 1982 to 1990. The first four years (1982-1985)
are used for the model development while the second five years (1986-1990) are used to test
each model's parametric structure.
A bidder is defined as a firm that has announced an attempt to takeover another firm. I have
define the year this offer is announced as the "announcement year" (See Appendix 111). A target
is defined as a firm that has received a bid by another firm. I have define the year this offer is
received as the "announcement year" (See Appendix DI). A non target is defined as a firm that
has neither received a bid by another firm nor has attempted to takeover another firm but the
year of announcement for that group is the year a target firm received the bid (See Appendix
4.2.1 The population
Initially, information about the names of bidder and target firms has been collected. The names of
bidders and targets by sector were extracted from the Acquisitions Monthly Journal2 which is
available at the London Business School and the Financial Times -Mergers and Acquisitions
Journal' which is available at the Science and Reference Library (British Library). The next step
was to identify the names of the firms that were not involved in a takeover activity namely the
"non-targets/non-bidders" or the "non-target" firms. Exstat database has been extremely
effective to identify the non-target firms. Exstat database was located at Bath University. The
names of the "non-acquired" firms were identified after personal and careful examination. The
"non-acquired" firms are firms that have not been recorded either as bidders or targets during the
period 1982-1990 either in the 'Acquisitions Monthly' or 'Financial Times- Mergers and
Acquisitions Journal'. The data employed in this study consists of a sample of firms selected
from the chemical, construction, food, electrical and electronics engineering and mechanical
engineering sectors. The initial sample size of the present research initially consisted of a
selection of 603 bidder firms, 314 target firms and 236 non-targets/non-bidders (non-target
group).
2 The 'Acquisitions monthly 'gives information regarding the announcement date of the take-over, the names, and
industrial classification of both bidder and target firms as well as the price of the bid.
'Financial Times -Mergers and Acquisitions Journal' gives information regarding the announcement date of the
take-over, the names, and industrial classification of both bidder and target firms as well as the price of the bid.
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4.2.2 Method of sampling
As outlined before, the initial sample size of the present research consisted of a selection of 603
bidder firms, 314 target firms and 236 non-targets/non-bidders (non-target group). Therefore,
the initial total number of firms was 1,153.
From the initial sample size, I have selected 427 companies from this population of available
firms for potential inclusion in the sample. The selection criteria for the final sample size were:
the firm should have a comprehensive set of financial statement information for the six years
before the announcement year as defined before for each group and the financial statement
information about the firm could be extracted from EXSTAT database. My final sample includes
96 bidders (22.5% of the total final sample size) , 161 targets (37.50% of the total final sample
size) and 170 non targets (39.8% of the total final sample size). The percentage of the firms
selected by year in the final sample from each group is described in Table 4.2-1. For example
27.08% of the total number of bidders in my final sample is selected from year 1982, 10.56% of
the total number of targets in my final sample is selected from year 1982 and 12.35% of the total
non targets is selected from year 1982.
Group
Year
Bidders
Number	 Percent
Targets
Number	 Percent
Non Targets
Number	 Percent
1982 26 27.08% 17 10.56% 21 12.35%
1983 0 0% 0 0% 0 0%
1984 11 11.46% 17 10.56% 16 9.41%
1985 12 12.5% 19 11.80% 23 13.53%
1986 21 21.88% 24 14.91% 25 14.71%
1987 11 11.46% 37 22.98% 38 22.35%
1988 8 8.33% 23 14.29% 26 15.30%
1989 6 6.25% 13 8.07% 10 5.88%
1990 1 1.04% 11 6.83% 11 6.47%
Total 96 161 170
Table 4.2-1
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As it is shown in Table 4.2-1 , 22.5% of the total final sample size is bidder firms, 37.7%
target firms and 39.8% non target firms.
For all bidder firms, I collect relevant, financial statement information for the last six years from
the announcement year when the bidder decides to initiate a takeover attempt. I therefore assign
as my information date the year end that is at least 6 years before the bid date.
For all target firms, I collect relevant, financial statement information for the last six years from
the announcement year when the target receives a bid. I therefore assign as my information date
the year end that is at least 6 years before the bid date.
For all non target firms, I collect relevant, financial statement information for the last six years
from the announcement year when the target receives a bid. I therefore assign as my information
date the year end that is at least 6 years before the bid date.
Industrial classification of the firms included in the present thesis was based on the SIC 4 code.
(See Table 4.2-2).
4 SIC= Standard Industrial Classification.
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• Chemicals (SIC CODE 2500):
* Chemicals and Plastics.
* Pharmaceuticals.
* Inorganic Chemicals, Fertilisers.
• Construction (SIC CODE 5000):
* Building and Construction.
* General Demolition and Construction Work
* Building Materials.
* Building Products.
* Building Contractors.
• Food (SIC CODE 4100)
* Food & Drink
* Food Manufacturing.
* Processed Foods.
* Meat.
* Fish Processing.
* Cakes, Pies & Pastries.
* Coffee, Tea, Snack Foods & Pasta.
* Processing of Fruit & Vegetables.
* Bread, Biscuits & Flour Confectionery.
* Ice-cream, Cocoa, Chocolate & Sweets.
* Miscellaneous Foods.
* Brewing, Beers, \Armes & Spirits.
* Sugar & Sugar by Products.
• Electronics & Electrical Engineering (SIC CODE 3400):
* ElectricaL
* Electronics.
* Basic Electrical Equipment.
* Electrical Equipment for Industrial Use.
* Telecommunications & Electronic Equipment.
• Mechanical Engineering.(SIC CODE 3200)
Table 4.2-2
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4.2.3 Nature of the data
The models developed in the present thesis utilise the 38 financial ratios and variables presented
in chapter 3, all of which are basic financial relationships that may represent important
characteristics of acquisition candidates. The ratios represent five dimensions: profitability,
leverage, efficiency, liquidity and capital expenditure. Initially, financial statement information of
the various firms has been extracted from datastream database which is located at Brunel
University. But, information about the "non-acquired" group of firms was not available from
datastream. Datastream could provide sufficient information for the group of the bidder firms but
not a satisfactory number of target firms.(See Table 4.2-4). Exstat database was the database
which actually was used to extract all the relevant financial statement information about the firms
that are under investigation in the present thesis. Therefore financial statement information for
bidders, targets and non-targets or non-acquired firms was extracted from EXSTAT database
(See Table 4.2-3) which was located at Bath University. Exstat database is the ideal database for
the present research because it provides information for all three groups under investigation (See
Table 4.2-4). Information was extracted for the following items:
Item Number	 Description
(as listed in EXSTAT)
CB3	 INTEREST RECEIVED
C23	 CAPITAL EXPENDITURE-CONTRACTED
C31	 SALES/TURNOVER
C34	 PROFIT BEFORE TAX
C43	 PROFIT AFTER TAX
C44	 MINORITY INTERESTS- PROFIT AND LOSS
C47	 COST OF PREFERENCE DIVIDENDS
C49	 RETAINED PROFIT
C52	 DEPRECIATION AND AMORTISATION
C57	 TOTAL INTEREST/TOTAL INTEREST AND
FINANCIAL EXPENSES.
C61	 COST OF GOODS SOLD
C65	 RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT
C91	 TOTAL NET TANGIBLE ASSETS
C103	 STOCK-FINISHED GOODS
C104	 WORK-IN-PROGRESS
C106	 DEBTORS
C111	 CASH AND EQUIVALENT
C114	 TOTAL CURRENT ASSETS
C115	 TOTAL ASSETS
C122	 PREFERRED CAPITAL
C123	 ORDINARY CAPITAL
C132	 SHAREHOLDERS' FUNDS
C133	 MINORITY INTEREST - BALANCE SHEET
C151	 CREDITORS
C157	 TOTAL CURRENT LIABILITIES
C158	 TOTAL LIABILITIES
Table 4.2-3
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CHAPTER 4	 Description of Data
4.2.4 The Examination Period.
The whole period under examination is 1982-1990. For examination purposes the time period is
divided into the estimation and the validation period 5 . From 1982-1985 is the estimation period
under examination and from 1986-1990 is the validation period under examination. Table 4.2-5
and Table 4.2-6 provide a description of the final number of firms that are used under the
estimation period and validation period by sector and at the economy wide leveL
By examining Table 4.2-5 (Bidders against targets) the estimation sample consists from 101
firms and the validation sample consists from 148 firms. The industry with the highest sample
size in the estimation period comes from the food sector and in the validation period from the
construction sector.
By examining Table 4.2-6 (Non targets against targets) the estimation sample consists from 111
firms and the validation sample consists from 212 firms. The industry with the highest sample
size in the estimation period comes from the food sector and in the validation period from the
construction sector.
5 The rationale for this has been discussed in chapter 2.
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4.3 Limitations of the present study
The limitations of the present thesis can be described as follows:
For the sample of firms selected no consideration has been taken of the foreign ownership or the
ownership by firms of overseas subsidiaries. However, by their very nature overseas of UK firms
has been excluded from this data set. Further no repeated acquisitions or repeated bids have been
included.
What follows is a descriptive analysis of the data as such it might be viewed as an analysis of
simple correlations. However, it gives the reader a compact way of reviewing the data analysed
in this study. Clearly, conclusions drawn from this analysis must be treated with some caution,
but as the conclusion emphasises there are instances when this analysis presage the results of
multivariate analysis.
4.4 Analysis of Sample Means - Economy wide sample and
Industrial Classification Analysis
The objective of section 4.5 and section 4.6 is to provide an initial investigation of the financial
characteristics of the groups under investigation. These two sections show graphically the mean
behaviour of the ratios under investigation for the three different groups. The findings of these
two sections will enhance the contribution of the present thesis which examines mergers and
acquisitions at the economy wide level and by industry. It seems that an industry classification
analysis in the topic of mergers and acquisitions will give an insight into what are the real
industrial financial characteristics of the target firms.
4.5 Analysis of Sample Means - The Economy wide sample
This aim of this section is to provide some preliminary findings for the behaviour of the mean of
the ratios of the economy wide sample. For each financial ratio there is a graph that shows its
mean value for the last six years including the year of the announcement. The findings of this
section will enhance the analysis of the empirical findings that are provided in chapter 5.
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Return on Capital Employed
Bidders-Targets-Non-Targets/Bidders
Yam
Figure 4.5-1 Figure 4.5-2
10
9.5
9
co 8.5
75
7
6.5
6
EBIT to Sales
Bidders-Targets-Non-Targets/Bidders
Figure 4.5-4
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8
7.5
7
6.5
6
5.5
5
4.5
4
Profit to Total Assets
Bidders-Targets-Non-Targets/Bidders
Figure 4.5-3
Figures (4.5-1, 4.5-2, 4.5-3 and 4.5-4) clearly show that the performance of the bidders in terms
of the profitability ratios under investigation are superior compared to the performance of the
target and non-target group. This superiority is more significant in the year of the announcement
(Year 0). This may denote that bidders on average are profitable firms and in their attempt to
expand their activities bidders acquire other companies. From figures (4.5-1, 4.5-2, 4.5-3 and
4.5-4) when comparing bidders with targets, target firms have low profitability but when
comparing target firms with non target firms this is not the case6
6 The performance of the non target firms is the worst in terms of profitability. It could be said that this group of firms
may be vulnerable to a takeover at a later stage. The fact that the non target firms have very low profitability will
have to be analysed further in chapter 6 and see whether non target firms are characterised with low profitabilit,
when compared to target firms.
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Bidders-Targets-Non-Targets1Bidders
/Non-TargetsfBidders
Target
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Sales to Total Assets
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Non-Targets/Brdders
Targets
Bidders
Annual Sales ( Natural Log of Sales )
Bidders-Targets-Non-Targets,Bidders
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Sales to Fixed Assets
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Figure 4.5-5
	
Figure 4.5-6
Figures (4.5-5, 4.5-6, 4.5-7 and 4.5-8) clearly show that the performance of the non-target firms
in terms of the efficiency ratios under investigation is superior compared to the performance of
the target and bidder group. This could be the answer to the question that has been raised before.
The non-target firms are very efficient firms in generating sales. Since these firms are efficient
and usually small in size they may raise profitability in the long-term. Bidder firms seem not
utilising their fixed assets efficiently (See Fig. 4.5-8). Target firms are clearly more efficient than
bidders' (See Fig. 4.5-6, 4.5-8).
7 This finding is not theory consistent with the finance literature which says that target firms are inefficient.
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Figure 4.5-9
Figures (4.5-9, 4.5-10, 4.5-11 and 4.5-12) are measures of efficiency. In terms of total
assets (See Fig.4.5-11) the bidder group perfolins better than the other groups. This is
consistent with the finance literature which says that bidder firms are bigger in size
compared to the target firms who seem to have lower size. The non-target group is even
smaller than target firms which clearly shows that these firms are small firms. Bidder firms
can attract investors (See Fig. 4.5-10) and can raise funds through the issue of ordinary
shares. Another finding is that, non-target firms seem to impose very strict credit limits to
their debtors (See Fig. 4.5-12) compared to the other groups. Both bidders and targets
seem to face a problem for collecting their debts (See Fig. 4.5-12).
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Figure 4.5-13
Debtors turnover ratio (Fig. 4.5-13) as outlined in chapter 3 is a reflection of the combination of
trade practice and the effectiveness of the firm's credit control. Again the non-target group seem
to show an effective performance in terms of the credit policy that is executed in this group of
firms when compared to the other two groups.
Asset Cover
Bidders-Targets-Non-TargetsBidders
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Bidders
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Cash Position No.1
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Target
Nan Targeb/Bidders
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Figure 4.5-17Figure 4.5-16
Figure 4.5-18
	
Figure 4.5-19
97
Cash Position No.2
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Figures (4.5-14, 4.5-15, 4.5-16 and 4.5-17) are financial ratios associated with the liquidity
position of the firm. The liquidity position of the non-target group seems to be superior
(See Fig.4.5-14 and Fig.4.5-15) to the liquidity position of the target and bidder firms. The
quick asset ratio as advocated in chapter 3 is a very good measure of the liquidity position
of the firm. Figure 4.5-15 shows clearly that bidder firms face liquidity problems and that
target firms do have a better liquidity position than that of the bidder firms. The liquidity
position of the target firms is better when compared to that of the bidder firms. This is
theoretically consistent with the finance literature which says that target firms are likely to
be acquired because of their good liquidity position.
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Figure 4.5-20
Figures (4.5-18, 4.5-19, 4.5-20 and 4.5-21) are financial ratios associated with the liquidity
position of the firm. The interesting figures are the two figures which explain the working
capital position of the firm. The working capital is the difference between current assets and
current liabilities. Then the working capital has been divided by the sales (See Fig.4.5-20)
and by the total assets (See Fig.4.5-21). The working capital of the target firms is superior
than that of the other two groups under examination, especially this is clearly evident in
Fig.4.5-20. Target firms generate more current assets from their sales (See Fig.4.5-20).
Target firms are more liquid than the other two groups of firms (See Fig.4.5-20 and 4.5-21)
and this finding is theory consistent with the finance literature which says that target firms
have a very good liquidity position when compared to the non- target firms.
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Figure 4.5-24
In addition, the liquidity dimension is examined through the financial ratios in Figures (4.5-
22, 4.5-23, 4.5-24 and 4.5-25). The target and the non-target group seem to perform and
generate significant amount of their quick assets (total current assets-stock of finished
goods)(See Fig.4.5-24) from their total assets. On the contrary, this is not the case of bidder
firms. The next interesting finding is that target firms do generate a lot of their quick assets
from their sales (See Fig.4.5-25) but this is not the case of the other two groups. Empirical
findings from the Figures 4.5-24 and 4.5-25 do support the notion that target firms are
potential takeover targets due to their healthy liquidity position.
Figures (4.5-26, 4.5-27) are another two financial ratios from the liquidity dimension. The
significant finding is the performance of the target group (See Fig. 4.5-27) where it shows
that target firms do really generate their current assets from the utilisation of their sales. The
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evidence is theoretically consistent with the existing finance literature whereby target firms
do appear to be more liquid than bidder firms or non-target firms.
Figure 4.5-30
The leverage dimension is another interesting dimension which shows the position of a firm
in terms of its borrowings. From the Figures (4.5-28, 4.5-29, 4.5-30 and 4.5-31) the
interesting findings are shown in Figures (4.5-28, 4.5-30) where the non-target group seems
to rely heavily on debt in order to finance its activities. The fact that non target firms can
finance their activities through borrowings could be an explanation why they are not
vulnerable to any takeover proposal
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Figure 4.5-34
The leverage dimension is shown again from the Figures (4.5-32, 4.5-33, 4.5-34 and 4.5-35).
The gearing ratio (See Fig.4.5-34) is a ratio which shows that around the year of the
announcement of a takeover the target firm is experiencing a high debt capacity in its capital
structure which may denote that in order to sustain their position in the market and avoid any
takeover proposal they borrow money so as to survive. Another interesting finding is shown in
Figure 4.5-35 where the debt to equity ratio for bidder firms is significantly higher than the other
groups and it is increasingly steadily from year 5 preceding the announcement of the bid to year
0 (year of the announcement of the bid) which gives evidence that a lot of bidders in order to
acquire some other firms they do increase their debt in their capital structure so as to acquire
their victim.
101
Interest Cover
Bidders-Targets-Non-Targets/Bidders
10
9,5-
9
8.5
7.5-
4	 3
Years
U No n-Targ /13tdders • Targets	 • Bidders
7
6 5-
6
•
• 	
•
aa
Capital Expenditure to Totai Assets
Bidders-Targets-Non-Targets/Bidders
0 023
0 022
0 021
0.02
0.019
0 018
0011
0.016
0 015
0 014
0.013
0 012
Capitai Expenditure to Sales
Bidders-Targets-Non-Targets,Bidders
Nor-Targets/Bidders
/Targets
Bidders
nit
aos
aoa
007
006
0.05
0.04
003
0.02
0.01
Figure 4.5-38
CHAPTER 4
	
Description of Data
Figure 4.5-36
The interest cover (Fig. 4.5-36) measures the firm's debt-servicing capacity and provides a
warning if there is some doubt as to whether the firm can pay future interest on what it has
borrowed. Figure 4.5-36 shows that bidder firms face a problem to pay the interest payments for
their borrowings. This may be the reason that bidder firms want to acquire firms which have
very good liquidity position so as to pay the interest for their borrowings.
Figure 4.5-37
The ratios that are associated with capital expenditure are the proxy for the money that
firms spend in research and development programs. None of the groups generate significant
capital expenditure from their sales (See Fig.4.5-38) whereas there is a significant impact of
the capital expenditure for the non-target group as shown in Figure 4.5-37. The non-targets
group seems to invest a substantial amount of money to improve their asset position which
may denote that they have good research and development capabilities as well.
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4.6 Analysis of Sample Means - By Industry
The aim of this section is to provide some preliminary findings for the behaviour of the mean of
the ratios by industry. For each financial ratio there is a graph that shows the mean value (six
year average) of each industry individually. The findings of this section will enhance the analysis
of the empirical findings that are provided in chapter 6. The purpose of the industrial mean
analysis is to examine the financial characteristics of the different industries across the three
different groups.
Figure 4.6-1
	
Figure 4.6-2
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Figure 4.6-3
The characteristics of the various industries in terms of profitability are different. The industry
with the higher profitability ratios across the three groups is the electronics industry. By
examining all figures (4.6-1, 4.6-2, 4.6-3, 4.6-4) the target firms of the mechanical industry
show very low profitability compared to the target firms of the other sectors and also the non-
target group of the same sector shows very low profitability similar to that of the target firms
which one can say that these firms could be seen as future takeover candidates.
Figure 4.6-5
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Figure 4.6-7
Figures (4.6-5, 4.6-6, 4.6-8) explain the industrial efficiency dimension for the non-target group
and shows very good efficiency compared to the bidder group and the target group. The non-
target group of the food industry (See Fig.4.6-5) generates a lot of its efficiency from its total
assets which is above the industry average. The bidder firms and the target firms of the
construction industry have the best performance of the sales to fixed assets ratio compared to the
other industries (See Fig. 4.6-8) which means that the more times that the fixed assets are
covered by the sales revenue, the greater the recovery of the investment in fixed assets for that
sector. The non-targets of the chemical sector show the best performance for the sales to fixed
assets ratio compared to the other sectors not only in that group, but also across the groups (See
Fig. 4.6-8).
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The two ratios that need to be investigated when examining figures (4.6-9, 4.6-10, 4.6-11 and
4.6-12) are the sales to current assets (Fig. 4.6-9) and the average debtor collection period (Fig.
4.6-12). The sector which seems that it takes advantage from its current assets is the food sector
and the finding applies to all the groups (See Fig. 4.6-9). The bidder firms of the electronics
sector seem to perform slightly above the industry average ratio for the sales to current assets
ratio but this is not the case for the target and non-target groups for that sector (See Fig. 4.6-9).
Another interesting finding is shown from the average debtors collection period which shows
how frequently debtors pay their debts.
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Figure 4.6-16
Joel Hasbrouck (1985) has examined the role of financial liquidity in takeover behaviour and he
believes that the events that give rise to excess liquid assets, and in consequence the relationship
to takeover likelihood, may be either firm-or industry-specific. Liquidity ratios measure the extent
to which assets can be quickly turned into cash. In other words, they try to assess how much
cash the entity has available in the short term. The liquidity position of the target group is better
than the bidder group (See Fig. 4.6-15) and especially for the electronics and mechanical sector.
The current ratio (Fig. 4.6-14) and the quick asset ratio (Fig. 4.6-15) show the liquidity
performance by industry in the three groups under examination. These graphs reveal that the
target firms of the construction sector are less liquid than the bidder firms of the same sector
(See Fig. 4.6-15). For the current ratio as mentioned in chapter 3 (See section 3.3.2.3), this ratio
assumes that current assets could be converted into cash to meet current liabilities but as
explained in that section there is no general rule for this ratio which may vary from industry to
industry (See Figures 4.6-14, 4.6-15, 4.6-16 and 4.6-17). The quick asset ratio of the food
industry is the lowest across all groups ( See Fig. 4.6-15) and this is due to the nature of the
activities of that sector. The reason for this may be the fact that in the numerator of that ratio we
do not take into account stock The asset cover ratio explains the relationship between total
assets against long-term liabilities. This will determine how many times the total assets cover the
long-term liabilities. The non-targets have on the overall higher asset cover (See Fig. 4.6-16).
The only sector which has very low asset cover ratio in that group is the chemical sector. Cash
position no.1 (Fig. 4.6-17) shows a better performance for the bidder group when compared to
the other two groups apart from two sectors, the electronics and construction sector.
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Figure 4.6-18
Figure 4.6-20
The notable figure from the graphs above is Fig. 4.6-20 8 . The working capital to sales ratio for
the target firms of the mechanical sector is higher when compared to the other sectors. This is
very important because if we go back and examine Fig. 4.5-20 which is the same ratio at the
economy wide level the target group has a higher working capital ratio when compared to the
other groups. The performance of the target firms of the mechanical sector affects the economy
wide sample of target firms. Therefore, this is a very good example which suggests that we need
to discriminate between different groups by industry.
s There has been an examination for possible outliers. The performance of two target firms from the mechanical sector
has an effect to the total sample of the mechanical target firms for the Working Capital to Sales ratio. The names of
the two companies are: ALLEN (EDGAR) BALFOUR LTD and GELTSPUR LTD.
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Figure 4.6-22
Figure 4.6-24
The cash to total assets ratio (See Fig. 4.6-22) indicates the amount of cash that is generated
from the total assets. The target firms of the electronics industry seems to show the best
performance for that ratio and the worst performance comes from the target firms of the food
sector. The quick assets to sales for the mechanical sector (See Fig.4.6-25 9 ) has similar
implications to that explained before for the working capital to sales ratio (Fig.4.6-20).
9 There has been an examination for possible outliers. The performance of two target firms from the mechanical sector
has an effect to the total sample of mechanical target firms for the Working Capital to Sales ratio. The names of the
two companies are: ALLEN (EDGAR) BALFOUR LTD and GELTSPUR LTD.
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Figure 4.6-26
The current assets to total assets ratio shows the amount of current assets that it has been
generated from total assets and generally establishes the input of the current assets to the overall
total assets of the firm. This ratio shows that the target firms of the chemical sector has the best
performance when compared to the other groups across all the industries under examination.
Beside this, the current assets to sales ratio for the mechanical sector (See Fig. 4.6-27 10) has
similar implications to that explained before for the working capital to sales ratio (Fig.4.6-20)
and quick assets to sales ratio (Fig.4.6-25).
There has been an examination for possible outliers for the Current Assets to Sales ratio. No particular target firms
from the mechanical sector seem to influence the total sample size of the mechanical target firms under examination
for the Current Assets to Sales ratio.
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Leverage ratios describe the firm's financial structure and measures the long-term risk implied by
that structure. The leverage position of the chemical sector is the striking finding of the non-
target group (See Fig.4.6-28 11 , 4.6-29, 4.6-30 12 , 4.6-31 13 ). MS may denote that non-target
chemical firms rely on debt financing so as not to be acquired. This is an outstanding finding
because when examining the same figures that explain the economy wide level performance of
the different groups (See Fig.4.5-28, 4.5-29, 4.5-30, 4.5-31) it seems that the non-target group
shows a high leverage position. But this overall impact of the leverage position of the non-target
group at the economy wide level is clearly affected from the non-target firms of the chemical
sector.
11 There has been an examination for possible outliers for the Long term Liabilities to Shareholders Equity ratio. No
particular non target firms from the chemical sector seem to influence the total sample size of the chemical non
target firms under examination for the Long term Liabilities to Shareholders Equity ratio.
12 There has been an examination for possible outliers. The performance of two non target firms from the chemical
sector has an effect to the total sample of the chemical non target firms for the Preference and Loan Capital to
Equity and Reserves ratio. The names of the two companies are: ENIMONT HOLDINGS UK LTD and ATOCHEM
UK HOLDINGS LTD.
13 There has been an examination for possible outliers for the Loan Capital and Preference Capital to Total Assets
ratio. No particular non target firms from the chemical sector seem to influence the total sample size of the chemical
non target firms under examination for the Loan Capital and Preference Capital to Total Assets ratio.
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Figure 4.6-32
Figure 4.6-34
When examining Figures (4.6-32, 4.6-33, 4.6-34, 4.6-35) the striking findings is the performance
of the interest paid to loan capital for non-targets/bidder group of the mechanical sector (See Fig.
4.6-32 14 ) which has again affected the economy wide sample under investigation for that
particular ratio (See Fig.4.5-32). In addition, the debt to equity ratio of the bidder firms of the
food sector (See Fig.4.6-35) seems to be high which denotes that these firms rely on debt
financing.
14 There has been an examination for possible outliers. The performance of one non target firm from the mechanical
sector has an effect to the total sample of the mechanical non target firms for the Interest paid to Loan Capital ratio.
The name of the company is H.M. HOLDINGS PLC.
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Figure 4.6-36
Interest cover measures the firm's debt-servicing capacity and provides a warning if there is
some doubt as to whether the firm can pay future interest on what it has borrowed. The literature
suggests that the cover should be over 4 for safety. A low cover figure warns creditors that there
is a greater risk of non-payment of interest should there be any future decrease in operating
earnings. By examining Fig. (4.6-36) the target firms and the non-target firms of the mechanical
sector seem to show bad performance concerning the interest cover ratio.
Figure 4.6-37
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The non-target group of the mechanical sector seems to spent more money for capital
expenditure and generates more sales compared to the other industries (See Fig.4.6-38 15 ).
This may be an indication of good research and development output for the non-target
group of the mechanical sector, which output ultimately generates sufficient sales to sustain
competitive advantage in the market.
15 There has been an examination for possible outliers. The peiformance of one non target firm from the mechanical
sector has an effect to the total sample of the mechanical non target firms for the Capital Expenditure to Total Sales
ratio. The name of the company is FERRUM HOLDINGS.
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4.7 Conclusion
The present thesis analyses mergers and acquisitions within the UK economy for the period
1982-1990. For the purpose of the analysis the sample size is divided into the estimation period
(1982-1985) and the validation period (1986-1990). The firms under investigation belong to the
following sectors of the economy: chemical, construction, food, electrical and electronics
engineering and mechanical engineering. The contribution of the present chapter is demonstrated
through graphical mean analysis of the financial ratios for both the economy wide sample and by
industry for the three groups of firms under investigation. The rationale for industry classification
is justified because firm characteristics vary substantially across industries and across the three
groups under investigation. Moreover, the financial characteristics of the groups under
investigation by industry are different from the financial characteristics of the groups at the
economy wide sample. In addition, there are specific industry characteristics that affect the
economy wide sample. It is obvious that by disaggregating the sectors of the economy a lot of
interesting findings are produced. Industry classification models will give an insight into what are
the real financial characteristics of the target firms. The analysis of the mean of the ratios under
the analysis for the economy wide sample and then within an industrial classification framework
clearly supports the proposition that there is a need i) to discriminate between a) Bidders b)
Targets c) Non-Targets (Non-targets\ Bidders or Non-acquired firms) and between industries.
The major findings of the graphical mean analysis are described as follows:
The performance of bidders in terms of the profitability ratios under investigation is superior to
that of the target and non-target group, and it is more significant in the year of the
announcement of the bid. This suggests that that bidders on average are profitable firms and in
their attempt to expand their activities bidders acquire other firms. Target firms tend to have low
profitability compared with bidders but not when compared with non target firms' case. It might
be argued that this low profitability makes non target i6 firms vulnerable to takeover. The
question is why and how non-target firms may escape from being takeover targets. The
characteristics of the various industries in terms of profitability are different. The industry with
the higher profitability ratios across the three groups is the electronics industry. The target firms
of the mechanical industry show very low profitability compared to the target firms of the other
sectors.
16 The fact that non target firms are very small in size may be a reason that protect these firms for being takeover
targets.
116
CHAPTER 4	 Description of Data
The performance of the non-target firms in terms of the efficiency ratios" under investigation is
superior to the performance of the target and bidder group. In terms of total assets the bidder
group performs better than the other groups. This is consistent with the finance literature which
says that bidder firms are bigger in size compared to the target firms. The non-target group is
even smaller than target firms. Another finding is that, non-target firms are efficient in collecting
their debts. On the other hand, both bidders and targets are inefficient in collecting their debts.
The non-target group of the food industry generates a lot of its efficiency from its total assets
which is above the industry average. The bidder firms and the target firms of the construction
industry seem to utilise their fixed assets efficiently compared to the other industries. The non-
targets of the chemical sector show the best performance for the sales to fixed assets ratio
compared to the other sectors not only in that group but also across the other groups as well.
The sector which seems that it takes advantage from its current assets is the food sector and the
finding applies to all the groups of that sector . The electronics sector faces problems of
collecting their debts throughout the three groups. The sectors that seem to change their debtors
a lot of times are the food and construction sectors throughout all their groups.
The leverage dimension is another interesting dimension which shows the position of a firm
in terms of its borrowings. The non-target group seems to be very highly levered and this
group may not be vulnerable to any takeover proposal because it can finance its activities
through borrowings. The gearing ratio shows that around the year of the announcement of a
takeover the target firm is experiencing a high debt capacity in its capital structure which
may denote that in order to sustain their position in the market and avoid any takeover
proposal they borrow money so as to survive. Another interesting finding is shown with the
debt to equity ratio for bidder firms which is significantly higher than the other groups and
may suggest that a lot of bidders do increase their debt in their capital structure so as to
acquire their victim. The high leverage position of the non-target firms of the chemical
sector is an interesting finding. This may denote that non-target chemical firms rely on debt
financing so as not to be acquired. This is an outstanding fmding because when examining
the same ratio in the economy wide sample it seems that the non-target group shows a high
17 Efficiency ratios measure the operational efficiency of the firm. Within the merger context a rigorous definition of
efficiency is lacking and it has to be differentiated from the pareto efficiency as defined in micro- economics. If a
fmn has operational inefficiency then this is a signal that may employ inefficient managers, therefore this firm is a
takeover target.
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leverage position. It is obvious, that this overall impact of the leverage position of the non-
target group at the economy wide level is clearly affected from the non-target firms of the
chemical sector. When examining the interest paid to loan capital for the non-target group
of the mechanical sector it seems that this sector has affected the economy wide sample
under investigation for that particular ratio. In addition, the debt to equity ratio of the
bidder firms of the food sector seems to be high which denotes that these firms rely on debt
financing. The interest cover ratio of the mechanical target and non target firms suggest that
these firms may face problems to pay future interest on what they have borrowed.
The liquidity position of the non-target group seems to be superior to the liquidity position of
the target and bidder firms. The working capital of the target firms is superior to that of the other
two groups under examination. Target firms are able to utilise their sales to generate more
current assets. The target and the non-target group seem to perform and generate significant
amount of their quick assets from their total assets. On the contrary, this is not the case of bidder
firms. The next interesting finding is that target firms do generate a lot of quick assets from their
sales but this is not the case for the other two groups. Empirical findings from the graphical mean
analysis do support the notion that target firms are potential takeover targets due to their healthy
liquidity position. The liquidity position of the target group is better than the bidder group and
especially for the electronics and mechanical sector. From the current ratio and the quick asset
ratio the target firms of the construction sector are less liquid than the bidder firms of the same
sector. The quick asset ratio of the food industry is the lowest across all groups and this is due
to the nature of the activities of that sector. The reason for this may be the fact that in the
numerator of that ratio we do not take into account stock The working capital to sales ratio for
the target firms of the mechanical sector is higher when compared to the other sectors. This is
very important because by examining the same ratio at the economy wide level the target group
has a higher working capital ratio when compared to the other groups. The performance of the
target firms of the mechanical sector for the working capital ratio affects the performance of the
target firms of the economy wide sample. In addition, the quick assets to sales and the current
assets to sales ratio for the mechanical sector have similar implications to what has just been
explained for the working capital to sales ratio, that the performance of the target firms of the
mechanical sector affects the performance of the target firms in the economy wide sample.
Therefore, these are very good examples which suggests that we need to discriminate between
different groups by industry. The target firms of the electronics industry seem to show the best
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performance for the cash to total assets ratio and the worst performance comes from the target
firms of the food sector. The current assets to total assets ratio shows that the target firms of the
chemical sector has the best performance when compared to the other groups across all the
industries under examination.
The non-target group seems to invest a substantial amount of money to improve their asset
position which may denote that they have good research and development capabilities as
well. Finally, the non-target group of the mechanical sector seems to spend more money on
capital expenditure and generates more sales compared to the other industries. This may
be an indication of good research and development output for the non-target group of the
mechanical sector, whose output ultimately generates sufficient sales to sustain competitive
advantage in the market.
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THE ECONOMY WIDE MODELS
5.1 Introduction
In this chapter, I present the main empirical findings for the economy wide models.
Following the discussion in chapter 3 multivariate binomial logit has been selected to
estimate the models presented here as it is preferred to MDA and as conclusions drawn
from probit are not materially different. First of all I attempt to discriminate between bidders
and targets and then between non targets and targets. In undertaking the analysis I
distinguish three distinct periods: estimation (1982-1985), validation (1986-1990) and the
whole period (1982-1990). In conclusion, I attempt to assess whether the financial
characteristics of a typical acquired firm relative to bidders and non targets is recognisable
from previous results and the rather tentative data analysis of the previous chapter.
5.2 Modelling merger and acquisition activity
The method of analysis selected is binomial logit. Logit is preferred to the linear probability
model for the reasons stated in chapter 3. The choice between logit and probit is quite
arbitrary as both methods define nice s- shaped functions'. The major advantage of logit is
that it is easier to generalise which provides us with a simple development path for future
research. In addition, I do not impose normality on the choice process which means that the
logit for any parametarisation has a fatter tailed distribution. All of the above methods
define a probability model for the choice problem which is dependent on a vector of
regressors or covariates. The regressors selected define measures of the hypotheses
formulated in chapter 2. The probability ( H ) that a firm is a takeover target can be
described from the following function:
1 In fact the logit and probit estimates are proportional to each other (Kmenta (1990) ).
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11 f(p 1 , p 2 , p 3, P4' p5)	 (1)
where p profitability 02
p 2 = inefficient management (-)
p 3 = financial leverage (-)
p 4 = corporate liquidity (+)
p 5 = capital expenditure (+)
The latent hypotheses behind the underlying theoretical model are described by p 1, p 2, p
p 4 and p 5. In practice, I have a list of regressors (4) which take account of these latent
variables and for the binomial logit the following probability model is defined:
exP 
(Z)
	
for binomial logit ( See chapter 3 )where f (Z,) — 1 + exP (z1)
z i
 = p o +/3 1 X 11 +/12 X 2, + fi3x3i
As stated in chapter 3, the problem with financial accounting data is the preponderance of
measures of similar theoretical variables and the high degree of correlation between the
variables. In the first instance I devised a number of strategies to select the appropriate
variables for the latent hypotheses that I wished to test. Clearly, the method selected should
pick the significant variables to discriminate between the choice states and ideally they
should be identified with specific hypotheses. Varimax factor analysis, stepwise regression
and the General to specific approach of Davidson et. (1978) have been the methods
applied to this data. Of these procedures the final results are based on the stepwise method.
However, the relative loadings for factor analysis associated with the selected variables are
presented in Appendix VI and the percentage variance for the factor associated with specific
2 In the parenthesis I have put the expected sign from each hypothesis. Each hypothesis is represented from financial
accounting ratios that are described in chapter 2 (Section 2.4). Profitability hypothesis is represented from the
financial accounting ratios of the profitability group of ratios, inefficient management hypothesis is represented from
the financial accounting ratios of the efficiency group of ratios, financial leverage hypothesis is represented from the
financial accounting ratios of the leverage group of ratios, corporate liquidity hypothesis is represented from the
financial accounting ratios of the liquidity group of ratios and capital expenditure hypothesis is represented from the
financial accounting ratios of the capital expenditure group of ratios.
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variables are in Appendix VI, as well as in the footnotes. The General to specific approach
is the downward testing procedure followed by certain time series econometricians (for
more detail see Cuthbertson et. al. (1992) ). However high correlation between financial
variables means that a general model with 38 variables could not be estimated. Ideally, the
stepwise approach and general to specific procedure should in large sample give the same
results. In practice, stepwise regression does not appear to suffer from the same type of
problems which is important as any misspecification or ommition of variables is likely to
cause inconsistency in the discrete choice case ( W.Greene (1992) ). The multicollinearity
observed is a function of the latent structure given by (1) above as many of the covariates
define alternative measures of the same thing which is the basis of latent definition behind
the use of factor analysis. Unfortunately, factor analysis did not successfully determine the
appropriate variables in my final specification. Finally, the specific models selected can
always be compared with the most feasible general specification. In what follows I first
analyse target firms relative to bidders using the three different sample periods. Then, I
analyse targets relative to non- targets.
5.3 Comparing Bidders with Targets: The Economy Wide Models
The purpose of this section is to examine the results of the economy wide sample when
comparing bidders with targets. In this section, I examine the financial characteristics of
target firms relative to bidder firms. The economy wide sample consists of all the bidder and
target firms3 . Here, I present the multivariate binomial logit models for the time periods
1982-1985 (estimation period), 1986-1990 (validation period) and 1982-1990 (whole
period). The validation period is primarily used to examine the parametric stability of the
model in the estimation period.
5.3.1 Estimation Period: 1982-1985
This section describes the multivariate model that has been estimated for the period 1982-
1985. Once the stepwise procedure has selected a set of important variables, the final
specification of the model presented here was based on their significance. Initially weak
inference was sufficient to keep variables in the models, but once specific models were
3 See chapter 4 (Table 4.2-5 and 4.2-6) .
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!Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-ratio Probltl x Mean of X Std.Dev.of X
Constant 0.84505 2.525 0.335 0.73782
X20 -6.9598 2.629 -2.648 0.00811 0.15346 0.17009
X25 9.5331 2.641 3.610 0.00031 0.35864 0.18326
X7 3.9967 1.521 2.627 0.00861 7.9255 0.78685
X11 -4.5012 1.519 -2.962 0.00305 7.7570 0.80083
Constant
X20 = Working Capital to Sales (Significant at 99%) (LIQUIDITY)
X25 = Quick Assets to Sales (Significant at 99%) (LIQUIDITY)
X7 = Annual Sales (Natural Log of Sales) (Significant at 99%) (EFFICIENCY)
X11 = Annual amount of Total Assets- (Natural Log of Total Assets)
(Significant at 99%) (EFFICIENCY)
Table 5.3-1
1
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found a more usual 5% criterion was used for the results in the estimation period. The final
multivariate model was selected using the F criterion from the stepwise regression, then
significance, theoretical acceptability and predictive power were used to confirm the results
of the logits.
Multivariate Binomial Logit Model
Dependent Variable: Bidder= 0
Target= 1
Maximum Likelihood Estimates
Log-Likelihood 	 -55.03345
Restricted (Slopes=0) Log-L. -67.23012
Chi-Squared	 (4) 	 24.39335
Significance Level 	 0.6660587E-04
Frequencies of actual & predicted outcomes
Predicted outcome has maximum probability.
Predicted
Actual 0 1 TOTAL
0 34 14 48
1 15 34 49
TOTAL 49 48 97
Conditional Classification Accuracy: (34/49) X 100 = 69.39%
Overall Classification Accuracy: (34+34)/ 97 X 100 = 70.10%
Table 5.3-2
The results of the model (See Table 5.3-1) based on logit for the period (1982-1985)
indicate that working capital to sales (liquidity), quick assets to sales (liquidity), annual sales
(natural log of sales) (efficiency) and the annual amount of total assets - (natural log of total
assets) (efficiency) are significant at the 99 percent level. The outcome of the present model
suggests that the probability of being a target among the sample of targets and bidders
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increases when working capital to sales (liquidity) and annual amount of total assets -
(natural log of total assets) (efficiency) decrease and when quick assets to sales (liquidity)
and annual sales (natural log of sales) (efficiency) increase. Therefore when discriminating
between bidders and targets at the economy wide level the dominant dimensions are
liquidity and efficiency. The negative sign of the working capital to sales ratio should be
investigated further because it suggests that illiquid firms are at risk. This contradicts the
results for the quick assets to sales ratio which says the reverse. However, the quick assets
ratio incorporates the cash holdings and claims on debtors. These are essentially assets
which can be quickly mobilised. Clearly, large holding of such assets relative to sales would
be significant attraction to prospective bidding firms.
If I refer to previous studies, then we can see that the ratios in my specified model have
appeared before:
Low working capital to sales (liquidity)
This ratio has been used by Belkaoui (1978)4 and it was one of the proxies for the liquid asset
turnover group. The results of the working capital to sales ratio in the present model suggest
that target firms do not generate enough working capital from their sales.
Low annual amount of total assets - (natural log of total assets) (efficiency)
This ratio has been employed by Harris et. al.(1982) as a proxy for the size dimension. The
present thesis has seen the natural log of total assets as a measure of efficiency. The findings
of the present model suggest that target firms are inefficient and this finding is theory
consistent with the inefficient management hypothesis.
High quick assets to sales (liquidity)
This ratio has been employed by Belkaoui (1978) 5 and it was one of the proxies for the liquid
asset turnover group. The sign of the coefficient of the quick assets to sales ratio in the present
model reveals that target firms are liquid and this finding is theory consistent with the
4 This ratio had the following percentage error in classification for years one to five before the takeover: 50%, 46%,
44%, 54% and 44%.
5 This ratio had the following percentage error in classification for years one to five before the takeover:
34%, 36%, 40%, 42% and 48%.
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liquidity hypothesis which says that acquired firms are liquid firms. This ratio shows that the
targets' quick assets are generated from their sales.
High annual sales (natural log of sales) (efficiency)
Simkovvitz and Monroe (1971), Wansley and Lane (1983) and Ronnie J. Clayton and M.
Andrew Fields (1991) employed the annual sales variable in their studies. Wansley and Lane
(1983) and Ronnie J. Clayton and M. Andrew Fields (1991) used this measure as a proxy of
size and their results suggest that target firms were of small size. The present thesis has seen
the above ratio as a measure of efficiency but for comparison purposes if this is seen as a
proxy for size then the present model reveals that target firms were big in size. This is a
new finding for the existing literature which suggest that target firms in the 80's were bigger
in size.
Table 5.3-2 summarises the frequencies of predicted and actual outcomes. Thirty-four of the
bidder firms are correctly classified by the model. Fourteen of the bidder firms are
incorrectly classified by the model. Fifteen of the target firms are incorrectly classified by
the model. Thirty-four of the target firms are classified correctly by the modeL The
conditional classification accuracy of the model is 69.39%. The overall prediction accuracy6
of the model is 70.10%.
5.3.2 Validation Period: 1986-1990
It is proper to think of the prediction period as being based on a completely different sample
of firms. In particular Kemp7 (1995) has suggested, that an analogue of the predictive
failure test used in time series might also be used here. Unfortunately, at the time of
specifying the original models the exact test procedure was not available. However, I can
look at the results for a separate period and determine whether the model parameters have
materially changed. When the derived model from the estimation period is tested in the
validation period (1986-1990) the variables do give the same sign s , the variables are jointly
6 This should properly be viewed as a measure of goodness of fit as this is what Maddala (1992) (p.334) calls the count
R2.
7 Gordon C.R. Kemp (1995), Structural Stability Analysis in Duration Models, Department of Economics, University
of Essex, February.
8 lithe signs of the coefficients are the same in the validation period this means that the result of the hypotheses do not
alter between the estimation and the validation period.
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'Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-ratio	 Probltl x Mean of X Std.Dev.of X I
Constant 3.4653 1.890 1.833 0.06678
X20 -6.3378 1.708 -3.711 0.00021 0.69336 4.7612
X25 4.7721 1.268 3.764 0.00017 1.1349 6.6320
X7 1.0469 1.152 0.909 0.36359 7.7765 0.87040
X11 -1.5227 1.188 -1.282 0.19989 7.6614 0.79863
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significant and the fit of the models is similar. This section describes the multivariate model
of the validation period 1986-1990.
Multivariate Binomial Logit Model
Dependent Variable: Bidder= 0
Target= 1
Maximum Likelihood Estimates
Log-Likelihood 	 -76.85682
Restricted (Slopes=0) Log-L. -89.74850
Chi-Squared	 (4) 	 25.78336
Significance Level 	 0.3499141E-04
Constant (Significant at 95%)
X20 . Working Capital to Sales (Significant at 99%) (LIQUIDITY)
X25 = Quick Assets to Sales (Significant at 99%) (LIQUIDITY)
X7 . Annual Sales (Natural Log of Sales) (Significant at 75%) (EFFICIENCY)
X11 = Annual amount of Total Assets- (Natural Log of Total Assets)
(Significant at 75%) (EFFICIENCY)
Table 5.3-3
Frequencies of actual & predicted outcomes
Predicted outcome has maximum probability.
Predicted
Actual 0 1 TOTAL
0 18 29 47
1 4 90 94
TOTAL 22 119 141
Conditional Classification Accuracy: (90/94) X 100 . 95.74%
Overall Classification Accuracy: (90+18)/ 141 X 100 = 76.60%
Table 5.3-4
Roughly using 2SE (comparing the standard errors of the variables in tables 5.3-1 and 5.3-
3) bands for the estimation period for which model was selected we could accept that all the
above parameters are the same (notice that the reverse is not true- hence we might want to
be careful in our final interpretation of these results). But they provide weak confirmation of
a similar model over the two periods and the fit of the model if anything is better in the
validation period. Table 5.3-4 summarises the frequencies of predicted and actual outcomes.
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Eighteen of the bidder firms are correctly classified by the model. Twenty-nine of the bidder
firms are incorrectly classified by the model. Four of the target firms are incorrectly
classified by the model. Ninety of the target firms are classified correctly by the model. The
conditional classification accuracy of the model is 95.74%. The overall classification
accuracy of the model is 76.60%. On the other hand, the multivariate binomial logit model9
in the estimation period (1982-1985) has achieved the conditional classification accuracy of
69.39% and an overall classification accuracy of 70.10%. It seems that this model has
achieved a high predictive accuracy in identifying takeover target firms (in a sample of
bidder and target firms).
5.3.3 The Combined Sample: 1982-1990
In this section I describe the model derived for the period 1982-1990 since it was felt that it
would be useful for comparison purposes. The 38 variables l° which were under
consideration have been used in a stepwise regression procedure and in factor il analysis.
Multivariate Binomial Logit Model
Dependent Variable: Bidder. 0
Target= 1
Maximum Likelihood Estimates
Log-Likelihood 	 -137.2774
Restricted (Slopes=0) Log-L. -159.5845
Chi-Squared (4)	 	 44.61427
Significance Level 	 0.4142439E-08
9 See Table 5.3-1.
" The variables under consideration are six year averages for bidder and target firms before the announcement of the
bid. For each variable that enters the final model I provide its results for the stepwise regression analysis and its
results for factor analysis in the footnotes.
11 See Appendix II for a theoretical discussion of factor analysis and Appendix Vito examine the results of factor
analysis that are associated with the present thesis.
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'Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-ratio Probltl x Mean of X Std.Dev.of X 1
Constant	 3.0930	 1.472	 2.101	 0.03567
X11	 -0.51348	 0.1829	 -2.807	 0.00500	 7.6997	 0.79916
X20	 -7.4049	 1.625	 -4.556	 0.00001	 0.47521	 3.6783
X25	 5.4194	 1.168	 4.641	 0.00000	 0.82086	 5.1236
X21	 2.2465	 1.059	 2.121	 0.03392
	 0.20167
	
0.18939
Constant (Significant at 95%)
X11 . Annual amount of Total Assetsn - (Natural Log of Total Assets)
(Significant at 99%) (EFFICIENCY)
X20 = Working Capital to Sales n (Significant at 99%) (LIQUIDITY)
X25 = Quick Assets to Sales" (Significant at 99%) (LIQUIDITY)
X21 = Working Capital to Total Assetsn (Significant at 95%) (LIQUIDITY)
Table 5.3-5
Frequencies of actual & predicted outcomes.
Predicted outcome has maximum probability.
Predicted
Actual
	
0	 1	 TOTAL
0 46 49 95
1 19 123 142
TOTAL	 65	 172	 237
Conditional Classification Accuracy: (123/142) X 100 = 86.62%
Overall Classification Accuracy: (123+46)/ 237 X 100 = 71.30%
Table 5.3-6
12 This variable has been identified by the stepwise regression analysis. Stepwise Regression Result for X11:
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-ratio Probltl x Mean of X Std.Dev.of X
XII	 -0.91409E-01 0.4191E-01 -2.181 0.03032 7.7534	 4.7570
In varimax factor analysis it appears under the fifth factor with the highest loading (See Appendix VI- Table 58). The
fifth factor explains 7.8% of the total variance (See Appendix VI- Table 58). This variable has been significant in the
tmivariate binomial logit and tmivariate binomial probit analysis as well.
13 This variable has been identified by the stepwise regression analysis. Stepwise Regression Result for X20:
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-ratio Probltl x Mean of X Std.Dev.of X
X20	 -1.1609	 0.2318	 -5.008 0.00000 0.18143	 25.083
In varimax factor analysis it appears under the fourth and the ninth factor (See Appendix VI- Table 58). The higher
loading comes under the fourth factor which explains 8.7% of the total variance (See Appendix VI- Table 58).
14 This variable has been identified by the stepwise regression analysis. Stepwise Regression Result for X25:
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-ratio Probltlx Mean of X Std.Dev.of X
X25	 0.54270	 0.1284	 4.227 0.00004 0.40755	 17.867
In varimax factor analysis it appears under the fourth and the ninth factor (See Appendix VI- Table 58). The higher
loading comes under the ninth factor which explains 3.8% of the total variance (See Appendix VI- Table 58). This
variable has been significant in the univariate binomial logit and univariate binomial probit analysis as well.
15 This variable has been identified by the stepwise regression analysis. Stepwise Regression Result for X21:
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-ratio ProbItl x Mean of X Std.Dev.of X
X21	 0.53346	 0.2008	 2.656 0.00852 0.19650	 7.0568
In varimax factor analysis it appears under the second and the fourth factor (See Appendix VI- Table 58). The
higher loading comes under the fourth factor which explains 8.7% of the total variance (See Appendix VI- Table
58). This variable has been significant in the tmivariate binomial logit and univariate binomial probit analysis as
well.
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Comparing the specified model which is selected in the periods (1982-1985, 1986-1990)
with that of 1982-1990 we have three common variables (X20, X25, X11). These variables
for the above models give exactly the same sign for their coefficients.
The results of the model (See Table 5.3-5) based on logit for the period (1982-1990)
indicate that the annual amount of total assets - (natural log of total assets) (efficiency),
working capital to sales (liquidity), quick assets to sales (liquidity) are significant at the 99
percent level. The working capital to total assets (liquidity) is significant at the 95 percent
level. The outcome of the present model suggests that the probability of being a target
among the sample of targets and bidders increases when the annual amount of total assets
(efficiency) and working capital to sales (liquidity) decrease and when quick assets to sales
(liquidity) and working capital to total assets (liquidity) increase. Moreover, the graphical
presentation of the means 16 for three" of the four financial ratios that have entered the final
model do support the sign of the coefficients of the model shown in Table 5.3-5. The
liquidity aspect appears to be the predominant one. Two liquidity ratios 18 that have entered
the final model are consistent with the liquidity theory which says that acquired firms are
liquid firms. However, another liquidity ratio° that has entered the model indicates that
target firms are illiquid. The results on the liquidity dimension suggest that target firms can
cover their short term liabilities from their total asset position but not from their sales.
Moreover, the quick asset position of target firms may be an attractive characteristic for
potential bidders. From the efficiency aspect the annual amount of total assets (natural log
of total assets) has entered the model which suggest that target firms are not efficient
enough to generate total assets. Table 5.3-6 summarises the frequencies of predicted and
actual outcomes. Forty-six of the bidder firms are correctly classified by the model. Forty-
nine of the bidder firms are incorrectly classified by the model. Nineteen of the target firms
are incorrectly classified by the model. One hundred and twenty three of the target firms are
classified correctly by the model. The conditional classification accuracy of the model is
86.62%. The overall classification accuracy of the model is 71.30%.
16 See Chapter 4.
17 The annual amount of total assets - (natural log of total assets) (efficiency) (Figure 4.5-11), quick assets to sales
(liquidity) (Figure 4.5-25) and the working capital to total assets (liquidity) (Figure 4.5-21).
18 Quick assets to sales (liquidity) and working capital to total assets (liquidity).
" Working capital to sales (liquidity).
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5.4 Comparing Non Targets with Targets: The Economy Wide
Models
The purpose of this section is to discriminate between non targets and targets based on their
financial characteristics. The economy wide sample used in the present section consists of
all the non target and target firms under analysis20 . This section presents the multivariate
binomial logit models for the time periods 1982-1985 (estimation period), 1986-1990
(validation period) and 1982-1990 (whole period).
5.4.1 Estimation Period: 1982-1985
This section presents the economy wide model derived in the estimation period 1982-1985
when comparing non targets with targets.
Multivariate Binomial Logit Model
Dependent Variable: Non- Target= 0
Target = 1
Maximum Likelihood Estimates
Log-Likelihood 	 	 -56.76226
Restricted (Slopes=0) Log-L 	 	 -73.78780
Chi-Squared (6) 
	 	
34.05108
Significance Level 	 	 0.6575683E-05
'Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-ratio Problti x Mean of X Std.Dev.of X
Constant 0.63922 2.490 0.257 0.79743
X10 7.5526 2.822 2.676 0.00744 7.1373 0.76519
X11 -6.7654 2.647 -2.556 0.01059 7.5242 0.78972
X12 0.11791E-01 0.8089E-02 1.458 0.14493 57.625 28.543
X31 -7.3222 2.508 -2.919 0.00351 0.66861 0.30436
X19 0.47118 0.2658 1.773 0.07627 3.3792 4.9091
X22 -54.732 29.53 -1.853 0.06382 0.32067E-01 0.44719E-01
Constant
X10 . Annual Equity and Capital Reserves- (Natural Log of Equity and Capital
Reserves) (Significant at 99%) (EFFICIENCY)
X11 = Annual amount of Total Assets- (Natural Log of Total Assets)
(Significant at 99%) (EFFICIENCY)
X12 = Average Debtor Collection Period (Significant at 90%) (EFFICIENCY)
X31 = Loan Capital and Preference Capital to Total Assets (Significant at 99%)
(LEVERAGE)
X19 = Cash Position No.3 (Significant at 95%) (LIQUIDITY)
X22 = Cash to Total Assets (Significant at 95%) (LIQUIDITY)
Table 5.4-7
20 See chapter 4 (Table 4.2-5 and 4.2-6) .
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Frequencies of actual & predicted outcomes
Predicted outcome has maximum probability.
Predicted
Actual 0 1 TOTAL
0 39 19 58
1 11 38 49
TOTAL 50 57 107
Conditional Classification Accuracy: (38/49) X 100 = 77.55%
Overall Classification Accuracy: (38+39)/ 107 X 100 = 71.96%
Table 5.4-8
The results of the model (See Table 5.4-7) based on logit for the period (1982-1985)
indicate that annual equity and capital reserves - (natural log of equity and capital reserves)
(efficiency), annual amount of total assets - (natural log of total assets) (efficiency) and the
loan capital and preference capital to total assets (leverage) are significant at the 99 percent
level, the cash position no.3 (liquidity) and the cash to total assets (liquidity) are significant
at the 95 percent level and the average debtor collection period (efficiency) is significant at
the 90 percent level. The outcome of the present model suggests that the probability of
being a target among the sample of targets and non-targets increases when annual amount
of total assets - (natural log of total assets) (efficiency), loan capital and preference capital
to total assets (leverage) and cash to total assets (liquidity) decrease and when annual equity
and capital reserves - (natural log of equity and capital reserves) (efficiency), average
debtor collection period (efficiency) and cash position no.3 (liquidity) increase.
If I refer to previous studies, then we can see that the ratios in my specified model have
appeared before:
Low annual amount of total assets - (natural log of total assets) (efficiency)
This ratio has been employed by Harris et. al.(1982) as a proxy for the size dimension. The
present thesis has seen the natural log of total assets as a measure of efficiency. The annual
amount of total assets in the present model suggests that target firms are inefficient firms.
This finding has been significant for the same multivariate analysis when discriminating
bidders and targets.
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Low loan capital and preference capital to total assets (leverage)
This ratio is used by Stevens (1973) in the final discriminant model and represents the
leverage dimension of the study and suggests that acquired firms have a lower Long- Term
Liability/ Total Assets ratio. Moreover, Harris et al.(1982) employed this ratio as a proxy
for the financial leverage dimension . Besides this, this variable has entered the final LDA
model of Wansley and Lane (1983) and it was a proxy for leverage and found that acquired
firms use less debt. Dietrich and Sorensen (1984) used this ratio as a proxy for leverage and it
has entered the final model and their findings suggest that acquired firms use less leverage. It
appears that the finding of the present model for the behaviour of the loan capital and
preference capital to total assets ratio which is a proxy of the leverage dimension is
consistent with the findings of the previous studies ( Stevens (1973), Wansley and Lane
(1983) and Dietrich and Sorensen (1984) ). This finding suggest that target firms have low
leverage and this is theoretically consistent with the financial leverage hypothesis which says that
acquired firms use less debt in their capital structure.
Low cash to total assets (liquidity)
This ratio indicates the amount of cash that is generated from the total assets. This ratio has
been examined in the study carried out by Belkaoui (1978)21 and it was one of the ratios
under the liquid assets to total asset group. The present model suggest that target firms do
not generate a lot of cash from their total assets.
High annual equity and capital reserves - (natural log of equity and capital reserves)
(efficiency)
This ratio is employed by Simkowitz and Monroe (1971) and it has entered their final model
as a proxy for the growth dimension. Simkowitz and Monroe (1971) found that among the
most significant ratios which give the greatest efficiency on standardise coefficients of the
discriminant function was the growth rates in equity. This variable in the study developed by
Simkowitz and Monroe (1971) indicates that acquired firms were relatively unable to build
the equity base needed and this was a signal of low growth in equity. Joel Hasbrouk (1985)
employed this ratio as a measure of size and based on the t-statistics, this was the most
important determinant and the sign of the coefficient suggested a low size for acquired
21 This ratio had the following percentage error in classification for years one to five before the takeover:
48%, 44%, 42%, 42% and 36%.
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firms. For the present thesis the log of the annual equity and capital reserves has been seen
as a measure of efficiency and the result suggests that target firms make an attempt to build
up an equity base in the market so as to sustain competitive position in the market.
High average debtor collection period (efficiency)
This ratio shows how frequently debtors pay their debts. The present thesis shows that acquired
firms' debtors do not pay at the specific time limits set up by the firms and this may suggest
cash flow problems. The present thesis has seen the average debtor collection period as a
measure of efficiency and it seems that acquired firms are inefficient in collecting their debts.
This finding is theoretically consistent with the inefficient management hypothesis.
High cash position no.3 (liquidity)
The higher the ratio, the higher the cash resources available to the firm. This ratio is
employed by Ronnie J. Clayton and M. Andrew Fields (1991) as a proxy of the liquidity
dimension but has not been successful to enter their final model. The present thesis suggests
that target firms have high cash resources which is theoretically consistent with the liquidity
hypothesis which says that target firms are liquid firms.
Table 5.4-8 summarises the frequencies of predicted and actual outcomes. Thirty-nine of the
non-target firms are correctly classified by the model. Nineteen of the non-target firms are
incorrectly classified by the model. Eleven of the target firms are incorrectly classified by the
model. Thirty-eight of the target firms are classified correctly by the model. The conditional
classification accuracy of the model is 77.55%. The overall prediction accuracy of the
model is 71.96%.
5.4.2 Validation Period: 1986-1990
Multivariate Binomial Logit Model
Dependent Variable: Non- Target= 0
Target = 1
Maximum Likelihood Estimates
Log-Likelihood 	 	 -113.6270
Restricted (Slopes=0) Log-L 	 	 -136.0184
Chi-Squared (6) 	 	 44.78276
Significance Level 	 	 0.5105223E-07
133
CHAPTER 5
	
Economy Wide Models
'Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-ratio Probltl x Mean of X Std.Dev.of X	 I
Constant -2.7225 1.790 -1.521 0.12831
X10 3.0137 1.137 2.652 0.00801 7.1449 0.75507
X11 -2.6692 1.121 -2.382 0.01724 7.5291 0.74584
X12 0.23128E-01 0.6052E-02 3.822 0.00013 65.573 33.560
X31 -0.90835 0.3835
-2.369 0.01785 0.68975 0.55122
X19 0.42626 0.1198 3.557 0.00038 5.7893 8.4725
X22 -41.630 12.70 -3.279 0.00104 0.60196E-01 0.82851E-01
Constant (Significant at 90%)
X10 = Annual Equity and Capital Reserves- (Natural Log of Equity and Capital
Reserves) (Significant at 99%) (EFFICIENCY)
X11 = Annual amount of Total Assets- (Natural Log of Total Assets)
(Significant at 99%) (EFFICIENCY)
X12 = Average Debtor Collection Period (Significant at 99%) (EFFICIENCY)
X31 = Loan Capital and Preference Capital to Total Assets (Significant at 99%)
(LEVERAGE )
X19 = Cash Position No.3 (Significant at 99%) (LIQUIDITY)
X22 = Cash to Total Assets (Significant at 99%) (LIQUIDITY)
Table 5.4-9
Frequencies of actual & predicted outcomes
Predicted outcome has maximum probability.
Predicted
Actual 0 1 TOTAL
0 82 28 110
1 34 54 88
TOTAL 116 82 198
Conditional Classification Accuracy: (54/88) X 100 = 61.36%
Overall Classification Accuracy: (54+82)/ 198 X 100 = 68.69%
Table 5.4-10
The results of the validation model (See Table 5.4-9) reveals the following: the liquidity
ratio [cash position no.3 (liquidity)] suggests that acquired firms are more liquid. On the
other hand, the cash to total assets (liquidity) ratio is not theory consistent with the liquidity
theory of takeovers. Two of the ratios that represent the efficiency dimension, the annual
amount of total assets (natural log of total assets) and the the average debtor collection
period22 (efficiency) suggest that target firms are inefficient. On the other hand, the annual
equity and capital reserves - (natural log of equity and capital reserves) (efficiency) is not
theoretically consistent with the inefficient management hypothesis.
This variable in the model appears with a positive sign and suggests inefficiency because the higher the ratio the
more days the firm needs to collect its debts. If this ratio increase then that may imply that we will have liquidity
problems. The mean value of the ratio indicates the number of days target firms need to collect their debts.
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The leverage dimension has entered the final model with the loan capital and preference
capital to total assets (leverage) ratio which appears to be theoretically consistent with the
financial leverage hypothesis which says that acquired firms use less financial leverage.
Table 5.4-10 summarises the frequencies of predicted and actual outcomes. Eighty-two of
the non-target firms are correctly classified by the model. Twenty-eight of the non-target
firms are incorrectly classified by the model. Thirty-four of the target firms are incorrectly
classified by the model. Fifty-four of the target firms are classified correctly by the model.
The conditional classification accuracy of the model is 61.36%. The overall classification
accuracy of the model is 68.69%. On the other hand, the multivariate binomial logit
mode123 in the analysis sample (1982-1985) has achieved the conditional classification
accuracy of 77.55% and the overall classification accuracy of 71.96%. It seems that this
model has achieved a good predictive accuracy in identifying takeover target firms (in a
sample of non target and target firms).
5.4.3 The Combined Sample: 1982-199024
Multivariate Binomial Logit Model
Dependent Variable: Non- Target= 0
Target = 1
Maximum Likelihood Estimates
Log-Likelihood 	 	 -188.5325
Restricted (Slopes=0) Log-L 	 	 -212.8196
Chi-Squared (7) 	 	 48.57425
Significance Level 	 	 0.2676049E-07
23 See Table 5.4-7.
24 The 38 variables which were under consideration have been used all in a stepwise regression procedure. As it is
discussed in Appendix II, this procedure proved to be satisfactory because it can isolate the variables which will be
significant in the logit models. Moreover, the 38 variables were subject to factor analysis in an attempt to isolate the
significant variables from each dimension under examination. For each variable that enters the final model I provide
its results for stepwise regression analysis and its results for factor analysis.
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'Variable Coefficient Std. Error	 t-ratio Probltl x Mean of X Std.Dev.of X I
Constant -1.3634 1.377 -0.990 0.32228
X12 0.15522E-01 0.4352E-02 3.567 0.00036 62.471 32.167
X10 3.9336 1.032 3.812 0.00014 7.1315 0.76299
X14 -2.4028 0.6544 -3.672 0.00024 1.6795 0.81275
X21 3.6842 1.287 2.863 0.00419 0.20867 0.17361
X31 -1.3926 0.3827 -3.639 0.00027 0.68062 0.47635
X11 -3.4602 0.9978 -3.468 0.00052 7.5208 0.75811
X15 1.5333 0.6015 2.549 0.01080 1.4831 0.77819
Constant (Significant at 75%)
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X12 = Average Debtor Collection Period 25
 (Significant at 99%) (EFFICIENCY)
X10 = Annual Equity and Capital Reservesu
 - (Natural Log of Equity and Capital
Reserves)(Significant at 99%) (EFFICIENCY)
X14 = Current Ratio 27
 (Working Capital Ratio) (Significant at 99%) (LIQUIDITY)
X21 = Working Capital to Total Assets u (Significant at 99%) (LIQUIDITY)
X31 = Loan Capital and Preference Capital to Total Assets29
(Significant at 99%)(LEVERAGE)
X11 = Annual amount of Total Assets"- (Natural Log of Total Assets)
(Significant at 99%) (EFFICIENCY)
X15 = Acid Test or Liquid Asset or Quick Asset Ratio 3 ' (Significant at 99%)
(LIQUIDITY)
Table 5.4-11
25 This variable has been identified by the stepwise regression analysis. Stepwise Regression Result for X12:
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-ratio Probltlx Mean of X Std.Dev.of X
X12	 0.38960E-02 0.9861E-03 3.951 0.00010 64.586 	 15.609
In varimax factor analysis it appears under the fifth factor the sixth factor and the eipjath factor (See Appendix VI- Table 591 The hiAher
loading conies under the eighth factor which explains 4.%of the total variance (See Appendix VI- Table 59). This variable has been
significant in the univanate binomial logit and umvanate binomial probit analysis as well.
26 This variable has been identified by the stepwise regression analysis. Stepwise Regression Result for X10:
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-ratio Prob10 x Mean of X Std.Dev.of X
X10	 0.50736	 0.1410	 3.598 0.00039 7.2045	 12.948
In varimax factor analysis it appears under the first factor the sixth factor and the seventh factor (See AppendixVI- Table 591. The hipjaer
loading comes under Ute sixth factorwhicia explains 6.d% of the total variance (See Appendix VI- Table 59). This variable has been
significant in the univanate binomial logit and univanate binomial probit analysis as well.
25 This variable has been identified by the stepwise regressim analysis. Stepwise Regressim Result for X14:
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-ratio Probltlx Mean of X Std.Dev.of X 
X14	 -0.57723	 0.1274	 -4.531 0.00001 1.5964	 20.527
In varimax factor analysis it appears under the 
the .factor and the fifth factor fSec_Appendix VI- Table 59). The higher loading comesunder the fourth factor which explains 8.0% of total variance (See Appendix VI- Tabl-e 59).
28 This variable has been identified by the stepwise regression analysis. Stepwise Regression Result for X21:
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-ratio Probitlx Mean of X Std.Dev.of X
X21	 1.0416	 0.3053	 3.412 0.00076 0.19947	 11.640
•
pre
ittvorarimanr tifiaecito rtAniasisil,/
e
it	 ears aimdiniefarthe
valueu ofaftoaorstemh (eoeeuith factor
 odr anixNYVYavhe5f9a)ctgSThe
 (Sec ictiTocr1.6.`q,111- Table'  1. 4509) . The00of the thirdfactor . ce 	
variance while the fourth factorexplains 8.0% of die total variance (See Appendix VI- Table S9).
29 This variable has been identified by the stepwise regression analysis. Stepwise Regression Result for X31:
Variable Coefficient Std. Error 1-ratio Probltlx Mean of X Std.Dev.of X
X31	 -0.26702	 0.7010E-01 -3.809 0.00018 0.70034	 14.510
In varimax factor analysis it appears under the first factor, the third factor and the seventh factorj_See Appendix VI- Table 59). The higher
loading comes under the thirdTactor which explains 11.4% of the total variance (See Appendix V1- Table 59).
This variable has been identified by the stepwise regression analysis. Stepwise Regression Result for X11:
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-ratio Probitlx Mean of X Std.Dev.of X
X11	 -0.41774	 0.1414	 -2.955 0.00345 7.5935	 8.7306
In varimax factor analysis it appears under the sixth factor (See Appendix VI- Table 59). The sixth factor explains 6.0% of the total
variance (See Appendix	 Table 59).
31 This variable has been identified by the stepwise regression analysis. Stepwise Repression Result for X15:
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-ratio Probltlx Mean of X Std.Dev.of X
X15	 0.32771	 0.1291	 2.539 0.01178 1.3735	 6.4448
In varimax factor analysis it appears under the third factor, the fourth factor and the fifth factor (See Appendix VI- Table 59). The higher
loading comes under the fourth- /actor which explains 8.0% of the total variance (See Appendix VI- Table 59).
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Frequencies of actual & predicted outcomes
Predicted outcome has maximum probability.
Predicted' 2
Actual 0 1 TOTAL
0 122 47 169
1 58 82 140
TOTAL 180 129 309
Conditional Classification Accuracy: (82/140) X 100 = 58.57%
Overall Classification Accuracy: (82+122)/ 309 X 100 = 66.02%
Table 5.4-12
Comparing the specified model which is selected in the periods (1982-1985, 1986-1990)
with that of 1982-1990 we have four common variables (X12, X10, X31, X11). These
variables for the above models give exactly the same sign for their coefficients.
The results of the model (See Table 5.4-11) based on logit for the period (1982-1990)
indicate that average debtor collection period (efficiency), annual equity and capital reserves
- (natural log of equity and capital reserves) (efficiency), current ratio (working capital
ratio) (liquidity), working capital to total assets (liquidity), loan capital and preference
capital to total assets (leverage), annual amount of total assets - (natural log of total assets)
(efficiency), acid test or liquid asset or quick asset ratio (liquidity) are significant at the 99
percent level. The outcome of the present model suggests that the probability of being a
target among the sample of targets and non-targets increases when current ratio (working
capital ratio) (liquidity), loan capital and preference capital to total assets (leverage) and
annual amount of total assets - (natural log of total assets) (efficiency) decrease and when
average debtor collection period (efficiency) annual equity and capital reserves - (natural
log of equity and capital reserves) (efficiency) working capital to total assets (liquidity) and
acid test or liquid asset or quick asset ratio (liquidity) increase. Moreover, the findings of
the model get a positive support from the graphical presentation of the mean ratios from
chapter 4. Moreover, the graphical presentation of the means 33 for five34 of the seven
32 The results of this table show very good discrimination for the two states ( 0 and 1) under examination.
33 See Chapter 4.
34 Average Debtor Collection Period (efficiency) (Figure 4.5-12), Annual Equity and Capital Reserves- (Natural Log
of Equity and Capital Reserves) (efficiency) (Figure 4.5-10), Current Ratio (liquidity) (Figure 4.5-14), Working
Capital to Total Assets (liquidity) (Figure 4.5-21) and Loan Capital and Preference Capital to Total Assets
(leverage)(Figure 4.5-31).
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financial ratios that have entered the final model do support the sign of the coefficients of
the model shown in Table 5.4-11. The liquidity aspect appears to be important. Two
liquidity ratios35
 suggest that target firms are liquid firms. On the other hand, the current
ratio (working capital ratio) (liquidity) is not theory consistent with the liquidity hypothesis.
Clearly, target firms are characterised by excess liquidity. As it was explained in chapter 3
the acid test ratio is a better indicator of the liquidity position than the current ratio,
therefore the fact that the current ratio contradicts the acid test ratio should not affect the
finding that target firms are liquid firms. The results of the ratios from the efficiency
dimension that have entered the final model indicate that target firms are inefficient in terms
of generating total assets, they make a positive attempt to build up an equity base in the
market and they do face problems in collecting their debts. The leverage dimension has
entered the final model with the loan capital and preference capital to total assets (leverage)
ratio which appears to be theoretically consistent with the financial leverage hypothesis
which says that acquired firms use less financial leverage. Table 5.4-12 summarises the
frequencies of predicted and actual outcomes. One hundred and twenty-two of the non-
target firms are correctly classified by the model. Forty-seven of the non-target firms are
incorrectly classified by the model. Fifty-eight of the target firms are incorrectly classified by
the model. Eighty-two of the target firms are classified correctly by the model. The
conditional classification accuracy of the model is 58.57%. The overall classification
accuracy of the model is 66.02%.
35 Working capital to total assets (liquidity) and acid test or liquid asset or quick asset ratio (liquidity).
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5.5 Conclusion
The present chapter has analysed one multivariate model for bidders and targets over the
estimation period 1982- 1985. This has been further tested using another sample of firms for
mergers and acquisitions for the period 1986-1990. A similar analysis is undertaken for non
targets against targets. This is essentially a way of testing the models' predictive ability and
if either the parameters or the model structure differs, then the model has failed for the
subsequent period. In discrete choice literature models have been validated using a subset
for the existing data period. In this analysis a separate time period is used which as was
suggested above is similar to the procedure devised by Chow for testing parameter stability
in time series. As a consequence it seemed natural to also look at the whole period. A test
of parameter stability was not undertaken, but a slightly different model does seem to apply
for the two sub-periods as compared with the whole period. The model for the whole
period does include more variables (when comparing non targets with targets) which are
significant, but the predictive accuracy or overall fit is slightly less impressive. A thither
reason for looking at this sample (i.e. whole period) is to provide a comparison for the
sectoral models, as the sectoral sample size precludes a validation period. Therefore, a
further model is also developed for the whole period (1982-1990), for each comparison,
bidders with targets and non targets with targets.
THE ECONOMY WIDE MODELS FOR THE PERIOD 1982-1990
The results of the multivariate binomial logit mode136
 (Bidders against Targets) in the
analysis sample for the period (1982-1990) has achieved the conditional classification
accuracy of 86.62% and an overall classification accuracy of 71.30%. The liquidity aspect
appears to be the predominant one. The results on the liquidity dimension suggest that
target firms can cover their short term liabilities from their total asset position but not from
their sales. Moreover, the quick asset position of target firms may be an attractive
characteristic for potential bidders. From the efficiency aspect the annual amount of total
assets (natural log of total assets) has entered the model which suggest that target firms are
not efficient enough to generate total assets.
36 See Table 5.3-5.
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On the other hand, the results of the multivariate binomial logit mode1 37 (Non Targets
against Targets) in the analysis sample (1982-1990) has achieved the conditional
classification accuracy of 58.57%. The overall classification accuracy of the model is
66.02%. The liquidity aspect appears to be important again. Clearly, target firms are
characterised by excess liquidity. The results of the ratios from the efficiency dimension that
have entered the final model indicate that target firms are inefficient in tenns of generating
total assets, they make a positive attempt to build up an equity base in the market and they
do face problems in collecting their debts. The leverage dimension has entered the final
model with the loan capital and preference capital to total assets (leverage) ratio which
appears to be theoretically consistent with the financial leverage hypothesis which says that
acquired firms use less financial leverage.
Concluding from the above, for both analyses (i.e. bidders against targets and non targets
against targets) for the period 1982-1990 target firms are characterised by a negative
coefficient for the annual amount of total assets which denotes that target firms are
inefficient and this finding is theoretically consistent with the inefficient management
hypothesis. Moreover, target firms for the same period and analyses possess a positive
coefficient for the working capital to total assets which denotes that target firms are liquid
firms which is theory consistent with the liquidity hypothesis.
COMPARING BIDDERS WITH TARGETS - (1982-1985) and (1986-1990)
The results of the multivariate binomial logit mode138 in the estimation period (1982-
1985) (Bidders against Targets) has achieved the conditional classification accuracy of
69.39% and an overall classification accuracy of 70.10%. In the validation period39
(1986-1990) the model has achieved the conditional classification accuracy of 95.74% and
an overall classification accuracy of 76.60%.
31 See Table 5.4-11.
38 See Table 5.3-1.
" See Table 5.3-3.
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In an attempt4° to discriminate between bidders and targets at the economy wide level the
dominant dimensions are liquidity and efficiency. The fundamental characteristics of
takeover targets as identified in the period 1982-1985 and then tested again in 1986-1990
are: low working capital to sales (liquidity), low annual amount of total assets -
(natural log of total assets) (efficiency), high quick assets to sales (liquidity) and high
annual sales (natural log of sales) (efficiency). These findings suggest that when
comparing bidders with targets, target firms are inefficient in terms of generating total assets
but efficient in terms of generating sales. Their sales can assist them to generate quick assets
but not to generate working capital. The present thesis has seen the annual sales figure as a
measure of efficiency but for comparison purposes with the previous studies if this is seen as
a proxy for size then the present model reveals that target firms were big in size. This is a
new finding for the existing literature which suggest that target firms in the 80's were bigger
in size.
COMPARING NON TARGETS WITH TARGETS - (1982-1985) and (1986-1990)
The results of the multivariate binomial logit moder (Non Targets against Targets) in
the analysis sample (1982-1985) has achieved the conditional classification accuracy of
77.55%. The overall classification accuracy of the model is 71.96%. The results of the
multivariate binomial logit mode142
 derived in the validation sample (1986-1990) has
achieved the conditional classification accuracy of 61.36%. The overall classification
accuracy of the model is 68.69%.
In an attempt43
 to discriminate between non targets and targets at the economy wide level
the dominant dimensions are liquidity, leverage and efficiency. The fundamental
characteristics of takeover targets when compared with the non targets as identified in the
period 1982-1985 and then tested again in 1986-1990 are: low annual amount of total
assets - (natural log of total assets) (efficiency), low loan capital and preference capital
to total assets (leverage), low cash to total assets (liquidity), high annual equity and
4° This is the model that is derived in the estimation period (1982-1985) (See Table 5.3-1)and has
been tested in the validation period (1986-1990) (See Table 5.3-3).
41 See Table 5.47.
42 See Table 5.4-9.
43 This is the model that is derived in the estimation period (1982-1985) (See Table 5.4-7) and has
been tested in the validation period (1986-1990) (See Table 5.4-9).
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capital reserves - (natural log of equity and capital reserves) (efficiency), high
average debtor collection period (efficiency) and high cash position no.3 (liquidity).
These findings suggest that when comparing non targets with targets, target firms are
inefficient in terms of generating total assets, they use less leverage in their capital structure,
they utilise limited amount of cash from their total assets but they have good liquidity
position when they add the interest received to their cash position (See Cash position no.3),
they make a positive attempt to build up an equity base in the market and they do face
problems in collecting their debts.
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THE INDUSTRY SPECIFIC MODELS
6.1 Introduction
In this chapter, I present the main empirical findings for the industry specific models. The present
chapter develops industry specific models for the following industries: chemical, construction,
food, electrical and electronics and mechanical engineering. As was advocated by Stanley B.
Block (1969) merger candidates may be identified, to some extent, through intensive industry
analysis. The industry specific models provide information about the financial profiles of takeover
targets by industry. The methodology selected to estimate the models is multivariate binomial
logit. Initially, there is an attempt to discriminate between bidders and targets and then between
non targets and targets, by industry. In undertaking the analysis I have only one period under
examination (1982-1990) whereas for the economy wide models I distinguish three distinct
periods for estimation (1982-1985), validation (1986-1990) and finally for comparison, the
whole sample is used (1982-1990). The sample sizes of the industry specific models were very
small when I made an attempt to derive samples in the estimation and validation period by
industry (See Chapter 4- Table 4.2-5 and Table 4.2-6). Because of that in order to provide a
comparison of the sectoral models with the economy wide model I have re-estimated: i) the
sectoral models using the variables in the economy wide model for the period 1982-1990 and ii)
the sectoral models using the variables in the economy wide model plus the industry variables for
the period 1982-1990. For the above models! provide the likelihood ratio derived.
The variables' under consideration are the financial ratios as described in chapter 3.
The variables under cansideratica are six year averages taken prior to the announcement year for each firm under examinatim .
Dependent Variable: Bidder= 0
Target= 1
Maximum Likelihood Estimates
Log-Likelihood 	
	
Restricted (Slopes=0) Log-L 	
Chi-Squared (2) 	
Significance Level 	
-21.23994
-24.98028
7.480662
0.2374624E-01
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6.2 The Industry Specific Models
As stated in the previous chapter 11 =f(p 1 , p 2 , p 3 , p 4 , p 5 ) where the specific
hypotheses are represented by the same set of basic regressors. However the selection procedure
leads to a number of different variables at the sectoral level. As stated above to provide some
degree of consistency I test each model against a simple general model which captures the
sectoral and economy wide variables. In all cases I am interested in looking at the probability of
being a target versus another state. In what follows I will analyse the results sector by sector
starting with the chemicals industry.
6.3 Chemicals - Bidders against Targets
6.3.1 Multivariate Binomial Logit Analysis - Time Period 1982-1990
Multivariate Binomial Logit Model
'Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-ratio Probltl x Mean of X Std.Dev.of X
Constant -8.0552 4.537 -1.775 0.07582
X6 1.2537 0.9622 1.303 0.19258 1.7757 1.5139
X34 9.2080 6.332 1.454 0.14590 0.71628 0.11043
Constant (Significant at 95%)
X6 = Sales to Total Assets 2 (Significant at 90%) (EFFICIENCY)
X34 = Gearing Ratio 3 (Significant at 90%) (LEVERAGE)
Table 6.3-1
2 The variable under varimax factor analysis it appears under the first factor (See Appendix VI- Table 60). The first
factor explains 34.7% of the total variance (See Appendix VI- Table 60). This variable has been significant in the
imivariate binomial logit and univariate binomial probit analysis.
3 The variable under varimax factor analysis it appears under the sixth factor (See Appendix VI- Table 60). The sixth
factor explains 4.9% of the total variance (See Appendix VI- Table 60). This variable has been significant in the
tmivariate binomial logit and univariate binomial probit analysis.
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Frequencies of actual & predicted outcomes
Predicted outcome has maximum probability.
Predicted
Actual 0 1 TOTAL
8 7 15
1 3 19 22
TOTAL 11 26 37
Conditional Classification Accuracy: (19/22) X 100 = 86.36%
Overall Classification Accuracy: (19+8)/ 37 X 100 = 72.97%
Table 6.3-2
The results of the model (See Table 6.3-1) based on logit for the period (1982-1990) indicate
that sales to total assets (efficiency) and the gearing ratio (leverage) are significant at the 90
percent level The outcome of the present model suggests that the probability of being a target
from the chemical sector among the sample of chemical targets and chemical bidders increases
when sales to total assets (efficiency) and gearing ratio (leverage) increase. The findings of the
model are not theory consistent with the finance literature for the two dimensions that have been
identified as important for the chemical sector. The financial characteristics that make chemical
target firms takeover candidates are: their efficiency position and the level of debt in their capital
structure. Table 6.3-2 summarises the frequencies of predicted and actual outcomes. Eight of the
bidder firms are correctly classified by the model Seven of the bidder firms are incorrectly
classified by the model Three of the target firms are incorrectly classified by the model Nineteen
of the target firms are classified correctly by the model The conditional classification accuracy of
the model is 86.36%. The overall classification accuracy of the model is 72.97%.
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Industry4
(2- 37)5
Restricted Model
Economy wide6
(4- 37)7
Restricted Model
Economy
vvide+1ndustry8
(6-37)9
Unrestricted Model
Logit
Log- Likelthood -21.23994 -23.25763 -20.50255
Industry Test
LR1 ° (Logit Model) hi„dry = 1.47478 < X2 (2) (0.05) = 5.99 (The industry model works) .
Economy wide Test
LR11 (Logit Model)Fm,„,y ,ide = 5.51016 <X2 (4) (0.05) = 9.48 (The economy wide model works).
On the basis of the X2 tests neither the sectoral nor the economy wide models can be rejected.
Hence, they fit the data equally well. However, the industry model is more parsimonious. It has a
better fit and by definition the two variables used must capture the same information as the
economy wide model. Hence, it would be _judged that the industry model provides a better
explanation of the determinants of acquisition, but this explanation does not differ greatly from
the economy wide model (we are still capturing efficiency).
' The variables included in this model are: X6, X34.
4 The first number in the parenthesis indicates the number of the variables and the second number indicates the number
of observations used in the model.
The variables included in this model are: X11, X20, X25, X21.
6 The first number in the parenthesis indicates the number of the variables and the second number indicates the number
of observations used in the model.
7 The variables included in this model are: X11, X20, X25, X21, X6, X34.
8 The first number in the parenthesis indicates the number of the variables and the second number indicates the number
of observations used in the model.
LRIndugry= -2[ Restricted Log-L,:L.0y - Unrestricted Log-L
	 inausuy]
11 LR= -2[ Restricted Log-La..,,,kk
 - Unrestricted Log- LEcannywick+13dAd
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6.4 Chemicals - Non Targets against Targets
6.4.1 Multivariate Binomial Logit Analysis - Time Period 1982-1990
Multivariate Binomial Logit Model
Dependent Variable: Non- Target= 0
Target = 1
Maximum Likelihood Estimates
Log-Likelihood 	 	 -4.011504
Restricted (Slopes=0) Log-L
	 	 -34.29649
Chi-Squared (2) 	 	 60.56997
Significance Level 	 	 0.0000000
'Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-ratio Probltl x Mean of X Std.Dev.of X
Constant -20.477 16.52 -1.240 0.21514
X16 14.989 11.13 1.347 0.17791 1.1543 0.57349
X22 37.934 32.01 1.185 0.23602 0.44775E-01 0.77317E-01
Constant (Significant at 75%)
X16 = Asset Covern
 (Significant at 90%) (LIQUIDITY)
X22 = Cash to Total Assetsn
 (Significant at 75%) (LIQUIDITY)
Table 6.4-1
Frequencies of actual & predicted outcomes
Predicted outcome has maximum probability.
Predicted
Actual 0 1 TOTAL
0 26 2 28
1 1 21 22
TOTAL 27 23 50
Conditional Classification Accuracy: (21/22) X 100 = 95.45%
Overall Classification Accuracy: (21+26)/ 50 X 100 = 94.00%
Table 6.4-2
12 This variable has been identified by the stepwise regression analysis. Stepwise Regression Result for X16:
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-ratio Probltl x Mean of X	 Std.Dev.of X
X16	 0.81717	 0.5036E-01 16.226 0.00000 1.1583	 263.28
The variable under varimax factor analysis it appears under the eighth factor (See Appendix VI-Table 61). The
eighth factor explains 3.8% of the total variance (See Appendix VI-Table 61). This variable has been significant in
the univariate binomial logit and univariate binomial probit analysis.
13 This variable has been identified by the stepwise regression analysis. Stepwise Regression Result for X22:
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-ratio Probltl x Mean of X	 Std.Dev.of X
X22	 3.1084	 0.4151	 7.488 0.00000	 0.37197E-01 56.076
The variable under varimax factor analysis it appears under the first factor (See Appendix VI-Table 61). The first
factor explains 26.9% of the total variance (See Appendix VI-Table 61).
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The results of the model (See Table 6.4-1) based on logit for the period (1982-1990)
indicate that the asset cover (liquidity) is significant at the 90 percent leveL The cash to total
assets (liquidity) is significant at the 75 percent level. The outcome of the present model
suggests that the probability of being a chemical target among the sample of chemical
targets and chemical non-targets increases when asset cover (liquidity) and cash to total
assets (liquidity) increase. The liquidity aspect appears to be the predominant one for the
chemical sector. The liquidity ratios which have entered the final model suggest that
chemical target firms are characterised by excess liquidity. Table 6.4-2 summarises the
frequencies of predicted and actual outcomes. Twenty-six of the non-target firms are
correctly classified by the model. Two of the non-target firms are incorrectly classified by
the model. One of the target firms is incorrectly classified by the model. Twenty-one of the
target firms are classified correctly by the model. The conditional classification accuracy of
the model is 95.45%. The overall classification accuracy of the model is 94%.
Industry"
(2-50) 15
Restricted Model
Economy wide 16
(7-50)17
Restricted Model
Economy
wide+Industry18
(9-50)19
Unrestricted Model
Logit
Log- Likelihood -4.01150 -6.24109 -0.00002
Industry Test
LR20 (Logit Model) 'mushy = 8.02296> X2 (2) (0 .05) = 5.99 (The industry model does not work) .
Economy wide Test
LR21 (Logit Model)F,,,c,my wade= 12.4821< X2 0) ( . 05) — 14.06 (The economy wide model works).
14 The variables included in this model are: X16, X22.
15 The first number in the parenthesis indicates the number of the variables and the second number indicates the
number of observations used in the model.
16 The variables included in this model are: X12, X10, X14, X21, X31, X11, X15.
17 The first number in the parenthesis indicates the number of the variables and the second number indicates the
number of observations used in the model.
18 The variables included in this model are: X12, X10, X14, X21, X3I, XII, X15, X16, X22.
19 The first number in the parenthesis indicates the number of the variables and the second number indicates the
number of observations used in the model.
20 LR inckwy=
 -2[ Restricted Log-L- Ultrestricted Log-L Emnotny wide+Indutry]
21 LREconotur wide= -2[ Restricted Log-LaconomywIde - Unrestricted Log-La
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Dependent Variable: Bidder= 0
Target= 1
Maximum Likelihood Estimates
Log-Likelihood 	
	
Restricted (Slopes=0) Log-L 	
Chi-Squared (2) 	
Significance Level 	
-31.09608
-35.42796
8.663750
0.1314288E-01
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We must prefer the economy wide model on the basis of the test or move to an intermediate
model which augments the industry model by variables in the economy wide modeL
6.5 Construction - Bidders against Targets
6.5.1 Multivariate Binomial Logit Analysis - Time Period 1982-1990
Multivariate Binomial Logit Model
'Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-ratio Probltl x Mean of X Std.Dev.of X
Constant -5.1070 3.651 -1.399 0.16182
X33 -0.30583E-01 0.3121E-01 -0.980 0.32713 6.1902 8.9835
X34 8.5931 5.148 1.669 0.09508 0.79066 0.24582
Constant (Significant at 90%)
X33 = Total Profit to Interest Paid" (Significant at 75%) (LEVERAGE)
X34 = Gearing Ratio" (Significant at 95%) (LEVERAGE)
Table 6.5-1
Frequencies of actual & predicted outcomes
Predicted outcome has maximum probability.
Predicted
Actual 0 1 TOTAL
0 3 14 17
1 3 39 42
TOTAL 6 53 59
Conditional Classification Accuracy: (39/42) X 100 = 92.86%
Overall Classification Accuracy: (39+3)1 59 X 100 = 71.19%
Table 6.5-2
n The variable under varimax factor analysis it appears under the fifth factor (See Appendix VI- Table 62). The fifth
factor explains 7.4% of the total variance (See Appendix VI- Table 62). This variable has been significant in the
univariate binomial logit and tmivariate binomial probit analysis.
23 The variable under varimax factor analysis it appears under the seventh factor (See Appendix VI- Table 62). The
seventh factor explains 5.4% of the total variance (See Appendix VI- Table 62). This variable has been significant in
the univariate binomial logit and tmivariate binomial probit analysis.
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The results of the model (See Table 6.5-1) based on logit for the period (1982-1990) indicate
that the gearing ratio (leverage) is significant at the 95 percent level. The total profit to interest
paid (leverage) is significant at the 75 percent level The outcome of the present model suggests
that the probability of being a target from the construction sector among the sample of
construction targets and construction bidders increases when total profit to interest paid
(significant at 75%) (leverage) decreases and when gearing ratio (significant at 95%) (leverage)
increases. The leverage dimension is the predominant one for the construction sector. The results
suggest that construction target firms use more debt in their capital structure because the gearing
ratio is positive and it seems that they can not cover interest payments from their profits.
Table 6.5-2 summarises the frequencies of predicted and actual outcomes. Three of the bidder
firms are correctly classified by the model Fourteen of the bidder firms are incorrectly classified
by the model Three of the target firms are incorrectly classified by the model. Thirty-nine of the
target firms are classified correctly by the model The conditional classification accuracy of the
model is 92.86%. The overall classification accuracy of the model is 71.19%.
Industry24
(2_5 9)25
Restricted Model
Economy wide26
(4-56)27
Restricted Model
Economy
wide+Industry28
(6-55)29
Unrestricted Model
Logit
Log- Likelihood -31.09608 -33.45494 -29.94192
Industry Test
LR30 (Logit Model) Industry = 2.30832 < X2 (2) 0.05) 5.99 (The industry model works).
Economy wide Test
LR31 (Logit Model)Econotny wide = 7.02604 <X2 (4) (.05) = 9.48 (The economy wide model works).
13 The variables included in this model are: X33, X34.
14 The first number in the parenthesis indicates the number of the variables and the second number indicates the
number of observations used in the model.
" The variables included in this model are: X11, X20, X25, X21.
16 The first number in the parenthesis indicates the number of the variables and the second number indicates the
number of observations used in the model.
17 The variables included in this model are: XI I, X20, X25, X21, X33, X34.
18 The first number in the parenthesis indicates the number of the variables and the second number indicates the
number of observations used in the model.
20 LR j= -2[ Restricted Log-L induiry - Unrestricted Log-L Economy wide+loductryl
31 LREconomy wd.= -2[ Restricted Log-4.1 %4,1,k - Unrestricted Log-Laommyworfhthan,1
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On the basis of the X2 tests neither the sectoral nor the economy wide models can be rejected.
6.6 Construction - Non Targets against Targets
6.6.1 Multivariate Binomial Logit Analysis - Time Period 1982-1990
Multivariate Binomial Logit Model
Dependent Variable: Non- Target= 0
Target = 1
Maximum Likelihood Estimates
Log-Likelihood 	 	 -49.24204
Restricted (Slopes=0) Log-L 	 	 -59.58740
Chi-Squared (3) 	 	 20.69071
Significance Level 	 	 0.1220501E-03
'Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-ratio Probltl x Mean of X Std.Dev.of X
Constant -18.038	 8.769	 -2.057	 0.03968
X10	 13.133
	 6.350	 2.068
	 0.03861	 7.0396
	 0.62503
X11	 -12.363
	 6.260	 -1.975
	 0.04829	 7.4846
	 0.57995
X34	 24.382	 14.09	 1.730
	 0.08361	 0.77755
	 0.20815
Constant (Significant at 95%)
X10 = Annual Equity and Capital Reserves" - (Natural Log of Equity and Capital
Reserves) (Significant at 95%) (EFFICIENCY)
X11 = Annual amount of Total Assets" - (Natural Log of Total Assets)
(Significant at 95%) (EFFICIENCY)
X34 = Gearing Ratio34
 (Significant at 95%)(LEVERAGE)
Table 6.6-1
32 Due to the fact that varimax factor analysis has failed to converged, the dimensions that will be analyse in this
section are the dimensions produced by the principal components. The variable appears in more than two
dimensions in the principal components analysis, therefore the interpretation is difficult (See Appendix VI- Table
63). This variable has been significant in the univariate binomial logit univariate binomial probit analysis.
33 Due to the fact that varimax factor analysis has failed to converged, the dimensions that will be analyse in this
section are the dimensions produced by the principal components. The variable appears in more than two
dimensions in the principal components analysis, therefore the interpretation is difficult (See Appendix VI- Table
63). This variable has been significant in the univariate binomial logit and imivariate binomial probit analysis.
34 Due to the fact that varimax factor analysis has failed to converged, the dimensions that will be analyse in this
section are the dimensions produced by the principal components. The variable appears in more than two
dimensions in the principal components analysis, therefore the interpretation is difficult (See Appendix VI- Table
63). This variable has been significant in the univariate binomial logit and univariate binomial probit analysis.
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Frequencies of actual & predicted outcomes
Predicted outcome has maximum probability.
Predicted
Actual 0 1 TOTAL
0 33 11 44
1 16 26 42
TOTAL 49 37 86
Conditional Classification Accuracy: (26/42) X 100 = 61.90%
Overall Classification Accuracy: (26+33)/ 86 X 100 = 68.60%
Table 6.6-2
The results of the model (See Table 6.6-1) based on logit for the period (1982-1990)
indicate that the annual equity and capital reserves- (natural log of equity and capital
reserves) (efficiency), annual amount of total assets - (natural log of total assets) (efficiency)
and the gearing ratio (leverage) are significant at the 95 percent level. The outcome of the
present model suggests that the probability of being a target from the construction sector
among the sample of construction targets and construction non-targets increases when
annual amount of total assets -(natural log of total assets) (efficiency) decreases and when
annual equity and capital reserves - (natural log of equity and capital reserves) (efficiency)
and the gearing ratio (leverage) increase. The important dimensions are: efficiency and
leverage. The annual amount of total assets - (natural log of total assets) (efficiency) ratio
indicates that target firms are inefficient. The gearing ratio which is a proxy for the leverage
dimension enters the final model but is not theory consistent since one would expect that
acquired firms would use less financial leverage. Therefore construction target firms are
inefficient and have high leverage in their capital structure. Table 6.6-2 summarises the
frequencies of predicted and actual outcomes. Thirty-three of the non-target firms are
correctly classified by the model. Eleven of the non-target firms are incorrectly classified by
the model. Sixteen of the target firms are incorrectly classified by the model. Twenty-six of
the target firms are classified correctly by the model. The conditional classification accuracy
of the model is 61.90%. The overall classification accuracy of the model is 68.60%.
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Dependent Variable: Bidder= 0
Target= 1
Maximum Likelihood Estimates
Log-Likelihood 	
	
Restricted (Slopes=0) Log-L
	
Chi-Squared (3)
	
Significance Level
	
-34.40393
-39.89164
10.97542
0.1185956E-01
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Industry35
(3-86)36
Restricted Model
Economy wide37
(7-82)38
Restricted Model
Economy
wide+Industry39
(8-82)4°
Unrestricted Model
Logit
Log- Likelihood -49.2420 -51.2811 -45.6768
Industry Test
LR41 (Logit Model) b,dustry= 7.1304< x2 (3) (0.05) = 7.81 (The industry model works) .
Economy wide Test
LR42 (Logit Model)Economy wade = 11.2086< X2 (7) Om) = 14.06 (The economy wide model works).
On the basis of the X2 tests neither the sectoral nor the economy wide models can be rejected.
6.7 Food- Bidders against Targets
6.7.1 Multivariate Binomial Logit Analysis - Time Period 1982-1990
Multivariate Binomial Logit Model
35 The variables included in this model are: X10, XII, X34.
The first number in the parenthesis indicates the number of the variables and the second number indicates the
number of observations used in the model.
37 The variables included in this model are: X12, X10, X14, X21, X31, XII, X15.
38 The first number in the parenthesis indicates the number of the variables and the second number indicates the
number of observations used in the model.
39 The variables included in this model are: X12, X10, X14, X21, X31, X11, X15, X34.
40 The first number in the parenthesis indicates the number of the variables and the second number indicates the
number of observations used in the model.
41 1-Rinawy= -2[ Restricted Log-Linawy - Unrestricted Log-L Emmy y4 dclindudry]
42 LREcanomy wide= -2[ Restricted Log-Ls, - Unrestricted Log-LE.mywide+Indadly]
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!Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-ratio Probltlx Mean of X Std.Dev.of X
Constant 1.2689 0.4758 2.667 0.00765
X17 -0.15606 0.1084 -1.440 0.14990 10.402 9.4821
X18 -0.46879 0.3441 -1.363 0.17303 2.0404 2.2013
X19 0.41292 0.2704 1.527 0.12670 3.5960 4.0456
Constant (Significant at 99%)
43X17 = Cash Position No.1 (Significant at 90%) (LIQUIDITY)
X18 = Cash Position No.2 44 (Significant at 90%) (LIQUIDITY)
X19 . Cash Position No.3 45 (Significant at 90%) (LIQUIDITY)
Table 6.7-1
Frequencies of actual & predicted outcomes
Predicted outcome has maximum probability.
Predicted
Actual 0 1 TOTAL
0 15 11 26
1 7 25 32
TOTAL 22 36 58
Conditional Classification Accuracy: (25/32) X 100 = 78.13%
Overall Classification Accuracy: (25+15)/ 58 X 100 = 68.97%
Table 6.7-2
The results of the model (See Table 6.7-1) based on logit for the period (1982-1990) indicate
that the cash position no.1 (liquidity), cash position no.2 (liquidity) and the cash position no.3
(liquidity) are significant at the 90 percent leveL The outcome of the present model suggests that
the probability of being a target from the food sector among the sample of food targets and food
bidders increases when cash position no.! (liquidity) and the cash position no.2 (liquidity)
decrease and when the cash position no.3 (liquidity) increases. The cash position no.3 (liquidity)
which has entered the final model for the food sector is theory consistent with the finance
43 This variable has been identified by the stepwise regression analysis. Stepwise Regression Result for X17:
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-ratio Probltl x Mean of X Std.Dev.of X
X17	 -0.17875E-01 0.6850E-02 -2.610 0.01171 10.608 	 6.8096
The variable under varimax factor analysis it appears under the second factor (See Appendix VI- Table 64). The
second factor explains 15.2% of the total variance (See Appendix VI- Table 64). This variable has been significant in
the univariate binomial logit and tmivariate binomial probit analysis.
" The variable under varimax factor analysis it appears under the second factor (See Appendix VI- Table 64). The
second factor explains 15.2% of the total variance (See Appendix VI- Table 64). This variable has been significant in
the univariate binomial logit and univariate binomial probit analysis.
45 The variable under varimax factor analysis it appears under the second factor (See Appendix VI- Table 64). The
second factor explains 15.2% of the total variance (See Appendix VI- Table 64). This variable has been significant in
the univariate binomial logit and univariate binomial probit analysis.
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literature which says that acquired firms are more liquid. On the other hand, cash position no.1
(liquidity) and cash position no.2 (liquidity) are not theoretically consistent with the liquidity
theory. Table 6.7-2 summarises the frequencies of predicted and actual outcomes. Fifteen of the
bidder firms are correctly classified by the model Eleven of the bidder firms are incorrectly
classified by the model. Seven of the target firms are incorrectly classified by the model Twenty-
five of the target firms are classified correctly by the model. The conditional classification
accuracy of the model is 78.13%. The overall classification accuracy of the model is 68.97%.
Industry"
(3-58)47
Restricted Model
Economy wide
(4_59)49
Restricted Model
Economy
wide+1ndustry5°
(7-58)51
Unrestricted Model
Logit
Log- Likelihood -34.40393 -33.99021 -28.82481
Industry Test
LR52 (Logit Model) industry = 11.15824 > X2 (3) (0.05) 7.81 (The industry model does not work).
Economy wide Test
LR53
 (Logit Model)E.y %Nide 10.3308> X2 (4) (0.05) = 9.48 (The economy wide model does not
work).
On the basis of the X2 tests both the sectoral and the economy wide models can be rejected.
46 The variables included in this model are: X17, X18, X19.
47 The first number in the parenthesis indicates the number of the variables and the second number indicates the
number of observations used in the model.
48 The variables included in this model are: X11, X20, X25, X21.
The first number in the parenthesis indicates the number of the variables and the second number indicates the
number of observations used in the model.
5° The variables included in this model are: XI I, X20, X25, X21, X17, X18, X19.
51 The first number in the parenthesis indicates the number of the variables and the second number indicates the
number of observations used in the model.
52
LRkbuty= -2[ Restricted Log-LhA,,,,- Unrestricted Log-L E.y.d0I1duthy]
53 LREemonlY wid.= -2[ Restricted Log-Lneccomy wide- Unrestricted Log-LEcammyvh&onduriyi
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6.8 Food- Non Targets against Targets
6.8.1 Multivariate Binomial Logit Analysis - Time Period 1982-1990
Multivariate Binomial Logit Model
Dependent Variable: Non- Target= 0
Target = 1
Maximum Likelihood Estimates
Log-Likelihood 	 	 -40.42823
Restricted (Slopes=0) Log-L 	 	 -51.17645
Chi-Squared (5) 	 	 21.49646
Significance Level 	 	 0.6524916E-03
1
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-ratio Probltl x Mean of X Std.Dev.of X
Constant 5.2114 1.818 2.867 0.00415
X23 -3.2824 1.624 -2.021 0.04329 0.12443 0.21163
X24 4.6268 2.263 2.045 0.04090 0.45051 0.18964
X16 -1.8102 0.6988 -2.590 0.00959 1.8288 0.74294
X26 19.190 14.52 1.321 0.18643 1.3582 0.31836
X30 -21.820 14.58 -1.497 0.13446 1.3940 0.32400
Constant (Significant at 99%)
X23 = Cash to Current Liabilities54 (Significant at 95%) (LIQUIDITY)
X24 = Quick Assets to Total Assets 55
 (Significant at 95%) (LIQUIDITY)
X16 = Asset Cover" (Significant at 99%) (LIQUIDITY)
X26 = Long Term Liabilities to Shareholders' Equity" (Significant at 90%)(LEVERAGE)
X30 = Preference and Loan Capital to Equity and Reserves" (Significant at 90%)
(LEVERAGE)
Table 6.8-1
54 This variable has been identified by the stepwise regression analysis. Stepwise Regression Result for X23:
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-ratio Probitl x Mean of X Std.Dev.of X
X23	 -0.77770	 0.2875	 -2.705 0.00863 0.11432	 7.3160
The variable under varimax factor analysis it appears under the third factor (See Appendix VI- Table 65). The third
factor explains 13.3% of the total variance (See Appendix VI- Table 65).
55 This variable has been identified by the stepwise regression analysis. Stepwise Regression Result for X24:
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-ratio Probiti x Mean of X Std.Dev.of X
X24	 0.86116	 0.3688	 2.335 0.02251 0.45102	 5.4518
The variable under varimax factor analysis it appears under the fourth factor and the fifth factor (See Appendix VI-
Table 65). The higher loading comes under the fourth factor which explains 9.5% of the total variance (See
Appendix VI- Table 65).
56 The variable under varimax factor analysis it appears under the first and the fourth factor (See Appendix VI- Table
65). The higher loading comes under the fourth factor which explains 9.5% of the total variance (See Appendix VI-
Table 65). This variable has been significant in the tmivariate binomial logit and univariate binomial probit analysis.
57 The variable under varimax factor analysis it appears under the second and the sixth factor (See Appendix VI- Table
65) . The higher loading comes under the sixth factor which explains 6.4% of the total variance (See Appendix VI-
Table 65). This variable has been significant in the univariate binomial logit and univariate binomial probit analysis.
58 The variable under varimax factor analysis it appears under the second and the sixth factor (See Appendix VI- Table
65). The higher loading comes under the sixth factor which explains 6.4% of the total variance (See Appendix VI-
Table 65). This variable has been significant in the tmivariate binomial logit and univariate binomial probit analysis.
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Frequencies of actual & predicted outcomes
Predicted outcome has maximum probability.
Predicted
Actual 0 1 TOTAL
0 32 11 43
1 10 22 32
TOTAL 42 33 75
Conditional Classification Accuracy: (22/32) X 100 = 68.75%
Overall Classification Accuracy: (22+32)/ 75 X 100 = 72.00%
Table 6.8-2
The results of the model (See Table 6.8-1) based on logit for the period (1982-1990) indicate
that the asset cover (liquidity) is significant at the 99 percent level The cash to current liabilities
(liquidity) and the quick assets to total assets (liquidity) are significant at the 95 percent level_
The preference and loan capital to equity and reserves (leverage) and the long term liabilities to
shareholders equity (leverage) are significant at the 90 percent level The outcome of the present
model suggests that the probability of being a target from the food sector among the sample of
food targets and food non-targets increases when cash to current liabilities (liquidity), asset cover
(liquidity), preference and loan capital to equity and reserves (leverage) decrease and when quick
assets to total assets (liquidity) and long term liabilities to shareholders' equity (leverage)
increase. The liquidity aspect appears to be important for the food sector. The quick assets to
total assets (liquidity) is theory consistent as one would expect that acquired firms are more
liquid. On the other hand, the cash to current liabilities (liquidity) and asset cover (liquidity) are
not theory consistent. The leverage dimension has entered the final model with the preference
and loan capital to equity and reserves (leverage) ratio which appears to be theoretically
consistent with the financial leverage hypothesis which says acquired firms use less financial
leverage. Another ratio from the leverage group that has entered the final model is the long term
liabilities to shareholders' equity (leverage) which is not theoretically consistent with the financial
leverage hypothesis. Therefore, food target firms are characterised from the dimensions of
liquidity and leverage but the results are mixed for both dimensions. Table 6.8-2 summarises the
frequencies of predicted and actual outcomes. Thirty-two of the non-target firms are correctly
classified by the model Eleven of the non-target firms are incorrectly classified by the model
Ten of the target firms are incorrectly classified by the model Twenty-two of the target firms are
classified correctly by the model The conditional classification accuracy of the model is 68.75%.
The overall classification accuracy of the model is 72%.
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Industry59
(5_75)60
Restricted Model
Economy wide61
(7-76)62
Restricted Model
Economy
wide+Industry63
(12-75)64
Unrestricted Model
Logit
Log- Likelihood -40.4282 -40.8380 -33.7752
Industry Test
LR65 (Logit Model) industy = 13.306> X2 (5)0.05) = 11.07 (The industry model does not work) .
Economy wide Test
LR66 (Logit Modepag.mywid. = 14.1256> X2 (7) (cm) 14.06 (The economy wide model does not
work).
As in the previous analysis, in section 6.7 on the basis of the X2 tests both the sectoral and the
economy wide models can be rejected.
6.9 Mechanical- Bidders against Targets
6.9.1 Multivariate Binomial Logit Analysis - Time Period 1982-1990
Multivariate Binomial Legit Model
Dependent Variable: Bidder= 0
Target= 1
Maximum Likelihood Estimates
Log-Likelihood 	 -17.52597
Restricted (Slopes=0) Log-L. -28.92142
Chi-Squared (3) 	 22.79089
Significance Level 	 0.4464466E-04
59 The variables included in this model are: X23, X24, X16, X26, X30.
60 The first number in the parenthesis indicates the number of the variables and the second number indicates the
number of observations used in the model.
61 The variables included in this model are: X12, X10, X14, X21, X31, XII, X15.
62 The first number in the parenthesis indicates the number of the variables and the second number indicates the
number of observations used in the model.
63 The variables included in this model are: X12, X10, X14, X21, X31, X11, X15, X23, X24, X16, X26, X30.
64 The first number in the parenthesis indicates the number of the variables and the second number indicates the
number of observations used in the model.
65 LRhawy= -21 Restricted Log-Lind.o., - Unrestricted Log-L E.many vack+Industry]
66 LREcEnomy wide= -2[ Restricted Log-LE.y- Unrestricted Log-LE,..myydt,k+,,,y]
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!Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-ratio Probltl4c Mean of X Std.Dev.of X
Constant 0.77377E-01 1.050 0.074 0.94128
X3 -0.52068 0.2202 -2.364 0.01806 3.4414 2.9663
X15 2.0038 0.7669 2.613 0.00898 1.5643 0.87158
X17 -0.69073E-01 0.4501E-01 -1.535 0.12484 14.599 11.404
Constant
X3 = Profit to Total Assets" (Significant at 99%) (PROFITABILITY)
X15 = Acid Test or Liquid Asset or Quick Asset Ratio" (Significant at 99%)
(LIQUIDITY)
X17 = Cash Position No.1" (Significant at 90%)(LIQUIDITY)
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Table 6.9-1
Frequencies of actual & predicted outcomes
Predicted outcome has maximum probability.
Predicted
Actual 0 1 TOTAL
0 15 4 19
1 3 20 23
TOTAL 18 24 42
Conditional Classification Accuracy: (20/23) X 100 . 86.96%
Overall Classification Accuracy: (20+15)/ 42 X 100 = 83.33%
Table 6.9-2
The results of the model (See Table 6.9-1) based on logit for the period (1982-1990) indicate
that the profit to total assets (profitability) and the acid test or liquid asset or quick asset ratio
(liquidity) are significant at the 99 percent level The cash position no.1 (liquidity) is significant at
the 90 percent level. The outcome of the present model suggests that the probability of being a
target from the mechanical sector among the sample of mechanical targets and mechanical
bidders increases when cash position no.! (liquidity) and profit to total assets (profitability)
decrease and when acid test or liquid asset or quick asset ratio (liquidity) increases. The results
69 The variable under varimax factor analysis it appears under the third factor (See Appendix VI- Table 66). The third
factor explains 16.2% of the total variance (See Appendix VI- Table 66). This variable has been significant in the
univariate binomial logit and tmivariate binomial probit analysis.
68 The variable under varimax factor analysis it appears under the first factor (See Appendix VI- Table 66). The first
factor explains 26.9% of the total variance (See Appendix VI- Table 66). This variable has been significant in the
univariate binomial logit and univaiiate binomial probit analysis.
89 The variable under varimax factor analysis it appears under the second factor (See Appendix VI- Table 66). The
second factor explains 16.8% of the total variance (See Appendix VI- Table 66). This variable has been significant in
the univariate binomial logit and univariate binomial probit analysis.
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of the model concerning the mechanical sector are theory consistent with the profitability
hypothesis which says that acquired firms have low profitability but the results about the liquidity
hypothesis are mixed. Table 6.9-2 summarises the frequencies of predicted and actual outcomes.
Fifteen of the bidder firms are correctly classified by the model. Four of the bidder firms are
incorrectly classified by the model. Three of the target firms are incorrectly classified by the
model. Twenty of the target firms are classified correctly by the model The conditional
classification accuracy of the model is 86.96%. The overall classification accuracy of the model is
83.33%.
Industry"
(3-42)71
Restricted Model
Economy widen
(4-43)73
Restricted Model
Economy
wide+Industry74
(7-42)75
Unrestricted Model
Logit
Log- Likelihood -17.52597 -5.452911 -4.189376
Industry Test
(Logit Model) 1„d„,,,),= 26.67319 > X2 (3) (om) = 7.81 (The industry model does not work).
Economy wide Test
LR77 (Logit Model)Econonv ,,ide = 2.52707< X2 (4) (0.05) = 9.48 (The economy wide model works).
We must prefer the economy wide model on the basis of the test or move to an intermediate
model which enhances the industry model by variables in the economy wide model
7° The variables included in this model are: X3, X15, X17.
71 The first number in the parenthesis indicates the number of the variables and the second number indicates the
number of observations used in the model.
72 The variables included in this model are: XII, X20, X25, X21.
73 The first number in the parenthesis indicates the number of the variables and the second number indicates the
number of observations used in the model.
74 The variables included in this model are: XII, X20, X25, X21, X3, X15, X17.
75 The first number in the parenthesis indicates the number of the variables and the second number indicates the
number of observations used in the model.
76 lakuinte-- -2[ Restricted Log-L- Unrestricted Log-L Economy wide+kmbily]
77 LREcanomy wide= -2[ Restricted Log-Lsconamy mac-Unrestricted Log-LE.ywide+hcbstryl
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6.10 Mechanical- Non Targets against Targets
6.10.1 Multivariate Binomial Logit Analysis - Time Period 1982-1990
Multivariate Binomial Logit Model
Dependent Variable: Non- Target= 0
Target = 1
Maximum Likelihood Estimates
Log-Likelihood
	 	 -14.90029
Restricted (Slopes=0) Log-L
	 	 -39.42947
Chi-Squared (3) 	 	 49.05834
Significance Level
	 	 0.1000000E-06
!Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-ratio Probltl x Mean of X Std.Dev.of X
Constant -1.3072 0.5073 -2.577 0.00997
X23
-16.782 6.520 -2.574 0.01006 0.22881 0.67196
X19 2.3588 0.7555 3.122 0.00179 1.8286 4.0577
Constant (Significant at 99%)
X23 = Cash to Current Liabilities (Significant at 99%) (LIQUIDITY)
X19 = Cash Position No.3 78
 (Significant at 99%) (LIQUIDITY)
Table 6.10-1
Frequencies of actual & predicted outcomes
Predicted outcome has maximum probability.
Predicted
Actual 0 1 TOTAL
0 37 1 38
1 3 19 22
TOTAL 40 20 60
Conditional Classification Accuracy: (19/22) X 100 = 86.36%
Overall Classification Accuracy: (19+37)/ 60 X 100 = 93.33%
Table 6.10-2
The results of the model (See Table 6.10-1) based on logit for the period (1982-1990) indicate
that the cash to current liabilities (liquidity) and the cash position no.3 (liquidity) are significant at
the 99 percent level The outcome of the present model suggests that the probability of being a
target from the mechanical sector among the sample of mechanical targets and mechanical non-
targets increases when cash to current liabilities (liquidity) decreases and when the cash position
78 This variable has been identified by the stepwise regressicn analysis. Stepwise Regressice Result for X19:
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-ratio Probitlx Mean of X StriDev.of X
X19	 0.12062	 0.1977E-01 6.102 0.00000 2.0466
	 37.232
The variable wider varimax factor analysis it appears under the third factor (See Appendix VI- Table 67). The third factor explains 13.0%
of the total variance (See Appendix VI- Table 67). This variable has been signficant in the tmivariate binomial logit and univariate
binomial probit analysis.
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no.3 (liquidity) increases. The results of the model for the mechanical sector indicates that the
liquidity dimension is important but the results are mixed. Table 6.10-2 summarises the
frequencies of predicted and actual outcomes. Thirty-seven of the non-target firms are correctly
classified by the modeL One of the non-target firms is incorrectly classified by the model Three
of the target firms are incorrectly classified by the model. Nineteen of the target firms are
classified correctly by the model. The conditional classification accuracy of the model is 86.36%.
The overall classification accuracy of the model is 93.33%.
Industry"
(2-60)80
Restricted Model
Economy wide81
(7-59)82
Restricted Model
Economy
wide+1ndustry83
(9_5 8)84
Unrestricted Model
Lot
Log- Likelihood -14.90029 -33.6336 -12.56833
Industry Test
LR85 (Logit Model) industry = 4.66392< X2 (2) (0 .05) ----- 5.99 (The industry model works) .
Economy wide Test
LR86 (Logit Model)Econon,y v.Ade = 42.13054> X2 (7) (0M) = 14.06 (The economy wide model does
not work).
On the basis of the X2 tests we must prefer the sectoral model.
'79 The variables included in this model are: X23, X19.
" The first number in the parenthesis indicates the number of the variables and the second number indicates the
number of observations used in the model.
81 The variables included in this model are: X12, X10, X14, X21, X31, X11, X15.
82 The first number in the parenthesis indicates the number of the variables and the second number indicates the
number of observations used in the model.
83 The variables included in this model are: X12, X10, X14, X21, X31, X11, X15, X23, X19..
" The first number in the parenthesis indicates the number of the variables and the second number indicates the
number of observations used in the model.
85
Illadultry= -2[ Restricted Log-Lbawy - Unrestricted Log-L Economy wide+Inckutyl
LRE.nomr,,,,,k= -2[ Restricted Log-Ls....yww. - Unrestricted Log-La.myvAdo-bauky]
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6.11 Electronics- Bidders against Targets
6.11.1 Multivariate Binomial Logit Analysis - Time Period 1982-1990
Multivariate Binomial Legit Model
Dependent Variable: Bidder= 0
Target= 1
Maximum Likelihood Estimates
Log-Likelihood 	 -21.79188
Restricted (Slopes=0) Log-L. -29.83346
Chi-Squared (3) 
	
16.08315
Significance Level 	 0.1090326E-02
'Variable Coefficient Std. Error t -ratio Probltl x Mean of X Std.Dev.of X
Constant 10.988 4.185 2.626 0.00865
X10 -1.1200 0.4850 -2.310 0.02092 7.1788 0.79918
X9 -1.5101 0.8108 -1.863 0.06253 -19.985 149.28
X23 3.6035 2.587 1.393 0.16367 0.17340 0.21157
Constant (Significant at 99%)
X10 = Annual Equity and Capital ReservesV
 - (Natural Log of Equity and Capital
Reserves)(Significant at 99%) (EFFICIENCY)
X9 = Sales to Current Assets" (Significant at 95%) (EFFICIENCY)
X23 = Cash to Current Liabilities" (Significant at 90%) (LIQUIDITY)
Table 6.11-1
Frequencies of actual & predicted outcomes
Predicted outcome has maximum probability.
Predicted
Actual 0 1 TOTAL
0 11 6 17
1 4 24 28
TOTAL 15 30 45
Conditional Classification Accuracy: (24/28) X 100 = 85.71%
Overall Classification Accuracy: (24+11)/ 45 X 100 = 77.78%
Table 6.11-2
87 Due to the fact that varimax factor analysis failed to converged in this sample I will analyse the variables based ion
the principal components. The variable under principal components analysis appears under the fourth factor and the
fifth factor (See Appendix VI- Table 68). The higher loading comes under the fourth factor which explains 9.7% of
the total variance (See Appendix VI- Table 68). This variable has been significant in the univariate binomial logit
and univariate binomial probit analysis.
" Due to the fact that varimax factor analysis failed to converged in this sample I will analyse the variables based ion
the principal components. The variable under principal components analysis appears under the second factor and the
sixth factor (See Appendix VI- Table 68). The second factor explains 15.0% of the total variance while the sixth
factor explains 6.4% of the total variance (See Appendix VI- Table 68). This variable has been significant in the
univariate binomial logit and univariate binomial probit analysis.
39 Due to the fact that varimax factor analysis failed to converged in this sample I will analyse the variables based ion
the principal components. The variable under principal components analysis appears under the first factor (See
Appendix VI- Table 68). The first factor explains 22.3% of the total variance (See Appendix VI- Table 68). This
variable has been significant in the univariate binomial logit and univariate binomial probit analysis.
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The results of the model (See Table 6.11-1) based on logit for the period (1982-1990) indicate
that the annual equity and capital reserves- (natural log of equity and capital reserves) (efficiency)
is significant at the 99 percent level The sales to current assets (efficiency) is significant at the 95
percent level and the cash to current liabilities (liquidity) is significant at the 90 percent level The
outcome of the present model suggests that the probability of being a target from the electronics
sector among the sample of electronic targets and electronic bidders increases when annual
equity and capital reserves - (natural log of equity and capital reserves) (efficiency) and the sales
to current assets (efficiency) decrease and when cash to current liabilities (liquidity) increases.
The ratios that represent the efficiency dimension [annual equity and capital reserves - (natural
log of equity and capital reserves) (efficiency) and sales to current assets (efficiency) ] are
theoretically consistent with the inefficient management hypothesis which says that mergers and
acquisitions are a mechanism by which managers who fail to maximise the efficiency of their
company are replaced. In addition, the liquidity ratio that has entered the final model [cash to
current liabilities (liquidity) ] is theoretically consistent with the liquidity theory which says that
target firms are more liquid. Table 6.11-2 summarises the frequencies of predicted and actual
outcomes. Eleven of the bidder firms are correctly classified by the model. Six of the bidder firms
are incorrectly classified by the model Four of the target firms are incorrectly classified by the
modeL Twenty-four of the target firms are classified correctly by the model The conditional
classification accuracy of the model is 85.71%. The overall classification accuracy of the model is
77.78%.
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Industry90
(3-45)91
Restricted Model
Economy wide92
(4-42)93
Restricted Model
Economy
wide+Industry94
(7_4095
Unrestricted Model
Logit
Log-Likelihood -21.79188 -22.36438 -18.23060
Industry Test
LR96 (Logit Model) inchisfry = 7.12256 < X2 (3) 00) = 7.81 (The industry model works).
Economy wide Test
LR97 (Logit Model) 	 = 8.26756 < X2 (4)0.05) = 9.48 (The economy wide model works).
On the basis of the X2 tests neither the sectoral nor the economy wide models can be rejected.
6.12 Electronics- Non Targets against Targets
6.12.1 Multivariate Binomial Logit Analysis - Time Period 1982-1990
Multivariate Binomial Logit Model
Dependent Variable: Non- Target= 0
Target = 1
Maximum Likelihood Estimates
Log-Likelihood 	 	 -5.839370
Restricted (Slopes=0) Log-L
	 	 -28.85647
Chi-Squared ( 2) 
	 	
46.03420
Significance Level 	 	 0.1000000E-06
90 The variables included in this model are: X10, X9, X23.
91 The first number in the parenthesis indicates the number of the variables and the second number indicates the
number of observations used in the model.
92 The variables included in this model are: X11, X20, X25, X21.
93 The first number in the parenthesis indicates the number of the variables and the second number indicates the
number of observations used in the model.
94 The variables included in this model are: XII, X20, X25, X21, X10, X9, X23.
95 The first number in the parenthesis indicates the number of the variables and the second number indicates the
number of observations used in the model.
96 LRImuay= -2[ Restricted Log-Lk,- Unrestricted Log-L
" LRECtnarayWitk= -2 [ Restricted Log-LE.xtur.wk- Unrestricted 1,08-1-o.nomy.kkthamuy]
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'Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-ratio ProbItl x Mean of X Std.Dev.of X
Constant 0.87062 2.471 0.352 0.72461
X17 6.6491 3.188 2.085 0.03703 9.7014 15.064
X15 -3.3095 2.355 -1.405 0.15997 1.5672 0.63570
Constant
X17 . Cash Position No.1 98 (Significant at 95%) (LIQUIDITY)
X15 = Acid Test or Liquid Asset or Quick Asset Ratio 99 (Significant at 90%)
(LIQUIDITY)
Table 6.12-1
Frequencies of actual & predicted outcomes
Predicted outcome has maximum probability.
Predicted
Actual 0 1 TOTAL
0 16 1 17
1 1 25 26
TOTAL 17 26 43
Conditional Classification Accuracy: (25/26) X 100 = 96.15%
Overall Classification Accuracy: (25+16)/ 43 X 100 	 95.35%
Table 6.12-2
The results of the model (See Table 6.12-1) based on logit for the period (1982-1990) indicate
that the cash position no.1 (liquidity) is significant at the 95 percent level The acid test or liquid
asset or quick asset ratio (liquidity) is significant at the 90 percent level. The outcome of the
present model suggests that the probability of being a target from the electronics sector among
the sample of electronic targets and electronic non-targets increases when the acid test or liquid
asset or quick asset ratio (liquidity) decreases and when cash position no.1 (liquidity) increases.
The important dimension of the model is only liquidity and the results about the liquidity
hypothesis are mixed. Table 6.12-2 summarises the frequencies of predicted and actual
outcomes. Sixteen of the non-target firms are correctly classified by the model. One of the non-
target firms is incorrectly classified by the modeL One of the target firms is incorrectly classified
by the model Twenty-five of the target firms are classified correctly by the model The
"The variable under varimax factor analysis it appears under the second factor (See Appendix VI- Table 69). The
second factor explains 17.7% of the total variance (See Appendix VI- Table 69). This variable has been significant
in the imivariate binomial logit and univariate binomial probit analysis.
99 The variable under varimax factor analysis it appears under the first factor (See Appendix VI- Table 69). The first
factor explains 24.5% of the total variance (See Appendix VI- Table 69).
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conditional classification accuracy of the model is 96.15%. The overall classification accuracy of
the model is 95.35%.
Industryl"
(2-43)101
Restricted Model
Economy wide102
(7-42)'°3
Restricted Model
Economy
wide+Industryl°4
(8)105
Unrestricted Model
Logit
Log- Likelihood -5.83937 -24.6434
Models- Singular
Hessian during
Newton iterations.
Industry Test
LR1 °6
 (Logit Model) frich ,,,y = 11.67874> X2 (2) (0.05) = 5.99 (The industry model does not work).
Economy wide Test
LR1 °7
 (Logit Model) 	 = 49.2868 > X2 a) (0.05) = 14.06 (The economy wide model does
not work).
100 The variables included in this model are: X17, X15.
101 The first number in the parenthesis indicates the number of the variables and the second number indicates the
number of observations used in the model.
102 The variables included in this model are: X12, X10, X14, X21, X31, X11, X15.
1" The first number in the parenthesis indicates the number of the variables and the second number indicates the
number of observations used in the model.
1°4 The variables included in this model are: X12, X10, X14, X21, X31, XII, X15, X17.
1" The first number in the parenthesis indicates the number of the variables and the second number indicates the
number of observations used in the model.
106 LRha= -2[ Restricted Log-L b.hey -Unrestricted Log-L scc.y wide+h&r,y]
107	 -2[ Restrided Log-LE.,-...y.e-Unreztlicted 1,08-1-n<m=ymd,-+I.hur]
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6.13 Conclusion
In the present chapter, I have selected with a small sample industry models which are
parsimonious with a view to determining how different they are to the economy wide modele s .
In certain cases the economy wide model was found to dominate, in others there was little
difference, but on the grounds of simplicity explanation we would select the industry model.
The present chapter examines the financial characteristics of takeover targets by industry. The
examination is based on a comparison of the financial characteristics of target firms of a
particular industry against the financial characteristics of potential bidder firms that made an
attempt to takeover a firm which belongs to that particular industry and then a comparison of
the financial characteristics of target firms of a particular industry against the financial
characteristics of non target firms that belong to the same industry. When examining the first
case (bidders against targets ) the major fmdings can be summarised as follows: chemical
target firms are characterised by high efficiency and use more debt in their capital structure,
construction target firms use more debt, food target firms are affected by the liquidity dimension
but as far as this dimension is concerned the findings are mixed, mechanical target firms are
characterised by low profitability and high liquidity and electronics target firms are inefficient
firms and more liquid. When examining the second case (non targets against targets) the
major fmdings can be summarised as follows: chemical target firms are characterised by
excess liquidity, construction target firms are inefficient and have high leverage in their capital
structure, food target firms are characterised from the dimensions of liquidity and leverage but
the results are mixed for both dimensions, the results of the model for the mechanical and
electronics sector suggest that the liquidity dimension is important but for both sectors the results
about the liquidity hypothesis are mixed.
108 i) when comparing bidders with targets the following sectoral models hold: chemical, construction and electronics.
when comparing bidders with targets the economy wide model holds for chemicals, construction, mechanical
and electronics.
iii) when comparing non targets with targets the following sectoral models hold: construction and mechanical.
iv) when comparing non targets with targets the economy wide model holds for chemicals and construction.
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The present thesis analyses mergers and acquisitions within the UK for the period 1982-
1990. There is a valid justification from the previous studies that one can predict mergers
and acquisitions by using the financial characteristics of the firms involved in a potential
merger or acquisition and that the financial characteristics of target firms will give an insight
as to what are the real financial motives for the takeover activity in U.K
Initially there has been a review of the theories of mergers. The different theories provided
a background for the formulation of the hypotheses to be tested. The present study has
chosen to examine five hypotheses which are financial in nature and they are the
representatives of five important theories. The hypotheses under investigation are:
profitability, inefficient management, financial leverage, corporate liquidity, and research
and development. The above hypotheses have been chosen because all of them are purely
financial in nature and therefore they satisfy the requirements of the data that has been
collected. In addition, these hypotheses are representatives of the respective theories of
mergers that are described in chapter 1 under section 1.2. It is beyond the scope of the
present thesis to test all the theories outlined in chapter 1. Clearly due to the nature of the
data some economic theories can not be tested (e.g. monopoly theory, economies of scale
theory, growth, diversification, etc.). Moreover, the present thesis has reviewed the
different merger waves that appear in the literature and has revealed that the major
industries that participated in almost all the waves are: chemicals, food, electricals,
petroleum, machinery, financial services. This was the rationale for selecting the sectors that
have been examined.
An extensive analysis is provided for the review of the studies on the prediction of
takeover targets so as to find the limitations of previous studies and to identify the most
common characteristics of acquired firms that appear in the literature. The present thesis
attempts to rectify some of the problems that traditionally the literature has faced in the area
of predicting takeover targets. The major limitations of the previous studies are: industry
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classification was not considered, estimation samples and validation samples were chosen
from the same time period, analysis of financial characteristics of acquired firms for a limited
time period before the announcement of the acquisition, limited number of variables under
consideration, the use of MDA analysis and the use of small sample sizes for both the
estimation and validation periods. The present thesis tests the estimation models (1982-
1985) in a different time period (1986-1990) and it collects financial statement information
of the firms under analysis six years preceding the acquisition and derives 38 financial
accounting ratios from the available information. Moreover, it examines the firms at an
economy wide level and at an industrial level with an initial sample size of 1,153 firms. The
methodologies adopted are logit analysis and probit analysis, methodologies that have been
employed so as to overcome the pitfalls of discriminant analysis. The results of probit
analysis are similar to that of logit and they are not presented in the thesis.
Industrial specific models are estimated in the present thesis so as to give an insight into
what are the real financial characteristics of the target firms. This is a major contribution
of the present thesis in the existing finance literature. Traditionally researchers have
examined the financial characteristics of takeover targets at an economy wide level paying
very little attention to predicting takeover targets and identifying their financial
characteristics by industry. The firms under investigation belong to the following sectors of
the economy: chemical, construction, food, electrical and electronics engineering and
mechanical engineering. The rationale for industry classification is justified because firm
characteristics vary substantially across industries and across the three groups under
investigation. It is clearly shown that the financial characteristics of the groups under
investigation by industry are different from the financial characteristics of the groups at the
economy wide level. Moreover, there are specific industry characteristics that affect
the economy wide sample. It is obvious that by disaggregating the sectors of the economy
a lot of interesting findings are produced.
Data has been collected for three different groups namely bidders, targets and non targets.
The previous studies in the area of the prediction of takeover targets considered either
targets against bidders or targets against non-acquired firms and this makes the comparison
of the results of the previous studies problematic because the financial characteristics of
target firms will be different if they are compared with bidders and different if these are
170
CHAPTER 7	 Conclusion
compared with non targets, something that is clearly evident from the present thesis.
Therefore, the present thesis is taking a step further by comparing the target firms with
bidders and then the target firms with non target firms. Beside this, the present thesis
employs two techniques that are normally used so as to achieve the reduction of the variables
without losing any significant information: varimax factor analysis and stepwise regression
analysis. Both methodologies have been analysed in Appendix II. Stepwise regression analysis
proved to be a satisfactory technique as it is shown in the empirical chapters (5+6). Factor
analysis has been extremely useful for the determination of the relative importance of the
different dimensions under investigation. Finally, the ratios under investigation have been
analysed together with the rationale of their inclusion in the present study.
The present thesis agree with the opinions put forward by Thomas Hogarty (1970) and Ajit
Singh (1992) who both suggest that mergers have a neutral impact on profitability. There
is no strong evidence behind this theory. Recalling, M.Firth (1979), he supports that
maximising management utility in the form of growth and size is perhaps a more important
influence in many firms than the alternative theory of profit maximisation. The suggestion of
M. Firth (1979) is even more interesting for the present thesis because, indeed U.K mergers
and acquisitions for the 80's are dominated from the theory of the market for corporate
control where the evidence gets clear support from the present thesis. From the multivariate 
models, mechanical target firms are characterised by low profitability when they are
compared to the bidders.
The market for corporate control seems to be a very important issue for mergers and
acquisitions. There is sufficient empirical evidence' which suggest that the "market for
corporate control" through take-overs is a mechanism for disciplining managers who
operate their firms in ways that do not maximise profits. The market for corporate control
indicates a number of important favourable outcomes for a firm such as avoidance of the
bankruptcy legal proceedings, more efficient management of firms and generally a more
efficient allocation of resources. The market for corporate control captures a very important
aspect of mergers and acquisition, the fact that inefficient managers through mergers and
acquisitions are replaced. Efficiency means how successful the management of a firm is in
using the resources of the firm. In other words, efficiency ratios, for the present thesis
1 Henry G. Manne (1965), Michael C. Jensen and Richard S. Ruback (1983), Ajit Singh (Jan.1992).
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measure the operational efficiency of the firm. Within the merger context a rigorous
definition of efficiency is lacking and it has to be differentiated from the pareto efficiency as
defined in micro- economics. For the purpose of the present thesis, if a firm has operational
inefficiency then this is a signal that may employ inefficient managers, therefore this firm is a
takeover target. From the multivariate models, when comparing bidders with targets2,
target firms are inefficient in terms of generating total assets but efficient in terms of
generating sales. When comparing, non targets with targets 3 , target firms are inefficient in
terms of generating total assets. In the sectoral models, when comparing bidders with
targets, chemical target firms are characterised by high efficiency and electronic target firms
are inefficient firms. In the sectoral models, when comparing non targets with targets,
construction target firms are inefficient.
Another important theory developed and tested within the M&A framework is that of
leverage or increased debt capacity 4 . Acquisition candidates are characterised by excess
debt capacity which means that a merger produces debt capacity for the post-merger firm
which exceeds the firms combined premerger debt capacities. From the multivariate models,
when comparing non targets with targets5 , target firms use less financial leverage in their
capital structure. In the sectoral models, when comparing bidders with targets, chemical and
construction target firms use more debt in their capital structure. In addition, when
comparing non targets with targets, construction target firms have high leverage in their
capital structure. Therefore, though the economy wide model (non targets against targets)
suggests that target firms are characterised by excess debt capacity, this is not the case for
some sectoral models that indicate that target firms in particular sectors have high leverage
in their capital structure.
Liquidity theory has been developed and well documented for mergers and acquisitions
and suggests that target firms have a very good liquidity position6 when compared to the
non-acquired firms. From the multivariate models, when comparing bidders with targets',
2 Economy wide sample.
3 Economy wide sample.
4 Jack 0. Vance (1969), Ronald E. Shrieves and Mary M. Pashley (1984).
5 Economy wide sample.
6 Jack 0. Vance (1969), Simkowitz and Monroe (1971), Stevens (1973), Rege (1984).
7 Economy wide sample.
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target firms have sufficient sales that can assist them to generate quick assets but not to
generate working capital . When comparing, non targets with targets', target firms utilise
limited amount of cash from their total assets but they have good liquidity position when
they add the interest received to their cash position (See Cash Position No.3). In the
sectoral models, when comparing bidders with targets, mechanical and electronic target
firms are characterised by high liquidity. Moreover, when comparing non targets with
targets, chemical target firms are characterised by excess liquidity.
The ratios that are associated with capital expenditure which are the proxy for the money
that firms spend in research and development programs do not have any significant
impact for the mergers and acquisitions under examination.
The multivariate model9 which is derived when comparing bidders with targets  at the
economy wide level shows that the dominant dimensions are liquidity and efficiency. The
fundamental characteristics of takeover targets when comparing bidders against targets as
identified in the period 1982-1985 and then tested again in 1986-1990 are: target firms are
inefficient in terms of generating total assets. This finding is theory consistent with the
inefficient management hypothesis which says that target firms employ inefficient managers
and that mergers and acquisitions act as a mechanism where inefficient managers are
removed. On the other hand, target firms are efficient in generating sales. Wansley and
Lane (1983) and Ronnie J. Clayton and M. Andrew Fields (1991) used sales as a proxy of
size and their results suggest that target firms were of small size. The present thesis has seen
the above ratio as a measure of efficiency but for comparison purposes if this is seen as a
proxy for size then the present model reveals that target firms were big in size. This is a
new finding for the existing literature which suggest that target firms in the 80's were bigger
in size. Another finding is that the sales amount of target firms can assist them to generate
quick assets but not to generate working capital.
Economy wide sample.
9 This is the model that is derived in the estimation period (1982-1985) (See Table 5.2-3)and has
been tested in the validation period (1986-1990) (See Table 5.2-5).
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The multivariate model'° which is derived when comparing non targets with targets  at
the economy wide level shows that the dominant dimensions are liquidity, leyeraze and
efficiency. The fundamental characteristics of takeover targets when comparing non targets
against targets as identified in the period 1982-1985 and then tested again in 1986-1990 are:
target firms are inefficient in terms of generating total assets. This finding says that target
firms have a low annual amount of total assets. This measure has been employed by Harris
et. al.(1982) as a proxy for the size dimension. The present thesis has seen the natural log of
total assets as a measure of efficiency. This finding suggests that target firms are inefficient
firms which is theoretically consistent with the inefficient management hypothesis".
In addition, target firms use less leverage in their capital structure. This is indicated from the
low loan capital and preference capital to total assets which is a measure of the leverage
dimension. This finding is consistent with the following studies which employed the same
ratio as a representative of leverage: Stevens (1973), Wansley and Lane (1983), Dietrich and
Sorensen (1984). Therefore, this finding suggest that target firms have low leverage and this is
theoretically consistent with the financial leverage hypothesis which says that acquired firms use
less debt in their capital structure. Moreover, target firms, utilise limited amount of cash from
their total assets. This measure has been examined in the study carried out by Belkaoui
(1978) 12 and it was one of the ratios under the liquid assets to total asset group. On the
other hand, target firms have good liquidity position when they add the interest received to
their cash position (See Cash position no.3). This ratio suggests that target firms have high
cash resources which is theoretically consistent with the liquidity hypothesis which says that
target firms are liquid firms. In addition, this ratio is employed by Ronnie J. Clayton and M.
Andrew Fields (1991) as a proxy of the liquidity dimension but has not entered the final
model.
Moreover, there is evidence that target firms make a positive attempt to build up an equity
base in the market. This finding is suggested from the high annual equity and capital
reserves. This finding is not consistent with the findings of the study of Simkowitz and
10 See Table 6.2-3.
"This finding has been significant for the same multivariate analysis when discriminating bidders and targets.
12 This ratio had the following percentage error in classification for years one to five before the takeover:
48%, 44%, 42%, 42% and 36%.
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Monroe (1971) where their study indicates that acquired firms were relatively unable to
build the equity base needed and this was a signal of low growth in equity. On the other
hand, Joel Hasbrouk (1985) employed this ratio as a measure of size and based on the t-
statistics, this was the most important determinant and the sign of the coefficient suggested
a low size for acquired firms. For the present thesis the log of the annual equity and capital
reserves has been seen as a measure of efficiency and the result suggests that target firms
make a positive attempt to build up an equity base in the market so as to sustain competitive
position in the market.
Another variable that enters the final model when comparing non targets against targets is
the high average debtor collection period which indicates that target firms face problems in
collecting their debts. This shows that target firms' debtors do not pay at the specific time
limits set up by the firms and this may suggest cash flow problems. This finding suggests
that acquired firms are inefficient in collecting their debts and is theoretically consistent with
the inefficient management hypothesis.
But, the major contribution of the present thesis stems from the fact that presents the
financial characteristics of takeover targets by industry. The examination is based on a
comparison of the financial characteristics of target firms of a particular industry against
the financial characteristics of potential bidder firms that made an attempt to takeover a
firm which belongs to that particular industry. The findings of the multivariate models by
industry suggest that chemical target firms are characterised by high efficiency and use more
debt in their capital structure, construction target firms use more debt, food target firms are
affected by the liquidity dimension but as far as this dimension is concerned the findings are
mixed, mechanical target firms are characterised by low profitability and high liquidity and
electronics target firms are inefficient firms and more liquid.
In addition, sectoral models are developed when comparing non targets with targets. The
examination is based on a comparison of the financial characteristics of target firms of a
particular industry against the financial characteristics of non target firms that belong to the
same industry. The findings of the multivariate models by industry suggest that chemical
target firms are characterised by excess liquidity, construction target firms are inefficient
and have high leverage in their capital structure, food target firms are characterised from the
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dimensions of liquidity and leverage but the results are mixed for both dimensions,
mechanical and electronic target firms have the liquidity dimension as important but the
results about this dimension are mixed for both sectors.
The results of the present thesis may be useful for regulators that want to derive policies on
regulating the merger and acquisition activity in UK. The present thesis has showed that the
financial characteristics of target firms vary between different industries. Therefore, different
government policies should regulate different industries..
The table on page 177 presents the classification accuracies of the models derived from
the present thesis together with the variables that enter each model. In front of each
variable the sign of the coefficient is stated
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CHAPTER 7	 Suggestions for further research
SUGGESTIONS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH
The collection of more data will give greater meaning to the industry specific models and
allow them to be developed further. The present thesis presents results for five different
industries. Further research may include more industries so as to identify the financial
characteristics of target firms for a range of industries.
It is of interest to compare the predictive power of the competing methods suggested by the
existing literature applied in discrete choice models. (logit and probit analysis, hazard
models and neural networks' ).
Multinomial logit was used, but the limits of time and space prohibited its inclusion.
Therefore, multinomial logit analysis can be useful when examining three groups at a time.
(For example bidders, targets and non- acquired firms) or (successful acquisitions,
unsuccessful acquisitions and firms that enter bankruptcy).
The theory of the market for corporate control is a very important issue. Therefore, the
ownership management control must always be incorporated in the different models so as to
provide more evidence for the theory of the market for corporate control. The ownership
management control can be measured by the proportion of shares that the directors have in
the firm. This is an important issue because as it was outlined in chapter 1, some researchers
believe that mergers are planned and executed by managers who thereby maximise their
own utility2 to the detriment of their shareholders.
1 R.H. Berry and Duarte Trigueiros in the book Neural Networks in Finance and Investing have developed a chapter
called Applying Neural Networks to the Extraction of Knowledge from Accounting Reports: A Classification Study
which gives an overview of an application of neural networks in finance.
2 Fridrich Trautwein (1990), H. Nejat Seyhum (1990), T. Boone Pickens Jr. (1985).
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APPENDIX II
Factor Analysis - A technique for the reduction of the variables.
"Factor analysis refers to a variety of statistical techniques whose common
objective is to represent a set of variables in terms of a smaller number
of hypothetical variables."
Jae- On Kim and Charles W. Mueller (1991)
In general, the first step of factor analysis involves an examination of the interrelationships
among the variables under investigation. Suppose that we use the correlation coefficient as
a measure of association and we have prepared a table of correlations. Inspection of the
correlation matrix may show that there are positive relationships among these variables,
and that the relationships within some subsets of variables are higher than those between
the subsets. A factor analysis may be used to address whether these observed correlations
can be explained by the existence of a small number of hypothetical variables. The
researcher may not have any idea as to how many underlying dimensions there are for the
given data. Therefore, factor analysis may be used as a tool of ascertaining the minimum
number of hypothetical factors that can account for the observed covariation, and as a
means of exploring the data for possible data reduction. The researcher may anticipate or
hypothesise that there are two different underlying dimensions and that certain variables
belong to one dimension while others belong to the second. If factor analysis is used as a
mean of confirming a certain hypothesis and not as a mean of exploring underlying
dimensions, this is referred to as confirmatory factor analysis. Concluding, the purpose of
factor analysis is to enable the researcher to reduce a large number of observable variables
to a small number of unobserved variables called factors without significant loss of
information. In other words, factor analysis can be viewed as a technique of data reduction
and to identify underlying dimensions which are not directly measurable. The basic idea is
that a set of undeveloped variables, called factors, exists and the factors derived can
adequately explain the interrelationship of the original variables. Stevens (1973) supports
that in interpreting factor analysis, one is generally interested to find the number of distinct
factors, how original data is grouped in the factors and if the factors can be given a meaningful
interpretation in terms of the research problem at hand. Factor analysis looks only at the total
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set of data (all ratios and combined groups) and its interdependence, whereas MDA divides
the total set into the predefined groups and finds a variable profile to best separate the groups.
Stevens (1973) carried out factor analysis when the original group of ratios was factored into
six dimensions being a linear combination of the original 20 ratios. The reduction from 20
ratios to 6 factors was possible due to the high level of multicollinearity or redundancy.
THE BASIC APPROACH OF FACTOR ANALYSIS
Jae- On Kim and Charles W. Mueller (1991) defined factors as "hypothesised,
unmeasured, and underlying variables which are presumed to be the sources of the
observed variables; often divided into unique and common factors"(p.77).
The basic steps that a researcher has to follow to carry out factor analysis can be described
as follows:
The first step is the collection of the data and the preparation of the appropriate matrix
which will be used in the analysis. Raw data variables for factor analysis are generally
assumed to be of metric measurement, although dummy variables could also be used. Jae-
On Kim and Charles W. Mueller (1991) support that in this step assumes that the basic
covariance structure (matrix) of interest is for the variables, and one could still make the
choice between analysing the covariance matrix or the correlation matrix_ Jae- On Kim and
Charles W. Mueller (1991) suggest that in exploratory factor analysis, one may rely on the
use of correlation matrix because there are two practical advantages. Firstly, many existing
computer programs do not accept the covariance matrix as basic input data, and secondly
almost all of the examples in the literature are based on correlation matrices- hence it will
be easier for the reader to understand and compare results with others.
The second step is to extract the number of factors that can adequately explain the
correlation among the observed variables. There are several methodologies' to derive the
initial factors like: the principal component analysis, least-squares method (variants are
principal axis factoring with iterated communalities or Minres), canonical factoring or
maximum likelihood method, alpha factoring (a method of initial factoring in which the
1 An extensive and detailed analysis of these methodologies is provided by Harry H. Harman (1976), Modern
Factor Analysis, The University of Chicago Press, Third Edition, Part 11, (Direct Factor Analysis Methods), pp.
113-217.
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variables included in the analysis are considered samples from a universe of variables2),
image factor analysis. The most popular method is that of principal components and this is
the method that has been applied in the present thesis. C. R. Laurent (1979) examines the
impact of the principal components analysis in the effectiveness of financial ratio analysis.
The study achieved its objectives of identifying a small set of financial ratios which: firstly
account for a significant proportion of the total variance in a (relatively) complete set of
financial ratios, and thus provide most of the information that would be obtained from a
highly detailed analysis, secondly are sufficiently few in number to increase the efficiency
and effectiveness of financial ratio analysis and finally are sufficiently independent of each
other to permit proper identification of their individual effects in multivariate analysis.
The criteria that may be used so as to find out how many factors to extract or how well
does the model with a particular number of common factors fit the data can be described
as follows:
• Latent root criterion (or eigenvalues): Eigenvalues equal or greater than one are
retained. (Eigenvalue: a mathematical property of a matrix; used in relation to the
decomposition of a covariance matrix, both as a criterion of determining the number of
factors to extract and a measure of variance accounted for by a given dimension2).
• Percentage variance criterion: The cumulative percentage of the variance
explained/extracted when successive factors are used. It is important to note that the
first factor is the most important one. Subsequent factors are based on the residual
amount of variance and are progressively by less important.
The third step is to determine the significance levels of factor loadings which as "a
general term referring to a coefficient in a factor pattern or structure matrix 2 "(p.77) and
in the present thesis factor loadings have been found using the Burt-Banks 3 formula:
2 Jae- On Kim and Charles W. Mueller (1991), Introduction to Factor Analysis: What it is and How to do it,
Sage University_Paper, Series: Quantitative Applications in the Social Sciences, Sage Publications.
3
Dennis Child (1990), The Essentials of Factor Analysis, Cassell Second Edition, p.114.
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VL = VC 	
n+1 — ri
where
VL= value which a loading must reach in order to be significant for a given sample
size.
VC= value a correlation must reach in order to be significant for a given sample
size.
n = the number of variables in the analysis, and
r = the factor number, that is the position of the factor during extraction.
The standard error of a correlation can be obtained from the above formula.
I will illustrate the Burt-Banks formula with an example from my thesis.
In the present thesis I have 38 variables. Suppose that I have to examine with factor analysis
a sample size of 51 firms. From the current Appendix 11 - Table 19 based on the number of
observations at 1% I have a 0.346 as a standard error of a correlation. Suppose that from
the analysis the number of factors extracted were 8 the standard error of a loading is
38 
calculated as follows: 0.346	— 0.346(1107) = 0.383
sv 38+1-8
In other words, for loadings to satisfy the one per cent level of significance in the 8th factor they
must be at least 0.383. Since factor loadings represent correlation coefficients, critical values can
be obtained for different levels of significance and degrees of freedom from Table 19 which is
presented in the current appendix (Appendix II) : Significance Levels for Pearson product-
moment correlation coefficients. Given that it is problematic to estimate the error involved in
factor analysis a conservative approach, 1% level of significance, is recommended. It has been
observed from the current research that the larger the sample size the smaller the loading to be
considered significant.
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Another important statistic which should be mentioned at this stage is that of
communality. Communality is a measure of how well the variation of each observed
variable is explained by all the retained factors together. Jae- On Kim and Charles W.
Mueller (1991) defined communality as the variance of an observed variable accounted for
by the common factors; in an orthogonal factor model, it is equivalent to the sum of the
squared factor loadings.
The fourth step is that although the initial solution fulfils certain statistical conditions, it
does not provide the best means of interpretation. Therefore, the factors are rotated in
order to improve interpretability and avoid a situation where an expression could be able
to be interpreted in more than one way. The rotation of the factors is essential so as to
provide a clear interpretation of the final solution. Jae- On Kim and Charles W. Mueller
(1991) when discussing the fourth step they say that in order to obtain the initial solution,
certain restrictions typically are imposed. These restrictions are (1) there are k common
factors, (2) underlying factors are orthogonal to each other and (3) the first factor
accounts as much variance as possible, the second factor accounts for as much of the
residual variance left unexplained by the first factor, the third factor accounts for as much
of the residual variance left unexplained by the first two factors, and so on.
There are two basic methods of rotation each having a variety of approaches4:
Orthogonal rotations (Jae- On Kim and Charles W. Mueller (1991): factors obtained by
this rotation are by definition uncorrelated): The rotation maintains the orthogonality of
the original factors. The most commonly used approaches are Quartimax, Varimax, and
Orthomax. The most commonly used method is that of varimax and this methods is used
in the present thesis. Jae- On Kim and Charles W. Mueller (1991) define varimax method
as a method of orthogonal rotation which simplifies the factor structure by maximising the
variance of a column of the pattern matrix. D. N. Lawley and A. E. Maxwell (1971 p.72)
support that with varimax method factors are rotated in such a way that the new loadings
tend to be either relatively large or relatively small in absolute magnitude compared with
4 An extensive and detailed analysis of these approaches is provided by Harry H. Harman (1976), Modern Factor
Analysis, The University of Chicago Press, Third Edition, Part DI, (Derived Factor Solutions), pp. 247-336.
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the original ones. This is accomplished by maximising a certain function of the squares of
the loadings, the procedure being iterative.
Oblique rotations : Jae- On Kim and Charles W. Mueller (1991) explain that when factors
are rotated without imposing the orthogonality condition and resulting terminal factors are
in general correlated with each other. Therefore, the orthogonality of factors is not
maintained and no restriction upon the independence of the factors is imposed into the
solution. The most commonly used approaches are Oblimax (a criterion for obtaining an
oblique rotation: it is equivalent to the quartimax criterion in orthogonal rotation5),
Quartimin, Oblimin (a general criterion for obtaining an oblique rotation which tries to
simplify the pattern matrix by way of reference axes; its variants include biquartimin,
covarimin, and quartimin5), Orthoblique.
The final stage is where the solution has been obtained with the pattern of the factor
loadings should be interpreted in order to assign a name for each of the factor. All
significant factor loadings and their respective signs (interpreted as in correlation, i.e.
negative signs indicate negative relationship) are used. In attempting to name the factors it
must be borne in mind that the first factors is usually a general one and in some cases it is
not possible to name it. In such cases the interpretation is based on subsequent factors
only. For the present thesis, the statistical package of SPSS has been used to carry out
varimax factor analysis (See Appendix VI - Table 58 to 69).
5 Jae- On Kim and Charles W. Mueller (1991), Introduction to Factor Analysis: What it is and How to do it,
Sage University Paper, Series: Quantitative Applications in the Social Sciences, Sage Publications.
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Stepwise Regression Analysis -A Technique for the reduction of the variables for
Logit/Probit Model.
A. H. Studenmund (1992) discuss stepwise regression analysis. In stepwise regression
analysis you need a list of possible independent variables, and then stepwise regression
analysis form the equation in steps. It chooses as the first explanatory variable the one that
by itself explains the largest amount of the variation of the dependent variable around its
mean. It chooses as the second variable the one that adds the most to R2, given that the
first variable is already in the equation. The stepwise procedure continues until the next
variable to be added fails to achieve some researcher- specified increase in R2
 (or all the
variables are added). The measure of the supposed contribution of each independent
variable is the increase in R 2
 caused by the addition of the variable. For the present thesis,
the statistical package of LIMDEP has been used to carry out stepwise regression analysis.
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Table 19: SIGNIFICANCE LEVELS FOR PEARSON PRODUCT-MOMENT CORRELATION COEFFICIENTS
Degrees of Freedom Values of correlations
required at 5% level
Values of correlations
required at 1% level
5 .755 .875
10 .576 .714
15 .483 .605
20 .425 .538
25 .380 .488
30 .338 .440
35 .320 .417
40 .300 .394
45 .280 .370
50 .262 .346
60 .248 .328
70 .233 .308
80 .220 .290
90 .206 .272
100 .194 .255
150 .158 .209
200 .137 .182
250 .125 .163
500 .088 .115
Table extracted from : Dennis
Child " The Essentials of Factor
Analysis", Year 1990, pp109.
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Table 20: Chemical Industry -Bidders
1. Unilever (1982)
2. Laporte Industries (1982)
3. Fisons (1982)
4. Brent Chemicals (1982)
5. May & Baker (1982)
6. Hoechst UK (1982)
7. Moss Robert (1982)
8. Kalon Group (1985)
9. Croda International (1985)
10. Beecham (1985)
11. Ellis & Everard (1986)
12. ICI (1986)
13. BTP (1987)
14. MTM (1989)
15. Chemoxy International (1989)
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Table 21: Chemical Industry - Non-Targets
1. Air Products (1987)
2. Akzo Chemicals Holdings Ltd (1987)
3. Albright & Wilson (1982)
4. Allied Colloids Group Plc (1989)
5. Amersham International Plc (1988)
6. Associated Octel Co (1987)
7. Atochem UK Holdings Ltd (1986)
8. Avon Cosmetics Ltd (1985)
9. Boc Group Plc (1982)
10. Bader (Scott) Co Ltd (1987)
11. Bespak Plc (1990)
12. Bioplan Holdings (1986)
13. Bristol-Myers Co Ltd (1985)
14. Bush Boake Men Holdings UK Ltd (1990)
15. Ciba - Ceigy Plc (1982)
16. Colgate-Palmolive Ltd (1982)
17. Dashtag (1987)
18. Eli Lilly Group Ltd (1986)
19. Enimont Holdings UK Ltd (1985)
20. Exxon Chemical Ltd (1987)
21. Gillette Industries Ltd (1987)
22. Henkel Chemicals (1987)
23. Interox Chemicals Ltd (1990)
24. Johnson Wax Ltd (1982)
25. Merck Holdings Ltd (1985)
26. Monsanto Plc (1985)
27. Pavion International (1987)
28. Tennants Cons. Ltd (1982)
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Table 22: Chemical Industry - Targets
1. Dow Chemical (1982)
2. DSM (1982)
3. May & Baker (1982)
4. Rhone- Poulenc (1982)
5. Wigglesworth (1982)
6. ICI (1985)
7. Kalon Ltd (1985)
8. Mebon (1985)
9. Barrow Hepburn (1986)
10. Scottish Agr. Industries Plc (1986)
11. Barrow Hepburn (1987)
12. Feb International (1987)
13. Reed International (1987)
14. Armitage Bros. (1987)
15. Reabrook Holdings (1987)
16. Rotunda (1987)
17. Coates Bros (1987)
18. Halite (1987)
19. Carless (1988)
20. Caradon (1989)
21. Chemoxy International (1990)
22. Foseco (1990)
23. Just Rubber (1990)
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Table 23: Construction Industry - Bidders
1. Wimpey George (1982)
2. Wiggins Group (1982)
3. Lilley FJC (1982)
4. Cakebread Robey (1982)
5. Roberts Thomas (1982)
6. Redland (1982)
7. Wilson (1984)
8. Lovell Y J (Holdings) (1984)
9. Costain Group (1984)
10. Falcon Industries (1984)
11. Tarmac (1984)
12. Lawrence (1984)
13. Cala (1986)
14. Tilbury Gr. (1986)
15. Turriff Corporation (1986)
16. Raine Industries (1987)
17. BIM Group (1988)
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Table 24: Construction Industry - Non- Targets
1. Amelia Holdings Plc (1984)
2. Bailey (Ben) Construction Plc (1984)
3. Barratt Development Plc (1982)
4. Blackwood Hodge Plc (1982)
5. Boscalis Westminster Ltd (1982)
6. Bowmer & Kirkland Ltd (1988)
7. British Building & Engineering Appliances Plc (1987)
8. Bryant Group Plc (1984)
9. Carter (R.G) Holdings Ltd (1987)
10. Chelsea Harbour Ltd (1988)
11. Christiani & Nielsen Ltd (1984)
12. Comben Group Plc (1985)
13. Combustion Engineering Ltd (1987)
14. Douglas (Robert M.) Holdings Plc (1988)
15. Milton Ltd (1987)
16. Dunton Group Plc (1990)
17. EBC Group Plc (1987)
18. Edmond Holdings Plc (1989)
19. Havelock Europa Plc (1988)
20. Haymills Holdings Ltd (1988)
21. Howard Holdings (1988)
22. Hunting Gate Group Ltd (1987)
23. Hollansche Beton Gr.(UK) Ltd (1986)
24. ISIS Group Plc (1988)
25. Jackson Group Plc (1988)
26. Kyle Stewart Ltd (1987)
27. Laing(John) Plc (1985)
28. Lelliott (john) Group Plc (1987)
29. Longley(James) Holdings Ltd (1985)
30. Mansell (R.) Ltd (1985)
31. Maunders (John) Group Plc (1987)
32. May Gurney Holdings Ltd (1986)
33. McCarthy & Stone Plc (1987)
34. McLaughlins & Harvey Plc (1987)
35. Miller (Stanley) Holdings Plc (1985)
36. NSM Plc (1985)
37. Newwarthill Plc (1986)
38. North Midland Construction Plc (1986)
39. Pochin's Plc (1982)
40. Shepherd Building Group Ltd (1985)
41. Thyssen(GB) Ltd (1984)
42. Vibroplant Plc (1985)
43. Willmott Dixon Holdings (1988)
44. Wiltshier Plc (1987)
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Table 25: Construction Industry - Targets
1. Cawoods (1982)
2. Ibstock Johnsen (1982)
3. Tunnel Holdings (1982)
4. Bath & Portland Group (1984)
5. Glossop (1984)
6. Streeters of Godalming (1984)
7. UBM Scaffolding (1984)
8. Wiljay (1984)
9. London Brick (1984)
10. Westbrick (1984)
11. Booth Alfred (1985)
12. IDC Group (1985)
13. Leech William (1985)
14. Pearce CH & Sons (1985)
15. Vectis Stone (1985)
16. Wallis GE (1985)
17. French Kier (1986)
18. Hat Group (1986)
19. Monk A. (1986)
20. Wiggins Group (1986)
21. Aberdeen Construction Group (1987)
22. Ford & Weston Group (1987)
23. Nolton (1987)
24. Trentham G. Percy (1987)
25. Clarke Securities (1987)
26. Baldwin (1987)
27. Babcock International (1987)
28. London and Northern Group (1987)
29. Scott Greenham (1987)
30. Crouch (Derek) (1987)
31. Trade Promotion Services Group (1987)
32. Jarvis (J) & Sons (1987)
33. Benlox (1987)
34. Oakwood Group (1987)
35. Ecorbic Holdings (1988)
36. Ruberoid (1988)
37. Nocros (1988)
38. Foster Wheeler Power Products (1988)
39. Costain (1988)
40. Frogmore Est. (1988)
41. Hay & Croft (1988)
42. Rush & Tompkins (1988)
43. Wimpey George (1988)
44. Crown House Engineering (1989)
45. Colroy (1990)
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Table 26: Food Industry - Bidders
1. Argyll Foods (1982)
2. Northern Foods (1982)
3. Fitch Lovell (1982)
4. Hazlewood Foods (1982)
5. Fisher Albert Gr. (1982)
6. Preedy Alfred & Sons (1982)
7. Rowntree Mackintosh (1982)
8. Whitbread (1982)
9. Boddingtons Breweries (1982)
10. Dewhurst (1984)
11. Scottish Newcaslte (1984)
12. Vaux Breweries (1984)
13. Basset Foods (1985)
14. Tate and Lyle (1985)
15. Dalgety (1986)
16. Unigate (1986)
17. General Foods (1986)
18. Bodycote International (1986)
19. Ranks Hovis Mc Dougall (1987)
20. Dalepak Foods (1988)
21. United Biscuits (1988)
22. Cadbury Schweppes (1988)
23. Guinness (1988)
24. Brake Bross (1989)
25. Lovell(G.F) (1989)
26. Perkins Foods (1990)
215
APPENDIX HI
Table 27: Food Industry - Non-Targets
1. Berisford International Plc (1989)
2. Ajinomoto Co (1990)
3. Billington (Ed) & Son Ltd (1987)
4. Alpine Group Plc (1988)
5. Anglo Eur. Food Group Ltd (1987)
6. Chambers & Fargus Plc (1985)
7. Associated Fisheries Plc (1984)
8. BSN (1987)
9. Buitelaur (Frans.) Ltd (1987)
10. Bulmer (H.P) Holdings Plc (1989)
11. CPC (UK) Ltd (1982)
12. Carlsberg Brewery Ltd (1986)
13. De Mulder (Prosper) Ltd (1990)
14. Devenish (J.A) Plc (1984)
15. ESS - Food (UK) Group Ltd (1986)
16. Favor Parker Ltd (1990)
17. Food Manufacturers GB Co Ltd (1987)
18. Foodane Ltd (1984)
19. Fuller, Smith & Turner Plc (1982)
20. Heald (A.) Ltd (1984)
21. Heavitree Brewery Plc (1984)
22. Kerrygold Co Ltd (1982)
23. Kraft Foods Ltd (1982)
24. McMullen & Sons Ltd (1990)
25. Meat Trade SuppL Plc (1982)
26. Mecaniver S.A (1984)
27. Mischeffkirl Holdings Ltd (1984)
28. Nichols (J.N)(V) Plc (1985)
29. Padway Holdings Ltd (1986)
30. Princes Foods Ltd (1985)
31. Shelton Jones Plc (1990)
32. Shrewsbury Wem Brewery Co Ltd (1987)
33. Taunton Cider Co Ltd (1988)
34. Taveners Plc (1982)
35. Thwaites (Daniel) Plc (1987)
36. Tollemache & Cobbold Breweries Ltd (1984)
37. Union International Plc (1990)
38. Usbome Plc (1987)
39. Weetabix Ltd (1986)
40. Weston(George) Holdings Ltd (1982)
41. Whiworths Holdings Ltd (1988)
42. Wolverhampton & Dudley Breweries (1982)
43. Young & Co's Brewery Plc (1986)
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Table 28: Food Industry - Targets
1. Avana Group Plc (1987)
2. Bassett Foods Plc (1989)
3. Bishop's Group Plc (1982)
4. Blue Bird Confectionery Holdings Plc (1986)
5. Boddingtons Breweries Ltd (1987)
6. Border Breweries (Wrexham) Plc (1984)
7. Bowyers (Wiltshire) Ltd (1985)
8. British Sugar Plc (1990)
9. Brown (Matthew) Plc (1987)
10.Buckley's Brewery Plc (1987)
11.Bums Philip & Co (1984)
12. Cameron (J.W.) & Co Ltd (1984)
13.Carlton Industries Plc (1984)
14.Clark (Matthew) & Sons(Holdings) Plc (1982)
15.Dalgety Plc (1984)
16.Fenwick Ltd (1984)
17.Fitch Lovell Plc (1990)
18.Haverhill Meat Products Ltd (1990)
19.Hazlewood Foods Plc (1990)
20.Hillsdown Holdings Plc (1990)
21.Home Farm Products Plc (1987)
22.Huntley & Palmer Foods Plc (1982)
23.Maynards Plc (1985)
24.Northem Foods Plc (1989)
25.01dham Brewery Plc (1982)
26.Pauls Plc (1985)
27.Peerless Plc (1982)
28.Porter Chadbum Plc (1984)
29.Premier Brands Ltd (1989)
30.Silver (John) Holdings Ltd (1986)
31.Slaters Food Products Plc (1986)
32.Thomhill( J.)& Sons Ltd (1982)
33.Unigate Plc (1986)
34.Vaux Group Plc (1988)
217
APPENDIX III
Table 29: Electronics Industry - Bidders
1. AB Electronic Products (1982)
2. Cabridge Electronic Industries (1982)
3. Ferranti (1982)
4. Telephone Rentals (1985)
5. Emess Lighting (1985)
6. Dowty (1985)
7. AMS Industries (1986)
8. Dowding & Mills (1986)
9. Sunleigh Electronics (1986)
10. Forward Tecnology Inds. (1986)
11. STC (1986)
12. Tunstall Group (1987)
13. Plessey (1987)
14. Prestwich (1987)
15. GEC (1988)
16. Bowthorpe Hidgs (1988)
17. Alphameric (1988)
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Table 30: Electronics Industry - Non-Targets
1. Arcolectric (Holdings) Plc (1987)
2. Arlen Plc (1988)
3. Bailey (N.G.) Organisation Ltd (1988)
4. Bulgin (A.F) & Co Plc (1985)
5. CEF Holdings Ltd (1988)
6. Chemring Gr.Plc (1989)
7. Clarke (T.) Plc (1989)
8. Combined Electrical MFRS Ltd (1989)
9. Emerson Electric UK Ltd (1988)
10. Fujitsu Europe Ltd (1988)
11. LPA Industries Plc (1990)
12. LEC Refrigeration Plc (1982)
13. Pillar Electrical Plc (1987)
14. Scholes Group Plc (1985)
15. Siemens Plc (1986)
16. Western Selection Plc (1982)
17. Wholesale Fittings Plc (1986)
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Table 31: Electronics Industry - Targets
1. Avesco Plc (1989)
2. BTS Group Plc (1988)
3. Crystalate Holdings Plc (1990)
4. DBE Technology Group Plc (1987)
5. Dixons Group Plc (1989)
6. Dubilier International Plc (1988)
7. Ealing Electro-Optics Plc (1988)
8. Ferranti International Plc (1987)
9. Gardiner Group Plc (1988)
10. Morceau Holdings Plc (1988)
11. Pilgrim House Group Plc (1988)
12. Polly Peck International Plc (1988)
13. Polytechnic Electronics Plc (1989)
14. Symonds Engineering Plc (1988)
15. U.E.I Plc (1989)
16. American Electronic Componet (1987)
17. Breville Europe Plc (1985)
18. Cass Group Plc (1985)
19. Derritron Plc (1982)
20. First Castle Electronics Plc (1986)
21. Friedland Doggart Group Plc (1985)
22. Inspectorate EAE Plc (1985)
23. International Signal and Control Group (1987)
24. Muirhead Plc (1985)
25. Sheffield Smelting Co Ltd (1984)
26. Shorrock Plc (1986)
27. Stone International Plc (1987)
28. Webber Electro Components Plc (1986)
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Table 32: Mechanical Engineering Industry - Bidders
1. Verson International (1982)
2. EIS Group (1984)
3. Bullough (1984)
4. BM Group (1985)
5. Simon Engineering (1985)
6. Newman Tonks (1985)
7. 600 Group (1985)
8. Glynwed International (1986)
9. Davy Corporation (1986)
10. Aerospace Engineering (1986)
11. Eadie Illdgs (1986)
12. Carclo Engineering Group (1986)
13. I1v1 Engineering (1986)
14. Howden Group (1986)
15. Habit Precision Engineering (1987)
16. CI Group (1987)
17. GKN (1987)
18. Braithwaite Group (1987)
19. Metalrax Group (1987)
20. Fife Indmar (1989)
21. Weir Group (1989)
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Table 33: Mechanical Engineering Industry - Non-Targets
1. AT Trust Plc (1986)
2. Alfa - Laval Co Ltd (1982)
3. Arley Holdings Plc (1985)
4. Baxi Partnership Ltd (1989)
5. Bogod Group Plc (1987)
6. British Shipbuilders (1987)
7. Crosby Woodfield Plc (1988)
8. Davies & Metculfe Plc (1989)
9. Dexion Group Plc (1987)
10. Epicure Industries Plc (1988)
11. Ferrum Holdings (1988)
12. Flexello Castors 8r, Wheels Plc (1987)
13. Folkes Group Plc (1984)
14. H.M. Holdings Plc (1986)
15. Haden Maclellan Holdings Plc (1986)
16. Hall Engineering Holdings Plc (1989)
17. Lancer Boss Group Ltd (1986)
18. Linde Holdings Ltd (1986)
19. Martin - Baker Aircraft Co Ltd (1986)
20. Martin- Baker Engineering Ltd (1984)
21 Mining & Allied Supplies Plc (1986)
22. Parsons (Ralph M)Co Ltd (1986)
23. Powerscreen International Plc (1985)
24. Renold Plc (1987)
25. Raleigh Industries (1988)
26. Robinson Thomas Group Plc (1988)
27. Rockwell International Ltd (1988)
28. S.I. Group Plc (1988)
29. SKF (UK) Ltd (1987)
30. SKF Invest. Ltd (1987)
31. Short Bros. Plc (1985)
32. Siebe Plc (1986)
33. Slingsby (HC) Plc (1986)
34. Unicorn Industries Plc (1985)
35. W.B. Industries Plc (1985)
36. Walker & Staff Holdings Plc (1984)
37. Walker (Thomas) Plc (1988)
38. West Industries Plc (1986)
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Table 34: Mechanical Engineering Industry - Targets
1. Allen (Edgar), Balfour Ltd (1986)
2. Allen(W.G.) & Sons (Tipton) Plc (1985)
3. Armstrong Equipment Plc (1984)
4. Astra Holdings Plc (1986)
5. Babcock International Plc (1987)
6. Baker Perkins Plc (1987)
7. Baldwin Plc (1987)
8. Benford Concrete Machinery Plc (1986)
9. Bestobell Plc (1986)
10. Brickhouse Dudley Plc (1986)
11. Brown(John) Plc (1986)
12. Burgess Group Plc (1984)
13. Christy Hunt Plc (1988)
14. Ferranti International Plc (1989)
15. Foster Wheeler Ltd (1988)
16. Giltspur Ltd (1987)
17. Victor Products Plc (1988)
18. Wadkin Plc (1986)
19. Wilkins & Mitchell Plc (1982)
20. Yarrow Plc (1986)
21. Herman Smith Plc (1985)
22. Tyzack Plc (1989)
23. Wyndham Group Plc (1989)
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Table 35:Aggregate Sample - Bidders Vs Targets
Year relative to the
announcement
Number of factors
extracted
Factor loading accepted
and above
5 9 0.287
4 8 0.282
3 8 0.282
2 9 0.287
1 8 0.282
0 9 0.287
6 years average 10 0.292
Table 36:Aggregate Sample - Non Targets Vs Targets
Year relative to the
announcement
Number of factors
extracted
Factor loading accepted
and above
5 9 0.287
4 9 0.287
3 9 0.287
2 8 0.282
1 9 0.287
0 10 0.292
6 years average 11 0.297
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Table 37: Chemicals - Bidders against Targets
Year relative to the
announcement
Number of factors
extracted
Kaiser-Meyer-
Olkin
Measure of
Sampling
Adequacy6
Factor loading
accepted
and above
5 6 0.88142 0.577
4 6 0.73567 0.577
3 6 0.87036 0.577
2 6 0.80873 0.577
1 6 0.92179 0.577
0 6 0.92354 0.577
6 years average 7 0.586
Table 38: Construction - Bidders against Targets
Year relative to the
announcement
Number of factors
extracted
Kaiser-Meyer-
Olkin
Measure of
Sampling
Adequacy
Factor loading
accepted
and above
5 8 0.57250 0.487
4 8 0.72792 0.487
3 8 0.42726 0.487
2 7 0.45779 0.479
1 8 0.50581 0.487
0 7 0.78936 0.479
6 years average 7 0.479
6 According to Marija J. Norusis (1990) in the manual of "SPSS/PC+ Statistics 4.0" (p.B-128-129) supports that
the Kaiser-Meyer-Oklin measure of sampling adequacy is an index for comparing the magnitudes of the
observed correlation coefficients to the magnitudes of the partial correlation coefficients. Small values
for the KMO measure indicate that a factor analysis of the variables may not be a good idea, since
correlations between pairs of the variables cannot be explained by other variables. Kaiser (1974)
characterises measures in the 0,90's as marvelous, in the 0.80's as meritorious, in the 0.70's as
middling, in the 0.60's as mediocre, in the 0.50's as miserable, and below 0.5 as unacceptable.
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Table 39: Food - Bidders against Targets
Year relative to the
announcement
Number of factors
extracted
Kaiser-Meyer-
Olkin
Measure of
Sampling
Adequacy
Factor loading
accepted
and above
5 7 0.51572 0.479
4 7 0.36298 0.479
3 7 0.81121 0.479
2 8 0.50214 0.487
1 8 0.28273 0.487
0 8 0.59218 0.487
6 years average 8 0.487
Table 40: Mechanical- Bidders against Targets
Year relative to the
announcement
Number of factors
extracted
Kaiser-Meyer-
Olkin
Measure of
Sampling
Adequacy
Factor loading
accepted
and above
5 6 0.94271 0.766
4 6 0.93066 0.766
3 6 0.88744 0.766
2 6 0.82255 0.766
1 6 0.94470 0.766
0 5 0.94514 0.755
6 years average 7 0.788
Table 41: Electronics- Bidders against Targets
Year relative to the
announcement
Number of factors
extracted
Kaiser-Meyer-
Olkin
Measure of
Sampling
Adequacy
Factor loading
accepted
and above
5 6 0.96719 0.649
4 5 0.97594 0.640
3 5 0.91066 0.640
2 5 0.96636 0.640
1 5 0.94165 0.640
0 5 0.88493 0.640
6 years average 7 0.659
226
APPENDIX IV
Table 42: Chemicals - Non Targets against Targets
Year relative to the
announcement
Number of factors
extracted
Kaiser-Meyer-
Olkin
Measure of
Sampling
Adequacy
Factor loading
accepted
and above
5 7 0.81753 0.586
4 7 0.58804 0.586
3 8 0.69619 0.596
2 7 0.67789 0.586
1 7 0.88574 0.586
0 6 0.77866 0.577
6 years average 8 0.596
Table 43: Construction - Non Targets against Targets
Year relative to the
announcement
Number of factors
extracted
Kaiser-Meyer-
Olkin
Measure of
Sampling
Adequacy
Factor loading
accepted
and above
5 6 0.81642 0.472
4 8 0.87067 0.487
3 6 0.77599 0.472
2 7 0.75161 0.479
1 6 0.81091 0.472
0 6 0.85569 0.472
6 years average 7 0.479
Table 44: Food- Non Targets against Targets
Year relative to the
announcement
Number of factors
extracted
Kaiser-Meyer-
Olkin
Measure of
Sampling
Adequacy
Factor loading
accepted
and above
5 7 0.53519 0.454
4 7 0.66154 0.454
3 7 0.42742 0.454
2 7 0.26897 0.454
1 8 0.48353 0.462
0 8 0.49331 0.462
6 years average 7 0.454
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Table 45: Mechanical- Non Targets against Targets
Year relative to the
announcement
Number of factors
extracted
Kaiser-Meyer-
Olkin
Measure of
Sampling
Adequacy
Factor loading
accepted
and above
5 6 0.83178 0.649
4 6 0.82086 0.649
3 7 0.86398 0.659
2 5 0.95919 0.640
1 5 0.94878 0.640
0 6 0.91772 0.649
6 years average 6 0.649
Table 46: Electronics- Non Targets against Targets
Year relative to the
announcement
Number of factors
extracted
Kaiser-Meyer-
Olkin
Measure of
Sampling
Adequacy
Factor loading
accepted
and above
5 4 0.97087 0.744
4 3 0.99453 0.734
3 2 0.99752 0.724
2 4 0.98697 0.744
1 4 0.97525 0.744
0 2 0.99770 0.724
6 years average 6 0.766
228
APPENDIX V
The analysis provided in Appendix V is an indicative one. It shows which dimensions and
variables have been significant for each industry for the last six years before the
announcement of the bid (including the year of announcement ). The significant variables'
in the estimation period are marked with a shaded box8 . The significant variables in both
the estimation and validation period are marked with a black box 9 . The methodologies
adopted for this analysis is univariate logit and univariate probit analysis.
Summarising the findings of this analysis the financial ratios that do tend to be very
significant in both the estimation and validation periods are:
Table 47: Chemicals - Bidders Vs Targets
X27 = Total Liabilities to Shareholders' Equity ( LEVERAGE)
Table 48: Chemicals - Non Targets Vs Targets
X26 = Long Term Liabilities to Shareholders' Equity ( LEVERAGE)
X30 = Preference and Loan Capital to Equity and Reserves ( LEVERAGE)
X32 = Interest Paid to Loan Capital ( LEVERAGE)
Table 51: Food - Bidders Vs Targets
X14 = Current Ratio ( Working Capital Ratio ) ( LIQUIDITY)
X15 = Acid Test or Liquid Asset or Quick Asset Ratio ( LIQUIDITY )
X17 = Cash Position No.1 ( LIQUIDITY )
X21 = Working Capital to Total Assets ( LIQUIDITY)
X24 = Quick Assets to Total Assets ( LIQUIDITY)
X28 = Current Assets to Total Assets ( LIQUIDITY)
Table 53: Mechanical - Bidders Vs Targets
X1 = Return on Capital Employed ( PROFITABILITY)
X2 = Profit to Sales ( PROFITABILITY)
X3 = Profit to Total Assets ( PROFITABILITY)
X4 = EBIT to Sales ( PROFITABILITY)
X15 = Acid Test or Liquid Asset or Quick Asset Ratio ( LIQUIDITY )
X19 = Cash Position No.3 ( LIQUIDITY )
X22 = Cash to Total Assets ( LIQUIDITY)
7 They may have been significant at 90% or 95% or 99% confidence level.
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Table 47: Chemicals - Bidders Vs Targets
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Table 48: Chemicals- Non Targets Vs Targets
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Table 49: Construction - Bidders Vs Targets
5 4 3 2 1 0 Group
X1 PROF.
X2 PROF.
X3 PROF.
X4 PROF.
X5 EFF.
X6 EFF.
._EFFX7 -	 	
X8 EFF.
X9 EFF.
X10 	 EFF.
X11 	 EFF.
X12 EFF.
X13 LIQ.
X14 LIQ.
X15 LIQ.
X16 LIQ.
X17 LIQ.
X18 LIQ.
X19 LIQ.
X20 LIQ.
X21 LIQ.
X22 LIQ.
X23 LIQ.
X24 LIQ.
X25 LIQ.
X26 LEV
X27 LEV.
X28 LIQ.
X29 LIQ.
X30 LEV
X31 LEV.
X32 LEV.
X33 LEV.
X34 LEV.
X35 LEV.
X36 LEV.
X37 R&D
X38 R&D
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Table 50: Construction - Non-Targets Vs Targets
Group
Xl PROF.
X2 PROF.
X3 PROF.
X4 PROF.
X5 EFF.
X6 EFF.
X7 EFF .
X8 EFF.
X9 EFF.
X10 EFF .
X11 EFF.
X12 EFF.
X13 LIQ.
X14 LIQ.
X15 LIQ.
X16 LIQ.
X17 LIQ.
X18 	 LIQ.
X19
X20
LIQ.
LIQ.
X21 LIQ.
X22 LIQ.
X23 LIQ.
X24 LIQ.
X25
X 
X27
	 LIQ.
LEV.
LEV.
X28 LIQ.
X29 LIQ.
X30 LEV.
X31 LEV.
X32
X33
X34
LEV.
LEV.
LEV.
X35
X36
LEV.
LEV.
X37
i. R&D
X38 R&D
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PROF.
PROF.
	 PROF.
	 PROF.
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EFF .
EFF .
EFF .
EFF .
LIQ .
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LIQ .
LIQ.
	 LIQ.
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LIQ.
	 LIQ .
LIQ .
LIQ .
LIQ .
LIQ.
	 LIQ.
LEV.
LEV.
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LIQ .
LEV.
LEV.
LEV.
LEV.
LEV.
LEV.
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34
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Table 51: Food - Bidders Vs Targets
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Table 52: Food - Non Targets Vs Targets
5 4 3 2 1 0 Group
X1 PROF.
X2
X3
PROF.
PROF.
X4 PROF.
X5 EFF.
X6 EFF.
X7 EFF.
X8 EFF .
X9 EFF.
X10 EFF.
X11 EFF.
X12 EFF.
X13 LIQ.
X14 LIQ.
X15 LIQ.
X16 LIQ.
X17 LIQ.
X18 LIQ.
X19 LIQ.
X20 LIQ.
X21 LIQ.
X22 LIQ.
X23 LIQ.
X24 LIQ.
X25 LIQ.
X26 LEV.
X27 . LEV.
X28 LIQ.
X29 LIQ.
X30 LEV.
X31 LEV.
X32 LEV.
X33 LEV.
X34 . LEV.
1 LEV.X35	 	
X36 LEV.
X37 R&D
X38 R&D
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RIM
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ZEE
5 4 3 2 1 0	 r oup
PROF.
PROF.
PROF.
PROF.
EFF.
EFF .
EFF .
EFF .
EFF .
LIQ.
LIQ.
LIQ.
MOM
14
	 EFF.
	LIQ.
	LEV
LEV.
LEV.
LEV.
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Table 54: Mechanical - Non Targets Vs Targets
Group
PROF.
PROF.
PROF.
PROF.
EFF .
EFF .
EFF .
EFF .
EFF .
EFF .
EFF .
EFF .
LIQ.
LIQ .
LIQ
LIQ
LIQ 
LIQ
LIQ
LIQ
LIQ .
LIQ.
LIQ.
LIQ.
LIQ .
LEV.
LEV.
LIQ.
LIQ
LEV.
LEV
LEV
LEV.
LEV.
LEV.
LEV.
R&D
R&D
3 2 0
X1
X2
X3
X4
X5
X6 
X7
X8 
X9
X10 
X11
X12
X13
X14
X15
X16
X17
X18
X19
X20 
X21
X22
X23
X24
X25
X26
X27
X28 
X29
X30
X31
X32
X33
X34
X35
X36
X37
X38
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Table 55: Electronics - Bidders Vs Targets
5 4 3 2 1 0 Group
X1 PROF.
X2 PROF.
X3
X4
PROF.
PROF.
X5 EFF .
X6
X7
EFF .
EFF .
X8 EFF .
X9 _ EFF .
X10 EFF .
X11 	 EFF .
X12 EFF .
X13 LIQ .
X14 LIQ .
X15 LIQ .
X16 LIQ .
X17 LIQ .
X18 LIQ .
X19	 	 LIQ .
X20 =_ LIQ .
X21 LIQ .
X22 L IQ .
X23 LIQ .
L IQ .
LIQ .
X24
X25
-
-_-_	
L--=	
X26 LEV .
X27 LEV .
X28 	 LIQ .
LIQ .E	X29
X30 LEV .
X31 LEV.
X32 LEV .
X33 LEV.
X34
X35
X36
LEV .
LEV .
LEV.
X37
X38
R&D
R&D
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Table 56: Electronics- Non Targets Vs Targets
5 4 3 2 1 0 Group
X1 PROF.
X2 PROF.
X3 PROF.
X4 PROF.
X5 EFF.
X6 EFF.
X7 EFF.
X8 EFF.
X9 EFF.
X10 EFF.
X11 EFF.
X12 EFF.
X13 LIQ.
X14 LIQ.
X15 LIQ.
X16 LIQ.
X17 LIQ.
X18 LIQ.
X19 LIQ.
X20 LIQ.
X21 LIQ.
X22 LIQ.
X23 LIQ.
X24 LIQ.
X25 LIQ.
X26 LEV.
X27 LEV.
X28 LIQ.
X29 LIQ.
X30 LEV.
X31 LEV.
X32 LEV.
X33 LEV.
X34 LEV.
X35 LEV.
X36 LEV.
X37 R&D
X38 R&D
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TABLE 57: RATIOS USED IN THE STUDY
A = Return on Capital Employed ( PROFITABILITY)
B = Profit to Sales ( PROFITABILITY )
C = Profit to Total Assets ( PROFITABILITY)
D = EBIT to Sales ( PROFITABILITY)
E = Sales to Shareholders' Funds ( EFFICIENCY)
F = Sales to Total Assets ( EFFICIENCY)
G = Annual Sales ( Natural Log of Sales ) ( EFFICIENCY)
H = Sales to Fixed Assets ( EFFICIENCY)
I = Sales to Current Assets ( EFFICIENCY)
J = Annual Equity and Capital Reserves - ( Natural Log of Equity and Capital Reserves )
( EFFICIENCY )
K = Annual amount of Total Assets - ( Natural Log of Total Assets ) ( EFFICIENCY)
L = Average Debtor Collection Period ( EFFICIENCY)
M = Debtors Turnover ( EFFICIENCY)
N = Current Ratio ( Working Capital Ratio ) ( LIQUIDITY )
0 = Acid Test or Liquid Asset or Quick Asset Ratio ( LIQUIDITY )
P = Asset Cover ( LIQUIDITY)
Q = Cash Position No.1 ( LIQUIDITY )
R = Cash Position No.2 ( LIQUIDITY )
S = Cash Position No.3 ( LIQUIDITY )
T = Working Capital to Sales ( LIQUIDITY)
U = Working Capital to Total Assets ( LIQUIDITY)
V = Cash to Total Assets ( LIQUIDITY)
W = Cash to Current Liabilities ( LIQUIDITY)
X = Quick Assets to Total Assets ( LIQUIDITY)
Y = Quick Assets to Sales ( LIQUIDITY)
Z = Long Term Liabilities to Shareholders' Equity ( LEVERAGE)
AA = Total Liabilities to Shareholders' Equity ( LEVERAGE)
AB = Current Assets to Total Assets ( LIQUIDITY)
AC = Current Assets to Sales ( LIQUIDITY)
AD = Preference and Loan Capital to Equity and Reserves ( LEVERAGE)
AE = Loan Capital and Preference Capital to Total Assets ( LEVERAGE)
AF = Interest Paid to Loan Capital ( LEVERAGE)
AG = Total Profit to Interest Paid ( LEVERAGE)
AH = Gearing Ratio ( LEVERAGE )
Al = Debt to Equity Ratio ( LEVERAGE )
AJ = Interest Cover ( LEVERAGE)
AK = Capital Expenditure to Total Assets ( R&D)
AL = Capital Expenditure to Total Sales ( R&D)
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TABLE 58: ECONOMY WIDE SAMPLE - BIDDERS VS TARGETS
TIME PERIOD: 1982-1990
FACTOR	 ANALYSIS
'Variable Communality Factor Eigenvalue Pet of Var Cum Pot
A .90747 * 1 7.06395 18.6 18.6
.94626 * 2 4.74862 12.5 31.1
.95054 * 3 4.41349 11.6 42.7
.95645 * 4 3.31167 8.7 51.4
.78748 * 5 2.98013 7.8 59.3
.92504 * 6 2.15195 5.7 64.9
.98340 * 7 2.12784 5.6 70.5
.69661 * 8 1.74191 4.6 75.1
.71213 * 9 1.43417 3.8 78.9
.97931 * 10 1.16127 3.1 81.9
.99112 * 11 1.05183 2.8 84.7
.79076 * 12 1.01597 2.7 87.4
.79117 *
.91234 *
0
.89656 *
.87942 *
.90541 *
.93121 *
.95875 *
.76431 *
.93886 *
V
.96056 *
.91997 *
.93139 *
.97409 *
.95781 *
AA
.86159 *
AB
.96405 *
AC
.97980 *
AD
.93339 *
AE
.86306 *
AF
.31041 *
AG
.87392 *
AR .60912 *
Al .83165 *
AJ .87445 *
AR .86798 *
AL .88495 *
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FACTOR ANALYSIS
Varimax Rotation 1, Extraction 1, Analysis 1 - Kaiser Normalization.
FACTOR 1	 FACTOR 2	 FACTOR 3	 FACTOR 4
	
FACTOR 5
.92798
.92754 .20560
.92234
V .88768 .38543
.87905 .40877
AB .87430 .31769
X .85383 .33667
.77206 -.22998
AE .75878
.92915
.92562
A .21546 .38659 .75805
.26888 .46273 .74634
.91711
0 .89140
.60070 .74385
.60770
-.52569
.96964
.96512
.96101
.96101
AD
.21358
AA
AC
AG
AJ
AL
AK
-.22494
.22697
-.39781
.21481
.25692
.21457
-.25150
-.19309
.25057
.23322
.22583
-.28670
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FACTOR	 6 FACTOR	 7 FACTOR	 8 FACTOR	 9 FACTOR 10
AB .24054
X .21913
.38968
AE -.44302
A
.29215
.24598
0
.21126
.54647
.51912
-.23886
AD .95272
.94669
.94669
.86746
AA .60741 .62803
.61141 .44746
.25259 .47342 .42096
.87936
-.79570
.94870
AC	 .94817
AG	 .88837
AJ	 .86998
AL
AK
AT	 -.22909
AR	 .36743	 .36440
APPENDIX VI
FACTOR 11	 FACTOR 12
-.22155
AL	 .87386
AK	 .86264
AT	 -.36412
AT	 . 89734
AR	 .49836
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I TABLE 59: ECONOMY WIDE SAMPLE - NON TARGETS VS TARGETS 
TIME PERIOD; 1982-1990
FACTOR ANALYSIS
'Variable Communality Factor Eigenvalue Pat of Var Cum Pot
A .89756 * 1 7.36916 19.4 19.4
.86783 * 2 4.41446 11.6 31.0
.93387 * 3 4.31330 11.4 42.4
.89047 * 4 3.03195 8.0 50.3
.88391 * 5 2.74842 7.2 57.6
.85244 * 6 2.28189 6.0 63.6
.98322 * 7 1.89347 5.0 68.6
.70240 * 8 1.86318 4.9 73.5
.80669 * 9 1.72674 4.5 78.0
.97419 * 10 1.36470 3.6 81.6
.99119 * 11 1.13594 3.0 84.6
.81637 * 12 1.01060 2.7 87.2
.80201 *
.90568 *
0 .85060 *
•95753 *
.77662 *
.91273 *
.91427 *
.92745 *
.91043 *
V .95440 *
.90702 *
.91088 *
.86403 *
.71282 *
AA .77913 *
AB .95344 *
AC .88452 *
AD .77054 *
AE .85890 *
AF .94282 *
AG .68758 *
AK .88084 *
Al .82389 *
AJ .74329 *
AK .95865 *
AL .96359 *
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FACTOR 1 FACTOR 2	 FACTOR 3 FACTOR 4	 FACTOR 5
APPENDIX VI
FACTOR ANALYSIS
Varimax Rotation 1, Extraction 1, Analysis 1 - Kaiser Normalization.
.86563 .16819 -.15029 .20856
A .85365 .19713 .29488
.85027 .17536 .20766
.83267 .21555 .36441
AJ .70641 .37195 -.25760
AG .67570 .32012 -.27549
AG .67570 .32012 -.27549
W .16093 .91312 .19337
R .20104 .90989 .17331
V .14313 .89143 .36558
S .16891 .85808 .37979
4 .15008 .83405 .14615
AB .90736 .17401
X .16241 .90089
AE .17596 .64412
.55222 -.39595
.90726 .16325
0 .14241 .85009 .23851
.69775 .62162
.63008 .63304 .16017
.17890 .90277
AC .21690 .90168
.15463
-.13967 -.21093
.16093
AA -.25368
.23981
-.24886 -.51494
AL -.13983
-.14875
AR -.20530
Al
-.16835
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FACTOR	 6 FACTOR	 7 FACTOR	 8 FACTOR	 9 FACTOR 10
AB .21023 -.14029
X .17200
AE -.37013 .46344
.47994 .35819
.98275
.96826
.94884 -.16944
.81600 .16157 .31552
.76673 .19078
AA .71900 -.16556 .37315
.88039
-.18964 -.84428
.30229 .59838
AD .85786
.14206 .81011
AL .95718
AK .95552
AT
.17183 -.20819
Al .42080 .37830
FACTOR 11 FACTOR 12
-.14311
-.16249 -.14770
-.16560
AT .96146
.91458
AH .90181
Al .67038
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TABLE 60: CHEMICAL INDUSTRY - BIDDERS VS TARGETS
TIME PERIOD: 1982-1990
FACTOR ANALYSIS
'Variable Communality Factor Eigenvalue Pat of Var Cum Par
A .91291 * 1 13.17693 34.7 34.7
.95582 * 2 7.23008 19.0 53.7
.97068 * 3 4.68032 12.3 66.0
.90705 * 4 4.20917 11.1 77.1
.93936 * 5 2.56781 6.8 83.9
.99173 * 6 1.85575 4.9 88.7
.96865 * 7 1.21534 3.2 91.9
.83115 * 8 1.01692 2.7 94.6
.93479 *
.97482 *
.97487 *
.86875 *
.87267 *
.94976 *
0 .96248 *
.94945 *
.97151 *
.95709 *
.99288 *
.97523 *
.99168 *
V .99183 *
.96992 *
.99173 *
.90036 *
.91829 *
AA .94728 *
AB .99673 *
AC .95755 *
AD .95565 *
AE .98157 *
AF .75189 *
AG .94912 *
AH .92589 *
Al .98372 *
AJ .95334 *
AK .96108 *
AL .96303 *
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AC
.47848
-.87011
.84930
-.80589
-.77137
.75795
-.73288
.66418
-.44710
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FACTOR ANALYSIS
Varimax Rotation 1, Extraction 1, Analysis 1 - KaiDer Normalization.
FACTOR 1
	 FACTOR 2	 FACTOR 3	 FACTOR 4	 FACTOR 5
X
AB
AE
V
A
AK
.98914
.98751
.97237
.94471
.92505
.87523
.86508
.83807
.78902
.68152
-.64474
.46859
.48730
.93893
.89697
.88669
.68176
.66288
-.49773
.97564
.96768
.96690
.65907
0
AD
Al
AR
AJ
AG
AF
AA
AL .47274
.50035
.92753
.86290
.83898
-.47203
-.50136
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FACTOR 6	 FACTOR 7	 FACTOR 8
AK
AD
Al
AR
AJ
AO
AF
AA
AL
.52086
.93327
.83325
.82967
.50470
.54241
.51355
.67696
.64555
-.56242
-.53654
.62032
.73271
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TABLE 61: CHEMICAL INDUSTRY - NON TARGETS VS TARGETS
TIME PERIOD: 1982-1990
FACTOR	 ANALYSIS
'Variable Communality Factor Eigenvalue Pet of Var Cam Pot
A .92010 * 1 10.22306 26.9 26.9
.93764 * 2 6.59836 17.4 44.3
.95307 * 3 4.28279 11.3 55.5
.91563 * 4 3.84273 10.1 65.6
.91788 * 5 3.45765 9.1 74.7
.98627 * 6 2.77851 7.3 82.1
.96053 * 7 1.71215 4.5 86.6
.58266 * 1.45493 3.8 90.4
.90398 *
.95952 *
.96621 *
.86219 *
.81927 *
.93686 *
.90895 *
.89130 *
.96765 *
.95399 *
.98951 *
.95690 *
.96427 *
V .98720 *
.92974 *
.98135 *
.88544 *
.94766 *
AA .96690 *
AB .98753 *
AC .93740 *
AD .70825 •
AE .95723 *
AT .81546 *
AG .92214 *
AB .66990 *
Al .94702 *
AJ .83820 *
AK .78094 *
AL .83345 *
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-.85436
.81124
.78235
-.67715
.56036
-.39683
.63188
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FACTOR ANALYSIS
Varimax Rotation 1, Extraction 1, Analysis 1 - Kaiser Normalization.
FACTOR 1	 FACTOR 2	 FACTOR 3	 FACTOR 4	 FACTOR 5
X
AB
V
AE
A
Al
AA
AD
AK
0
AL
.98956
.98897
.95152
.91128
.90853
.88409
.87783
.71133
.63530
.95436
.94603
.93693
.92285
.68870
.58672
.92190
.88549
.88423
.64052
.39558
.39868
.91372
.88369
.85949
.55012
-.59261
.51207
.62916
.42256
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FACTOR 7	 FACTOR 8FACTOR 6
APPENDIX VI
AE .38704
C .52972
A .56831
AD .42214
AL .50130
L
I
M
AC
Er -.38391
AG .92216
AJ .81501
D .73485
B .64619
K .96383
G .95031
J .93462
P -.85879
AF -.71122
AK .47163
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TABLE 62: CONSTRUCTION INDUSTRY - BIDDERS VS TARGETS
TIME PERIOD: 1982-1990
FACTOR	 ANALYSIS
!Variable Communality Factor Eigenvalue Pet of Var Cum Pet
A .89766 * 1 9.73364 25.6 25.6
.94261 * 2 6.68083 17.6 43.2
.87773 * 3 5.96936 15.7 58.9
.93308 * 4 3.54078 9.3 68.2
.95700 * 5 2.80352 7.4 75.6
.92662 * 6 2.31256 6.1 81.7
0 .99007 * 7 2.05804 5.4 87.1
.81805 * 1.11942 2.9 90.0
.88346 *
.98377 *
.98715 *
.70225 *
.57425 *
.90647 *
.91844 *
.95960 *
.98074 *
.94358 *
.98116 *
.96826 *
.95649 *
V .98552 *
.97896 *
X .94740 *
.91704 *
.93829 *
AA .96525 *
AB .96371 *
AC .93656 *
AD .92556 *
AE .93931 *
AP .76846 *
AG .76438 *
AH .64003 *
Al .95408 *
AJ .80118 *
AK .79450 *
AL .90948 *
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FACTOR ANALYSIS
Varimax Rotation 1, Extraction 1, Analysis 1 - Kaiser Normalization.
0
X
AB
AC
Al
AA
AE
.89694
.89369
.87122
.82081
.78980
.78559
.77389
.77253
-.68869
-.39648
.46534
.39040
.93663
.92774
.91382
-.90840
.76467
.56437 .55777
-.41431
-.42979
.55931
.46278
.97290
.96436
.96379
.96282
.92799
A
AJ
AG
AL
.42122
.38874
.82975
.81396
-.63267
.60885
.56953
.54405
.47743
.43730
.46564
.86919
.85979
.70944
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FACTOR 6 FACTOR 7	 FACTOR 8
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.95117
.94788
.94199
AD .91856
.91740
AR .64382
AK -.79657
AT -.36782 .68552
AL -.65059
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I TABLE 63: CONSTRUCTION INDUSTRY - NON TARGETS VS TARGETS I
TIME PERIOD: 1982-1990
FACTOR	 ANALYSIS
!Variable Communality Factor Eigenvalue Pet of Var Cam Pot
A .92755 * 1 9.16205 24.1 24.1
.93532 * 2 6.68711 17.6 41.7
.91130 * 3 5.61153 14.8 56.5
.93535 * 4 3.26548 8.6 65.1
.92162 * 5 3.09096 8.1 73.2
.95371 * 6 2.31263 6.1 79.3
.96886 * 7 2.06370 5.4 84.7
.76886 * 8 1.38389 3.6 88.4
.93099 * 9 1.08028 2.8 91.2
.98181 *
.97080 *
.87770 *
.85821 *
.93917 *
.95180 *
.97509 *
.96891 *
.90765 *
.97988 *
.97030 *
.98023 *
.98270 *
.94930 *
X .95968 *
.94553 *
.98133 *
AA .89727 *
AB .96162 *
AC .96738 *
AD .98001 *
AE .95312 *
AP .52400 *
AG .74776 *
AR .74693 *
Al .95053 *
AJ .83530 *
AK .76386 *
AL .89618 *
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PC	 ANALYSIS
Varimax Rotation 1, Extraction 1, Analysis 1 - Kaiser Normalization.
0
AC
.85145
.79686
.78096
.76029
-.38520
-.37633
-.34007
-.30983
.74120 .37256 -.37640
.72290 -.31205
-.70630 .39493 .36029
.69873 .46567
AA -.67678 .33754
AE .66479 -.42787
-.65745 .31091 .46929 .39318
.65125 .46928
-.63717 .47827 .38168
-.62903 -.55833 -.32294
.61188 .38721
.55792 .42246 .52607
V .81929
-.34857 .80376
.75666
.73091 .31200
.70339
-.37448 -.34945
.67272 -.60396
AB .66867 -.60884
.34582 .45612 .44724
.31932 .68186 .37655 -.31903
AD .31812 .67734 .37938 -.32876
.59938 -.36357 .31648
A .49048 .42148 .51485
.40435 -.58372 .41805
AJ .33064 .45654 .32948
L -.36307 -.68067
G .31284 .33741 -.41951 .50640
Al .40077 .45969 -.33586
AL -.41033 .40556
AT
AH -.37373 -.31224
AK -.41258 .34652
AG .35289 .37730
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FACTOR	 6 FACTOR	 7 FACTOR	 8 FACTOR
AA .31424
AE .33133 -.32793
-.40353
.37007
.38385
X
AB
.44613
-.38450
AD -.38363
-.37785 -.35606
A .33831
-.35882 -.32855
AJ .33158 .40978
.36846
-.36536 -.39069
Al -.52746
AL .42580 -.33072
AT -.38684
AE .64318
AK .43420 -.44030
AG .52229
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TABLE 64: FOOD INDUSTRY- BIDDERS VS TARGETS
TIME PERIOD: 1982-1990
FACTOR	 ANALYSIS
'Variable Communality Factor Eigenvalue Pot of Var Cum Pet
A .92014 * 1 8.74730 23.0 23.0
.83958 * 2 5.78343 15.2 38.2
.90571 * 3 5.19095 13.7 51.9
.86239 * 4 4.49462 11.8 63.7
.94558 * 5 3.44745 9.1 72.8
.96126 * 6 2.20876 5.8 78.6
.94956 * 7 1.97214 5.2 83.8
.82584 * 8 1.51707 4.0 87.8
.90737 * 9 1.34621 3.5 91.3
.95448 *
.96641 *
.84872 *
.76024 *
.96826 *
0 .92538 *
.89074 *
.96601 *
.96529 *
.97630 *
.95466 *
.97788 *
V .97593 *
.98039 *
.95129 *
.97464 *
.84567 *
AA .93274 *
AB .97605 *
AC .98086 *
AD .84427 *
AE .93023 *
AF .83000 *
AG .77864 *
AR .95706 *
Al .94977 *
AJ .77639 *
AK .87362 *
AL .87859 *
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FACTOR ANALYSIS
Varimax Rotation 1, Extraction 1, Analysis 1 - Kaiser Normalization.
FACTOR 1	 FACTOR 2	 FACTOR 3	 FACTOR 4
	
FACTOR 5
AE
AA
AF
AD
V
.91059
-.89447
.88626
.87388
.77501
.74067
.62098
.56209
.54900
.98218
.97449
.96675
.94663
.93944
.54354
.54181
-.40459
.97158
.96930
0 .95080
X .49380 .80795
AB .51743 .79920
A
AG
AJ
AK
AL
AB
-.49209
-.50654
-.50654
-.39844
.60305
.94469
.93211
.92994
.53276
.89386
.87616
.68649
.67720
.62776
.56902
.56902
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1 1
FACTOR	 6 FACTOR	 7 FACTOR	 8 FACTOR	 9
F .56815
AG .37657
I .87380
L -.85449
M .85051
Y .97363
AC .96991
T .77122
AR .86937
AL .83642
Al .94453
AR .68476
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TABLE 65: FOOD INDUSTRY NON TARGETS VS TARGETS
TIME PERIOD: 1982-1990
- FACTOR	 ANALYSIS
'Variable Communality Factor Eigenvalue Pet of Var Cam Pot
A .88699 * 1 9.78044 25.7 25.7
.88728 * 2 5.89161 15.5 41.2
.86988 * 3 5.03802 13.3 54.5
.88547 * 4 3.60073 9.5 64.0
.92426 * 5 3.09533 8.1 72.1
.91698 * 6 2.42200 6.4 78.5
.98583 * 7 1.95395 5.1 83.6
.91336 * 8 1.54904 4.1 87.7
.88688 * 9 1.12217 3.0 90.7
.96852 *
.97955 *
.85196 *
.80904 *
.93940 *
0 .90045 *
.92042 *
.65778 *
.94967 *
.95657 *
.97286 *
.93748 *
V .96287 *
.97751 *
X .92970 *
.97459 *
.86457 *
AA .94904 *
AB .96960 *
AC .98357 *
AD .82852 *
AE .90750 *
AF .92642 *
AG .73496 *
AR .86816 *
Al .93340 *
AJ .81240 *
AK .91601 *
AL .91383 *
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FACTOR ANALYSIS
Varimax Rotation 1, Extraction 1, Analysis 1 - Kaiser Normalization.
AT .94769
AA .91691
Al .91572
.76921 .41924
.76095 .42861
.90056
A .89528
AJ .76395
A0 .75162
.74982 -.43835
.74449 -.44188
V .95544
.95306
.95263
.94021
.68311
AR
AB
X
AE
tr
0
AD
.49810
-.60250
.46484
.46484
.33179
-.44718
-.43704
-.38005
.34110
.79212
.78061
.75977
.72615
-.68845
.61247
.61247
.50427
.52459
.91717
.90421
.90244
.53857
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1
FACTOR	 6 FACTOR	 7 FACTOR	 8 FACTOR	 9
F .46604
a .97024
K .96490
J .93424
L -.85933
H .80567
1 .74031
Y .97812
AC .97807
T .76228
AL .93730
AK .92802
AD .46828 .57217
Z .50172 .54480
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TABLE 66: MECHANICAL INDUSTRY BIDDERS VS TARGETS
TIME PERIOD: 1982-1990
FACTOR	 ANALYSIS
'Variable Communality Factor Eigenvalue Pat of Var Cum Pot
A .87580 * 1 10.20338 26.9 26.9
.93720 * 2 6.37496 16.8 43.6
.93941 * 3 6.13743 16.2 59.8
.86881 * 4 3.50599 9.2 69.0
.97745 * 5 2.83648 7.5 76.5
.90735 * 6 2.34460 6.2 82.6
.94020 * 7 1.63235 4.3 86.9
.72358 * 8 1.23468 3.2 90.2
.86736 *
.90971 *
.92663 *
.86188 *
.85936 *
.93138 *
.89645 *
.94433 *
.97349 *
.99037 *
.97280 *
.67208 *
.90875 *
V .96515 *
.95255 *
X .91730 *
.91898 *
.97562 *
AA .98584 *
AB .86562 *
AC .91044 *
AD .97632 *
AE .95448 *
AF .71558 *
AG .78265 *
AH .88049 *
Al .98299 *
AJ .84995 *
AK .79313 *
AL .95843 *
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FACTOR ANALYSIS
Varimax Rotation 1, Extraction 1, Analysis 1 - Raiser Normalization.
AC
X
0
AB
.92334
-.90073
.87080
.85748
.81052
.78467
.61150
-.41106
.96436
.95557
.95273
.92725
.91993
.91993
A
AJ
AG
AF
AD
AH
Al
AA
AE
.52356
.89217
.85630
.85354
.82619
.80895
.78274
-.60998
.95485
.94434
.78874
.74740
.73508
.56034
.42756
.41230
.52836
.53716
-.88894
.84823
-.71396
.56249
-.44936
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FACTOR 6	 FACTOR 7	 FACTOR 8
.51245
.43383
-.44744
AB
AL
AK
.79518
-.79338
.64387
.54981
.90598
.86121
.83077
.58066
-.93689
-.83562
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TABLE 67: MECHANICAL INDUSTRY - NON TARGETS VS TARGETS
TIME PERIOD: 1982-1990
FACTOR	 ANALYSIS
'Variable Communality Factor Eigenvalue Pot of Var Cum Pet
A .90708	 * 1 8.42743 22.2 22.2
.94378	 * 2 6.13619 16.1 38.3
.97770	 * 3 4.92587 13.0 51.3
.93352	 * 4 4.06642 10.7 62.0
.93675	 * 5 3.24290 8.5 70.5
.96878	 * 6 2.75500 7.3 77.8
.94859	 * 7 2.08214 5.5 83.3
.78279	 * 8 1.68535 4.4 87.7
.91212	 * 9 1.24161 3.3 91.0
.90181	 *
.94424	 *
.90534	 *
%95594	 *
.95022	 *
0 .83802	 *
.96345	 *
.95351	 *
.92635	 *
.75231	 *
.93586	 *
tJ .96966	 *
V .96319	 *
.91060	 *
.87754	 *
.88706	 *
.84396	 *
AA .94762	 *
AB .90132	 *
AC .91487	 *
AD .94149	 *
AE .89488	 *
AF .96256	 *
AG .86191
	 *
AR .88648
	 *
AI .87307	 *
AJ .85280	 *
AK .88467	 *
AL .85109	 *
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FACTOR ANALYSIS
Varimax Rotation 1, Extraction 1, Analysis 1 - Raiser Normalization.
FACTOR 1	 FACTOR 2	 FACTOR 3	 FACTOR 4	 FACTOR 5
A
AG
AJ
AR
AC
I.
V
.94961
.92779
.91910
.86801
.75570
.70520
-.59472
-.87560
.87364
.86784
-.83575
.71044
-.67184
.38076
.92750
.92239
.91702
.88745
.74582
.44096
0
AS
AB
AL
AK
Al -.51937
-.39225
.39299
.40189
.96024
.83480
.83103
.77798
.71039
-.37078
.84314
.82129
-.68127
.66153
-.52358
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1 1FACTOR	 6 FACTOR	 7 FACTOR	 8 FACTOR	 9
AR .50639
M .52746
L -.50200
AK .38174
K .91616
G .91245
J .89555
Al .54545
AA -.92436
AD -.85210
E -.78960
AF -.94596
P -.92328
z .65960
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TABLE 68: ELECTRONICS INDUSTRY - BIDDERS VS TARGETS
TIME PERIOD: 1982-1990
FACTOR	 ANALYSIS
'Variable Communality Factor Eigenvalue Pot of Var Cum Pet
A .84389 * 1 8.47321 22.3 22.3
.92373 * 2 5.71406 15.0 37.3
.95369 * 3 4.92574 13.0 50.3
.89392 * 4 3.68927 9.7 60.0
.74228 * 5 3.07856 8.1 68.1
.87458 * 6 2.43821 6.4 74.5
G .96153 * 7 2.16206 5.7 80.2
.76567 * 8 1.85740 4.9 85.1
.63735 * 9 1.11534 2.9 88.0
.97228 *
.96921 *
.80756 *
.56208 *
.89651 *
0 .89595 *
.92094 *
.87172 *
.94171 *
•94974 *
.97011 *
.92238
V .96129 *
.90239 *
X .83660 *
.85947 *
.95321 *
AA .81433 *
AB .93293 *
AC .85610 *
AD .96634 *
AE .96397 *
AF .68606 *
AG .91181 *
AK .94723 *
AI .79198 *
AJ .94316 *
AK .91045 *
AL .93967 *
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.72507
.71357 .59968
AR -.71144 .54504
0 .70495 .54753
.69509 .56175
AE .66669
-.46840
.62357
AT -.61319
.60154 .49185
.59151 .50373
.58792 -.47263 .45110
A .58158
AC .57435 .50922
-.57289 .48745
.49415 .67780
.46689 -.62324
AB .61757 .46745
.50667 -.61373
X .61351
.59826
.53005
AA .67378
V .51734 .60147
S .50575 .56763
Al .56012
AL -.52379
Z .47376
AD .47116
-.45771
-.45568
-.45303
	
.43714
	 .46223
	
.43415
	 .46520
.68763
-.66242
	
.64216
	 -.45525
	
.61415
	 -.47784
.57427
.48958	 .62848
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PC	 ANALYSIS
Varimax Rotation 1, Extraction 1, Analysis 1 - Kaiser Normalization.
FACTOR 1	 FACTOR 2	 FACTOR 3	 FACTOR 4
	 FACTOR 5
AK
-.46139
AJ	 .44638
AG	 .46349
1APPENDIX VI
FACTOR	 6 FACTOR	 7 FACTOR	 8 FACTOR	 9
4 -.41827
AB .45495
X .44944
E
H .50938
AL .42750 .46387
Z -.42808
AK .70829
I -.47150
AJ .59569
AG .59166
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TABLE 69: ELECTRONICS INDUSTRY - NON TARGETS VS TARGETS
TIME PERIOD: 1982-1990
FACTOR	 ANALYSIS
'Variable Communality Factor Eigenvalue Pot of Var Cum Pct
A .81008 * 1 9.31223 24.5 24.5
.95249 * 2 6.70884 17.7 42.2
.92511 * 3 4.33195 11.4 53.6
.95354 * 4 3.37291 8.9 62.4
.75873 * 5 2.81173 7.4 69.8
.91025 * 6 2.40212 6.3 76.2
.96226 * 7 2.07676 5.5 81.6
F .74581 * 8 1.65996 4.4 86.0
.84155 * 9 1.28465 3.4 89.4
.97190 *
.97099 *
.79448 *
.81295 *
.91572 *
0 .85318 *
.93908 *
.89627 *
.94020 *
.95800 *
.97072 *
.95052 *
.95055 *
.91150 *
.86208 *
.88820 *
.96469 *
AA .83930 *
AB .91838 *
AC .88270 *
AD .98145 *
AE .97321 *
AF .68220 *
AG .87694 *
AH .95279 *
Al .81045 *
AJ .91788 *
AR .87070 *
AL .84427 *
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FACTOR ANALYSIS
Varimax Rotation 1, Extraction 1, Analysis 1 - Kaiser Normalization.
FACTOR 1	 FACTOR 2	 FACTOR 3	 FACTOR 4	 FACTOR 5
AE
AH
0
AF
.91891
-.90347
-.89988
.78516
.74246
.70722
-.62711
-.61230
-.50623
.44869
.51122
V
A
AC
.56254
.95536
.94644
.93240
.74230
.73742
.66517
.62566
.51636
.52437
.79537
.77445
-.74357
-.73859
.70446
-.68030
.42660
.54495
-.42209
.88174
.87139
.76175
.94559
.94103
.89286
.89286
AA	 -.55513
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FACTOR
	 6 FACTOR	 7 FACTOR	 8 FACTOR	 9
AD .98209
.96829
Al .76013
AA .62230
AJ .92356
AG .86929
AK
-.79449
AL -.73089
X .85531
AB .46508 .75365
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